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THE EFFECT OF MARITIME COMMAND ON LAND CAMPAIGNS SINCE WATERLOO

THE EFFECT OF MARITIME COMMAND ON LAND CAMPAIGNS SINCE WATERLOO

BY

MAJOR CHARLES EDWARD CALLWELL, R.A.

AUTHOR OF 'SMALL WARS: THEIR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE,' ETC.

WITH MAPS AND PLANS

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THE EFFECT OF MARITIME COMMAND ON LAND CAMPAIGNS SINCE WATERLOO.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

The growth of national interest in naval questions of recent years.

THE present generation has witnessed no more remarkable change in the drift of British public opinion than the recent transformation of popular indifference as regards questions of imperial defence into a keen and intelligent interest in all things appertaining to the security of the realm. A quarter of a century ago the potentialities and the efficiency of the naval and military forces of the Crown attracted no general attention. The warnings of experts were looked upon as idle tales. The nation, justly proud of its traditions, held itself to be invincible. The altered con-

ditions created by the introduction of universal service abroad were not appreciated. The comparative impotence of the United Kingdom as a European military Power, apart from special conditions created by maritime command, was not recognised. And worst of all, the rulers and the people rested content with a navy palpably unequal to the certain fulfilment of its vast and ever-growing responsibilities in every quarter of the globe.

But happily there has come an awakening in very recent years. The Anglo-Saxon race, with all its self-sufficiency, is shrewd. Men of prominence have spoken with no uncertainty of sound, and their words have found an echo in all quarters of a land the wealth and prosperity of which are wholly dependent upon national security. The people have become convinced that the safety of a great empire must rest on sounder foundations than reputation won in an era which has passed away, or than records of naval and military triumphs gained under circumstances which have disappeared. And so to-day the fighting forces of the United Kingdom and its dependencies are not wholly inadequate to perform their allotted task. The British fleet is on a footing with which the country can be fairly satisfied. The close relations which must exist between our navy and our army are beginning to attract an attention more commensurate with their importance. The theory

is gaining ground that maritime command is the paramount condition upon which the employment of the land forces in time of war depends. And the great strategical principle that in virtue of supremacy upon the ocean bodies of troops, insignificant as compared with the legions which Continental Powers can put into the field, may sometimes decide tremendous issues, is becoming a basis of our national policy.

Literature with regard to the influence of sea-power.

Literature on the subject of the influence of sea-power is a plant of modern growth. Nor has the British empire taken the foremost place in creating it. Popular histories of England ignore the great truth that its prosperity and might have been built up on the ocean. We owe incomparably the finest works upon the subject to the pen of a writer whom we will not call foreign, but whom we cannot claim as a compatriot. Captain Mahan's luminous volumes treat of the subject from the broadest and most comprehensive point of view. They deal with the effects of naval force upon the destinies of the human race. They are not mere treatises on the art of war; their scope is far wider, and is adapted for the edification of the citizen as well as of the sailor or the soldier. They stop short, however, at the downfall of Napoleon, which closed the epoch of maritime war upon its grandest scale. Since that momentous episode fleets have not played a very conspicuous part in shaping events.

There has been no recurrence of those memorable years when, under Chatham, British commerce was "united with and made to flourish by war." No incident has occurred analogous to the shattering of French hopes of creating a great empire in the Levant in the Bay of Aboukir. There have been no sea-fights to rank with Lepanto and Trafalgar. Maritime strength has not in appearance governed the course of contemporary history since Waterloo to the same extent as prior to the decline of Buonaparte. But a study of the campaigns since the Great War demonstrates that naval command exerts a very remarkable influence over land operations under certain given conditions. And it is the purpose of this volume to trace through the military annals of the past eighty years how, sometimes indirectly, at other times in decisive obvious fashion, dominion on the waters has affected conflicts between the armies which the enmity of nations has brought into antagonism.

Maritime command from the military point of view.

From the point of view of a military commander it is seldom the case that in war one party to a struggle enjoys absolute dominion on the seas. The relative superiority of the naval forces of one side will often be so great as to forbid comparison. But unless the dominant fleet be also ubiquitous, unless it can establish a blockade of the hostile coasts so close that the enemy cannot move even

the smallest detachments from place to place on board ship, absolute maritime command does not exist. In a naval sense maritime command may be undisputed. The adversary may possess no ships of war, or they may have been destroyed, or they may not dare to put to sea, but the circumstances of the case may nevertheless admit of the enemy embarking and disembarking military forces, and of thus influencing the course of the land campaign. Sea-power affects terrestrial operations as a general rule only in so far as it governs or renders practicable the transport of troops, of warlike stores, or of sustenance for armies across the ocean. The expression "maritime command" in subsequent pages must therefore in most cases only be understood as relating to military movements by water, and not to questions of security of commerce or of the impotence of the hostile fleets upon their proper element.

Naval strategy is a complex subject, and forms a special branch of the art of war. It is not proposed in this volume to touch upon its manifold problems except when unavoidable. The effect of naval supremacy upon the prosecution of campaigns on land can be appreciated without acquaintance with the intricate ramifications into which the theory of naval warfare extends. The theme can be elaborated without constant reference to the principles which govern the manœuv-

ring of fleets when actually in collision, or when by their attitude in the theatre of war they dominate the maritime campaign. It will be found that there is a distinct connection between the fighting capacity of military forces in territories adjacent to the sea and the relative naval strength of the belligerents. The whole question is, moreover, governed by certain fundamental laws of strategy which are very simple in themselves. And the subject is one which merits the attention of all soldiers, and especially of those of the world-wide British empire.

Its remarkable illustration in the Peninsular War.

The history of war treats of no conflict which better exhibits the relations between sea-power and successful military operations on shore than the prolonged struggle of Great Britain, aided by Portugal and Spain, against the giant forces of Napoleon south of the Pyrenees. It is strange how little interest the annals of the stirring contest excite to-day. Napier is regarded as out of date in the British army. His fascinating volumes are not studied in the hope of gleaning from their pages lessons on the military art. They are read as a tribute to their literary merit, to their purity of style and force of description, to their vivid picturing of episodes which famous regiments cherish as traditions. And yet strategical principles are taught by them which are as fresh and opportune at the present time as they were in the pre-

Crimean days, when every officer versed in his profession was familiar with the incidents in the Peninsula—principles more applicable to the conditions of the British empire than any which can be deduced from Königgrätz or Gravelotte. For the operations in Spain and Portugal hinged upon sea-power. The grip which the British army maintained upon the theatre of war during the constant vicissitudes of years of checkered conflict, and the final triumph of the Allies over the opposing hosts, were the direct outcome of the naval supremacy which Nelson had by hard fighting won for England. The reconquest of the Peninsula was effected through the instrumentality of an all-powerful fleet. But for maritime command the campaign could not have been initiated, nor maintained, nor brought to its successful issue.

The fighting strength of Napoleon was infinitely greater on land than that of the United Kingdom. Although Spain and Portugal absorbed merely a fraction of the legions of the conqueror, the armies of Sir John Moore and of Wellington were numerically far inferior to the hosts which poured over the Pyrenees from France. The ultimate victory of the Allies was no doubt due in part to British pluck, to able handling, and to the indirect but powerful support of the guerillas. But maritime command was its real cause. For British troops bore the brunt of the fighting, and these existed

only in virtue of sea-power. The sea afforded them a refuge and asylum when in peril. Across the sea they drew the reinforcements which filled the gaps in their ranks arising from battle and from sickness. They manœuvred with a confidence and vitality which no other conditions could have justified. They stuck to their design of driving the French out of the Peninsula with a tenacity rarely equalled in the history of war. They formed a canker in the mighty empire built up by the genius and ambition of Napoleon, which ate into its very heart. And the resources of the greatest military despotism of modern times were powerless to check this, or even to arrest its course.

Liberty of action which a military commander often derives from maritime supremacy. Sir J. Moore's campaign.

The independence which maritime command assures to an army operating in a theatre of war with an extensive coast-line is admirably shown by Sir John Moore's memorable operations in 1808. The British force amounted only to a few thousand men. The greater part of it started from Lisbon, a portion from farther north. It moved boldly on Salamanca and the upper Douro. Suddenly the French in overpowering strength swooped down upon it from Madrid. The direction of the foe's advance forbade retreat towards the lower Tagus. The only lines of possible escape led northwards and north-westwards. The story of the famous march through the Galician Highlands in the depth of winter to

Corunna will be remembered for all time. The dogged resolution of the soldiery, the desperate fight on the hills overlooking the harbour where the transports had just tardily arrived, and the fall of the gallant chief in the very hour of his triumph, belong to the romance of war. But taking the campaign as a whole, its most remarkable feature is the British general's confidence that if overmatched he would find salvation at some point on the coast other than his base, and the complete justification of that confidence by what actually occurred.

Second Punic War.

This liberty of action conferred on a military commander by sea-power is not a modern innovation of war. Examples of its working can be found in almost every age. It involves a strategical principle almost as old as history itself. The Second Punic War—that singular conflict in which naval force on both sides exerted so great an influence upon the operations of the contending armies—illustrates it strikingly. When Hannibal, on his way towards the Alps from Spain, reached the Rhone, it happened that the first Scipio was sailing westwards from Italy with a powerful armament destined to challenge the authority of Carthage south of the Ebro. One of the Roman vessels touched at some point on the coast of Gaul, and received information that the enemy in great force was marching for the Po. Scipio landed a force

and tried to bring the foe to action, but he failed in the attempt. He thereupon re-embarked the whole of his troops, and, heading his flotilla eastwards, sailed with all speed for Tuscany, and marched over the Apennines to meet the Carthaginians. The armies came in collision on the Ticino, and Hannibal was victorious. Meanwhile the Roman chief Sempronius had been mustering a great armada for an attack upon the African coasts. He was operating in Sicily when news came that a mighty hostile host had passed the Alps and was overrunning the northern plains. Sempronius acted with the utmost promptitude. He sailed northwards, landed his army, and marched to join Scipio beyond the Apennines. He arrived too late to participate in the fight on the Ticino, but the combined Roman armies offered battle again upon the Trebbia. They were defeated. Their tactical failure does not, however, weaken the strategical lesson which their success in meeting Hannibal before he had conquered more than a fraction of the basin of the Po teaches us as to the value of sea-power. The Carthaginian navy was not at this time making its presence felt in Italian waters, so that Rome enjoyed maritime command over her own and neighbouring shores.

Strategical significance of

Torres Vedras is a name at once any reference to the Peninsu

INTRODUCTION

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prepared redoubts, became a veritable fortress. But strategically the position was even more advantageous. The noble harbour of Lisbon afforded facilities almost unrivalled as a military base. Fleets of battleships and transports could ride secure in all weathers in the wide estuary of the Tagus. The city itself, for centuries an emporium of maritime commerce, was rich in many requirements of an army in the field. Supplies caused the British chief no anxiety. His troops could rest in comparative ease and comfort after the fatigues and trials of a many months' campaign. Not so the enemy. Massena's troops were planted down in a hostile land. The tracts which they occupied were not at any time a land of plenty; now, after they had been deliberately devastated by Wellington in his retreat, they were little better than a wilderness. Operating in such a theatre of war is always inconvenient. But the French line of communications from the Pyrenees to Santarem was so extensive, it traversed a country so full of natural difficulties, and it was so exposed to the predatory attacks of the Spanish partisan bands, that it was essential to the plans of the Marshal that the triumph which he confidently anticipated should be promptly gained. Suddenly he found himself in front of what was to all intents and purposes a maritime fortress. The lines were

too formidable to be attacked by storm. Siege operations were out of the question. Even had Soult loyally co-operated with his rival, the Allies were safe from both of them, and could bide their time, certain that the strategical conditions must eventually compel Napoleon's legions to fall back.

Torres Vedras assured to Wellington a firm footing in the Peninsula. The French force melted away from disease and hardship; the army based on the sea lived in luxury. The conditions were no doubt somewhat abnormal. A nation supreme at sea which despatches its troops across the ocean to fight in a foreign land will not always find a base so favourable as Lisbon for their operations. The Peninsula was not hostile soil; it was a theatre of war peopled by supporters, but in occupation of the foe. Still the records of the campaign as a whole, and especially the story of Torres Vedras, bear cogent testimony to the strange security which an army enjoys when disembarked in an enemy's country so long as its maritime communications are not endangered.

Sea-power enables base to be shifted as campaign progresses.

There is yet another great strategical principle which the Peninsular War illustrates. This is the power of shifting his base from place to place as his operations progress which a successful commander, backed by maritime force, possesses

military force, the defending troops must have many points to guard. The invaders, on the other hand, can choose their line of operations. They can suddenly appear in great force at one point. And they may be able to establish themselves firmly in hostile territory and to prosecute an effective campaign before their antagonists can muster in sufficient force to offer battle. The circumstances, moreover, facilitate feints, most perplexing to the foe. The adversary may be induced to assemble the bulk of his fighting strength at a section of the littoral far removed from the real point of danger. Landings on an adversary's soil, in fact, generally partake of the character of a strategical and tactical surprise. The annals of expeditions undertaken by a people powerful at sea afford frequent examples of this. There is scarcely an amphibious conflict which has taken place since the days of the Peloponnesian war which has not illustrated it, either by some striking episode, or else in less obvious fashion by compelling one of the belligerents to disseminate his forces to his detriment as a measure of protection against possible maritime descents.

How maritime command tends to "contain" hostile forces in districts not really in danger.

This last is a point often not very apparent from popular narratives of a campaign. But its significance must not be overlooked. The mere possibility of a hostile descent upon the coast may demand the allotment of numerous detachments,

amounting in the aggregate to a vast total sufficient, and more than sufficient, to decide the issue of a war, which, from the conditions of the case, never fire a shot. Armies may be absorbed in guarding against a danger which never comes, while in some other region there are not troops enough to hold the enemy in check or to save the State from sore disaster. This demonstrates another of the many advantages which arise from maritime command. A nation supreme at sea may be able to enter upon warlike operations on a great scale in one region, and also able at the same time, without appreciably diminishing its fighting strength, to contain—to use a technical military term—a portion of the opposing host in districts far removed from the real theatre of war. And so an empire, paramount at sea in virtue of its battleships and cruisers and torpedo craft, may not find a colossal army indispensable for a land attack upon a great military Power. Maritime command may compensate for deficiency of troops.

Maritime descents when attempted without sufficient sea-power.

The destruction of the Invincible Armada and the battle of the Nile rank among the most splendid of British naval victories. Both were decisive almost beyond precedent. They involved more than the mere tactical discomfiture of a hostile fleet. They amounted to an annihilation of the beaten squadrons. And in each case they



decided the fate of an army as well as of a maritime force. The Peninsular War illustrates the advantage of sea-power to a commander who can use it. The fate of Medina Sidonia's tremendous flotilla and the fight in Aboukir Bay serve to show the risks attendant on the despatch of troops across the ocean unless naval supremacy is undisputed: in the one case the army suffered disaster when actually on the waters, in the other case not till after it had reached its destination.

The Spanish Armada.

The annals of war contain few lessons more striking than that which is taught by the overthrow of the Spanish Armada. A terrible catastrophe befell a mighty army and a formidable fleet, and befell them simultaneously. Philip, when he despatched the vast armament to its doom, was probably confident that his great galleons would easily overmaster the small craft of Drake and his brother captains. The error was not an unpardonable one. The fatal blunder committed by the king was the launching of his military forces on such an enterprise while there was any possibility of doubt as to what would be the result when the rival armaments met in combat. An army on the high seas insufficiently protected by the convoying fleet is in a deplorable situation. Its very existence depends upon its eluding the vigilance of the hostile ships of war. If caught, the troops are helpless; unless they

find salvation in the speed of the transports, they are lost; they must choose between surrender and destruction. It is difficult to conceive a position more appalling. A commander who exposes his men to such a risk incurs a very grave responsibility.

Napoleon's expedition to Egypt.

Attack when actually in transit to the enemy's shores is the worst danger to an expeditionary force contemplating a maritime descent. But even when safely landed, the loss of maritime command may jeopardise its existence and bring about its downfall. And of this Nelson's triumph over Brueys is the most remarkable instance in modern times. The audacious expedition to Egypt was, perhaps, the most serious strategical mistake which Napoleon committed throughout his wonderful career. Many of the errors most injurious to his prospects which the great conqueror was guilty of can be explained away. Sometimes his intelligence was fallacious. Sometimes he miscalculated the power of resistance of his foes. But for the Egyptian enterprise there was no excuse. There was no question but that British sea-power was far too formidable for any liberties to be taken with it, and that the maritime conditions did not justify the despatch of a French army from one end of the Mediterranean to the other; the whole scheme of operations was fundamentally unsound; under the circumstances existing at the

time the undertaking was a blunder. The expedition was, it is true, favoured by good fortune. It evaded Nelson's fleet. The soldiers of France, full of enthusiasm for their victorious chief, established themselves in the Nile delta. But the inevitable Nemesis came when the British admiral at last found Brueys' armament gathered in Aboukir Bay. To the intrepid tactics of Nelson may, no doubt, be attributed the extraordinary completeness of his triumph. Napoleon could scarcely have foreseen that at one single blow the hostile navy which had dogged his footsteps to the Levant would make itself paramount from the Pillars of Hercules to Syria. But a statesman so astute must have known that maritime command was not assured to him, and he should not have run so great a risk. Military disaster did not, indeed, immediately follow upon the utter collapse of French sea-power in the Mediterranean. Thanks to the fertility of Lower Egypt, the expeditionary force maintained its ground for a time, and it even invaded Palestine. But the situation was an impossible one. Hope of reinforcements there was none. Communications with the Gulf of Lyons were effectually severed. And when Abercromby appeared upon the scene, and Anglo-Indian armies made their power felt, Menou, left to carry on an unprofitable campaign under circumstances most depressing, surrendered as he had every right to do.

Maintenance of land communications sometimes influenced by naval considerations.

The disastrous termination to the First Consul's dreams of oriental dominion was the direct and immediate result of the snapping of the chain connecting him with France. A military commander may depend wholly on the sea, as Napoleon did in Egypt, and in that case loss of naval command means ruin. But it is not only in the case of maritime descents that the communications of an army may depend upon sea-power. Under certain geographical conditions a line of land communications more or less indispensable to a force operating in the field may be cut by hostile ships of war. Such conditions are perhaps unusual; but they are not unknown in history, and where they exist it is clear that the effect of maritime command upon the land campaign may be decisive.

The Riviera.

Few stretches of railway are better known to the itinerant public of Europe than that which leads from Genoa to Tuscany. It traverses a district justly renowned for the beauties of its scenery. It is a monument of engineering enterprise and skill. Yet how few travellers, as they feast their eyes upon the landscape and marvel at the galleries and tunnels through which they rush, are aware that the route which they are following forms one of the most remarkable of strategical defiles. The fighting power of a great modern nation, a nation which can put a million soldiers in the field if all

goes well, almost hinges on those few miles of railway. And their military importance to Italy is only equalled by their extraordinary exposure to maritime attack.

A glance at any map of the country shows that the basin of the Po—a level, highly cultivated, productive tract, thickly inhabited throughout and containing numerous populous cities — is divided from what may be called peninsular Italy by the Apennines where these cross from the eastern Riviera to the Adriatic Sea. This mountain-range does not constitute a great military obstacle like the Alps. But the few railways which climb over the hills from Tuscany to the northern plains traverse broken hilly country. Their curves are sharp and their gradients steep. And they are in consequence so ill adapted for the movement of heavy military trains as to be almost useless for the concentration of such masses of troops as Italy must be prepared to move towards the point of danger in the event of war. To avoid crossing these rugged uplands, either the Riviera must be utilised, or else the line which skirts the eastern coast between Ancona and Brindisi. And of the two the former is the more convenient for various reasons, and therefore strategically the more necessary to the country. But from its nature it is at the mercy of a hostile navy. Its lofty viaducts can be destroyed by a few boats' crews landing

under cover of an enemy's fleet. It can be swept at all points by the guns of warships lying in deep water close in to the shore. If Italy suffer a maritime disaster, or be not strong enough at sea to keep in check the naval forces of the foe, this great line of communications is lost to the country as much as if it never had existed. The defile is in fact available to the Italian army only while the Italian fleet is predominant in the Ligurian Sea.

The case of the eastern Riviera is no doubt exceptional. A great line of communications rarely runs like this for miles within a few yards of the shore. But it is manifest that even if a road or railway follows a line not actually along the coast, but within a few miles of it, military communications along it are very liable to be interrupted if the enemy has gained maritime command. Columns moving by it may not be under fire of hostile battleships, but there is always the risk of a sudden landing, of some bridge being blown up, or of some important point on it being seized and held by an opposing force not easy to eject. Therefore where such conditions exist it is clear that the question of sea-power enters largely into the strategical problems to be solved by the belligerents.

Maritime power assists military supply.

The advantages of maritime over land transport are universally admitted. It is a broad economic principle well known in the commercial world that, as a general rule, the conveyance of goods by ships

is cheaper than their conveyance by road or rail. How far this is the case depends of course on a variety of circumstances. The question of distance affects it, and the nature of the ports of arrival and departure. In a land traversed in all directions by roads, where there exists a network of railways, and where all the appliances for moving stores are to be found which modern ingenuity has devised, transport by coasting steamers has not very much to recommend it. But in districts where such conditions do not prevail, in thinly populated countries and in regions inhabited by semi-civilised and barbarous races, the convenience of vessels for the conveyance of freight are obvious. For instance, the despatch of a cargo of warlike stores by sea from Suez to Aden is a simple operation, and one which can be completed within the space of a very few days; but to send the same cargo across the deserts of Arabia a host of pack-animals would be necessary, and they would take months ere they reached their journey's end. Now it is often the case that a theatre of war is very deficient in land communications—Spain and the Balkan Peninsula, both of them territories which have been the scene of many memorable campaigns, may be cited as examples. The progress of warfare in such countries is often largely, and is sometimes wholly, dependent upon the power which one or other of the antagonists may possess to move his supplies from

point to point by sea. And it is obvious that without maritime command such a power rarely can exist.

The Japanese invasion of Korea in the sixteenth century as an example of this.

This is illustrated by a remarkable campaign undertaken by Japan some centuries ago against Korea supported by the Chinese empire. The Japanese, an insular people, are by nature mariners. In the days when Drake's name was a terror on the Spanish Main, the pirates from the eastern islands infested the Yellow Sea and ravaged the seaboard southwards to Canton. Their forays did incalculable damage. Their junks, although fewer in number and less in tonnage than those which the Chinese could muster for a general action, were far more smartly handled and could generally hold their own. About the time of our Queen Elizabeth there emerged from obscurity in Japan one Hideyoshi, who, by his genius for administration, his strength of will, and his insatiable ambition, came to be practically autocrat of the island realm. This remarkable personage resolved upon the conquest of Korea as a preliminary to an attack on China. He assembled a great army, he concentrated the corsair flotilla of Japan, and he despatched a formidable expeditionary force which duly effected a landing at the southern end of the peninsula which he coveted. But he committed one fatal error. He gave the command to two chiefs instead of one, and these soon became embittered rivals.

All went well at first. The Japanese army swept away the levies which strove to check its victorious career and reached Seoul. There the two commanders, after quarrelling a while, agreed to separate. One reached Phong Yang—the scene of the chief combat of the recent war; the other moved north-eastwards. Korea was not a land where this locust host could long subsist upon the theatre of war, and the force at Phong Yang, hoping to push on to the Yalu and Manchuria, found itself obliged to pause till the Japanese fleet with the accompanying freight-ships should come up. But a disaster befell the invaders on their proper element. Their squadron was defeated on the way and driven from the Yellow Sea, and thereupon want of supplies forced the Japanese left wing to abandon its dreams of further conquest. The other army of invasion advanced beyond the limits of Korea towards where the Russian fortress of Vladivostok now stands; but under pressure of the Chinese armies, which were now assembling, it fell back again towards Seoul. The naval catastrophe had been fatal to the ambitious schemes of Hideyoshi. The Japanese had half Korea in their grip, but could get no farther. And during negotiations which ensued they gladly fell back to the southern end of the peninsula, where on the sea-coast they were sure of their supplies.

The belligerents could not come to terms, and Hideyoshi ordained a fresh invasion of Korea. But this was less successful than the previous effort. The Koreans were now prepared, and had at their back a powerful Chinese army. And again the Japanese fleet was beaten when it advanced into the Yellow Sea intending to bring up supplies for the invading troops, which had reached Seoul a second time. A second time the failure to gain maritime command proved fatal to the projects of the Tokio Government. And the formidable force with which Hideyoshi had hoped to acquire an empire on the mainland of the Asiatic continent had no course open to it but to retire to the coast, and eventually to abandon the peninsula and return to its island home. In both campaigns the whole project of conquest had been based upon active support from the flotilla which the Japanese were justified in trusting to from its recent records around the Chinese coast. The leaders of the invading armies depended on sea-power. Their scheme of operations had for its foundation the retention of maritime command. The overthrow of the attendant fleet was fatal to its consummation.

The reason why the effect of maritime power upon

It is the case, then, that sea-power may exert a far-reaching influence over land campaigns. In every age there have occurred instances where the

land operations is so often not appreciated.

course of conflict between contending armies has been manifestly governed by maritime conditions in adjacent waters. History affords numerous instances, ancient and modern, when, as at Actium, the overthrow of a great naval armament has involved the destruction of an imposing military force. The triremes of Themistocles swept the Persian hordes back from Attica, never to return; while Marathon, brilliant victory as it was, had checked merely for a moment the ambitious projects of the Eastern king. The tardy creation of a fleet by Rome when the Punic wars began, was the first step on the road which brought the younger Scipio to the gates of Carthage. The Scandinavian rovers who coerced and trampled down powerful races in north-western Europe conquered in virtue of immunity from molestation till they had set foot on shore. The battle of Trafalgar, fought off the coast of Seville, drove Napoleon's legions from Boulogne to seek for glory in Moravia, in the heart of Central Europe.

But maritime dominion does not always shape the course of wars on land quite so obviously, even when it is the chief factor in deciding the issue. We have taken a century to learn that the expulsion of the French from North America and from the East Indies was the result of the supremacy gained by the British navy of the day over its historic rival. We are apt to ascribe the ending

of the Peninsular War to the stirring achievements of Wellington upon the battlefield alone, and to overlook the influence of the peculiar strategical conditions which the maritime command of the supporting fleet around the coasts of Spain and Portugal exerted over the struggle. For one who attributes to the triumph of stout Don John of Austria in the narrows of the Gulf of Corinth the turn of the tide of Ottoman conquest, there will be ten who ascribe it to Sobieski's famous victory under the walls of Vienna some generations later. Nor is there anything strange in this and to be wondered at.

The final decision of a war on land is in most cases brought about by some general action. It is the combat, the actual clash of arms, which not unnaturally chains the attention of the contemporary observer; the train of events which lead up to the battle and make it possible are disregarded and forgotten in the rejoicings at the tactical success. The effect of sea-power upon land campaigns is in the main strategical. Its influence over the progress of military operations, however decisive this may be, is often only very indirect. And so it remains unnoticed and forgotten till the records of the campaign are examined, and till the causes of the dramatic episodes which excite the popular imagination are traced back to their source.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON TO THE BATTLE OF NAVARINO.

Europe immediately after Waterloo.

WATERLOO closed a conflict conducted on the grandest scale. The war was one in which the whole civilised world was more or less involved. All Europe was in arms. On the actual battle-field there was engaged only a fraction of the mighty hosts called out for service from the Volga to the Pyrenees. But the strain was felt by all the leading States alike. The relief from the terror of Napoleon's name was as keen in Styria and the Ukraine as in Westphalia and on the Thames. And so there resulted a natural reaction after the intense pressure of a quarter of a century of incessant strife.

The nations were exhausted. Treasuries were empty. The industries of many provinces, famous for their commercial prosperity and for their well-developed resources, were at a standstill.

The treaty of Vienna had, moreover, created a new Continental system. Under its provisions new States had come into existence. Unknown dynasties had been set up. The map of Europe had been transformed by the diplomatists in the Vienna council-chamber. The Continent could not in a moment accustom itself to such changed conditions. Time was needed to gauge the true import of what the congress had achieved. A period of comparative restfulness ensued. And more than a decade passed before any difference between two powerful peoples was again referred to the final arbitrament of war.

But the lull after the dramatic events of 1815 was not a period of absolute peace. Great Britain, Spain, France, and the Ottoman empire successively became involved in warlike operations against opponents not by any means contemptible. Conflicts of considerable interest ensued. Hostilities were engaged in which throw additional light upon the theory of military and naval science. Campaigns were fought which add some fresh experiences to those accumulated in the vast storehouses of history illustrating the principles of the art of war.

The bombardment of Algiers.

In the very year after the overthrow of Napoleon on the heights of Mont St Jean, a very remarkable naval episode occurred. Events had long pointed to a conflict between Western civilisation and the

pirates of the Barbary coast. For years the anchorages from Ceuta to Cape Bon had served as shelter to swarms of maritime marauders. These daring corsairs were a terror to Mediterranean shipping, and acted as a serious check to the development of Mediterranean commerce. While all Europe was in a blaze no nation could afford to deal once and for all with this great and growing public danger. None of the maritime Powers cared to bring their standing quarrel with the Algerian Dey actually to a head. But within a few months of the downfall of Napoleon the British Government resolved to bring the freebooters and their chief to reason, and a powerful squadron was despatched to attack the evil at its very source.

Lord Exmouth's bombardment of the stronghold of Algiers, his destruction of the frowning battlements, and his effectual coercion of the pirate prince, memorable achievement as it undoubtedly was, was a naval operation pure and simple. From the stirring episode nothing is to be learnt as to the effect of maritime command on military strategy. It need not indeed have been referred to here but for the fact that this tremendous blow of a great Christian Power at a Mediterranean Moslem State foreshadowed the nature of wars that were to come. The attack of the British fleet upon Algiers heralded the

storm already brewing in the East. The Dey's submission to Lord Exmouth was the first of a long succession of reverses which the Crescent has during the past three generations suffered at the hands of the all-conquering Cross.

The South American wars of independence.

But before dealing with the singularly dramatic train of events extending over several years which the historian sums up as the Greek War of Liberation, we must refer for a moment to a far distant quarter of the globe. Mexico and great part of South America were at this time in the throes of a conflict dating back to the period when Napoleon was at the zenith of his fame. A war was in progress which changed the destinies of a whole continent. The colossal empire beyond the seas which the genius and resolution of Cortez, of Pizarro, and of the long roll of warrior-adventurers of Spain, had built up in the golden era of maritime discovery, was passing away never to arise again. And in the struggle in one province of what had been Spanish South America—Chili—the effect of maritime command on war on land is illustrated so remarkably that a brief *résumé* of the course of the campaign cannot fail to be instructive.

About 1810 a great wave of disaffection spread over the vast Spanish colonies on the mainland of America. Province after province raised the flag of independence, popular governments were

set up, and the parent State was openly defied. With French armies on the Tagus, Spain was in no condition to effectually deal with such a state of things. Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and other dependencies of King Ferdinand beyond the Atlantic, became the scene of prolonged campaigns between the royalist forces and the patriot levies —campaigns marked throughout by the ferocity with which they were conducted, and by the mutual reprisals in which the antagonists indulged. That the struggle was so long protracted was due in no small measure to dissensions among the insurgent chiefs. But the principal cause of the long delays which ensued before the various provinces won their independence at the bayonet's point, is to be found in the influence which Spanish maritime command exerted over the operations on land. The royalist troops were generally able to hold the fortresses upon the coasts and to use them as starting-points for expeditions into the interior. Reinforcements, moreover, arrived from time to time across the ocean from Cadiz and Barcelona without let or hindrance. Spain, groaning under invasion in the early years of struggle, and convulsed with faction towards its close, was yet enabled in virtue of sea-power to carry on the conflict for many years. But for the most part the warfare was of such a character as to be of interest rather from the point of view of national than of

military history, and it was only in Chili, and in the intervention of Chili to liberate Peru, that the operations deserve more detailed mention in this volume.

The Chilian Revolution.

The peculiar geographical features of Chili are well known. It is a long narrow strip of rich and fertile territory interposed between the snow-capped Cordilleras and the sea. The coast-line is jagged and much indented. Its gulfs and bays form splendid natural harbours. It is obvious that in such a country military operations must be governed in no small degree by sea-power. And the truth of this was proved not only when the thriving republic on the Pacific coast was struggling for its freedom, but also in very recent times within the memory of all. The sketch-map facing page 328, chapter ix., serves to illustrate the wars of independence in Chili and Peru, as well as operations of a later date. And it will be found that the campaigns early in the century against the Spanish forces, and those of 1885 and 1892, show many points in common.

The Chilians in 1810 found in the first instance little difficulty in overthrowing the Royalist Government. Acknowledging the sovereignty of the Spanish king, they were for a period left to work out their destinies in peace, the small army of occupation confining itself to retention of certain places on the coast and in the south. The insta-

bility of such conditions was manifest from the outset, but for three years no attempt was made to deprive the people of their unacknowledged independence. Then the local executive learnt that coercion was in prospect, and that plans were being matured for the re-establishment of alien rule. Lima, the chief town in Peru, was at this time the Spanish capital of South America. It was the seat of the viceroy. With its fortified port Callao it formed the headquarters of the military and naval forces of the king. And it was from here that in 1813 an expedition was despatched by sea to resubjugate the recalcitrant Chilians.

It is suppressed by Spain in virtue of sea-power.

This force landed near Talcahuano, and advanced northwards upon Santiago the capital. The Chilians, however, hastily mustered an army to confront the royalist troops, and offered such a sturdy resistance that these were at first driven back to the coast in great confusion. But in the following year the viceroy, in virtue of his maritime supremacy, was enabled to send considerable reinforcements to the theatre of war, and after desperate fighting the Spanish forces reoccupied Santiago and overthrew the patriot Government.

For three years Chili groaned under the military rule set up in the room of the local junta. Rigorous punishment was meted out to the patriot chiefs. The Spanish authorities did their utmost to stamp out the revolutionary spirit, but they

only succeeded in making the down-trodden people more resolved to throw off the yoke of foreign domination. Then salvation came from a quarter from which the royalists had not anticipated danger.

General San Martin liberates the country.

Many who had taken part in the previous uprising had fled across the mountains into La Plata, or Argentina as it is now named. The town of Mendoza had become an asylum for these fugitives. Here, under the superintendence of General San Martin,—an officer formerly in the Spanish army, and who after quitting it had played an important part in the liberation of La Plata,—a small army was formed and carefully organised. Early in 1817 this little force crossed the Andes. Its passage of this great mountain barrier is accounted one of the most remarkable operations of this class in modern times. It fell upon a Spanish army sent out to meet it at Chabuco, gained a signal triumph after an obstinate combat, and entered Santiago amid the enthusiastic acclamations of the multitude. The great seaport of Valparaiso was taken, and the Spanish army of occupation retired into its coast fortress of Talcahuano. This stronghold was blockaded by the patriot forces. A popular government was constituted. And during the summer fortune seemed to smile upon the patriot cause.

But the influence of sea-power exerted itself

A royalist army lands and nearly overturns the patriot Government.

anew in favour of the royalists. The viceroy at Lima was resolved that Spain's fairest foreign possession should not pass from her without a further struggle. Late in the year an expeditionary force was shipped at Callao destined for the Chilian coast, it disembarked at Talcahuano, and with the troops assembled at that place it formed an army capable of undertaking a vigorous offensive campaign. Early in 1818 it took the field and moved on Santiago. The patriot force which was assembled to bar the road suffered a serious reverse. For a few weeks the very existence of the budding State trembled in the balance. Panic reigned supreme in the capital. But General San Martin at this critical juncture fully rose to the occasion, and resolved to strike at least one more blow in defence of Chilian freedom. He reorganised the beaten army with wonderful rapidity and restored its confidence, his courage and enthusiasm proved contagious, and on the 5th of April a decisive battle was fought before Santiago, in which the patriot troops gained a great victory. The Spaniards were driven back upon their base, and suffered losses amounting almost to annihilation. The danger was averted, and the Chilians breathed again. But it was only too obvious to their leaders that the dominion of the adjacent seas which the enemy possessed rendered the situation most precarious. A hostile force might at any moment

plant itself at some point on the extended coast-line of the country, and strike some grievous blow. Under existing conditions there could be no security. The provisional Government was not blinded by the recent triumph to the dangers which beset it. So it was wisely decided to form a Chilian navy at all costs.

Chili creates a navy.

An old East-Indiaman lying in the harbour of Valparaiso, which was blockaded at the time, was purchased. Guns were put on board. A motley but enthusiastic crew was got together. And the merchantman thus suddenly converted into a war-vessel boldly stood out to sea, attacked the two Spanish ships on guard off the port, and raised the blockade. This success aroused the ardour of the Chilians. The whole country with frantic eagerness seconded the efforts of the executive to create a fleet. Subscriptions poured in. Valuables were sold. Plate was melted down. Those who had no money to give offered the produce of their lands in kind. Several vessels were bought. Armament, equipment, and provisions were hurried into them by willing hands. The authorities were inundated with applications from high and low to be taken on the books. And in an incredibly short space of time a fleet of four sail was ready to meet the Spaniards on the high seas.

Its triumphs.

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for. It was known that Spain was straining every nerve to send out a formidable force from Cadiz, destined to recover her ascendancy upon the Pacific coast. It had been ascertained that a fleet of transports convoyed by a hostile frigate was under way. So that when, on the 9th of October, the Chilian squadron quitted Valparaiso and headed southwards, it had a definite and important duty to perform.

The success achieved by the fleet which had been improvised in so remarkable a manner exceeded all expectations. The Spanish frigate had parted company with its charges in the tempestuous latitudes of Cape Horn; all unsuspecting the existence of a hostile navy, it proceeded leisurely on its course, and when attacked unawares it fell an easy prey. The transports as they approached the Chilian coast were captured one by one, three only escaping to Callao. And within a month of the patriot squadron's weighing anchor thirteen sail entered the bay of Valparaiso in line ahead, receiving a tremendous ovation from the populace. Spanish supremacy upon the ocean had been fairly challenged. It was felt that Chilian independence was at last secure. There has been no more remarkable example since the days of Salamis of a State suddenly developing into a formidable sea Power, and triumphing thereby over the naval and military forces of a mighty foe.

Chili emancipated by its fleet.

A few days later the distinguished British commander, Lord Cochrane, arrived by invitation to command the Chilian navy. The new chief, celebrated as he was for energy and daring, readily concurred with the Government in its wish to strike at the Spanish shipping in Callao and to blockade Peru; and soon the flag of Chili was supreme upon the waters from Panama to Patagonia. The question of the hour ceased to be whether Chili would be able to maintain its freedom; it was now eagerly debated whether efforts should not be made to liberate Peru and to rid the South American continent finally of the dominion of an alien race.

A Chilian army lands in Peru and helps to drive the Spaniards out.

In 1820 an expeditionary force was despatched from Chili and landed in Peru. The operations which followed are not of striking interest, and they need not be narrated here. Suffice it to say that in the end Peruvian independence was finally established by means of the maritime command which the enterprising neighbouring State had won for itself in a manner so dramatic. Sea-power decided the contest in Peru as it had decided the contest in Chili. The story of these events is as stirring as it is strange. The republics of the South Pacific did not win their freedom without a desperate and protracted struggle. The narrative of their fight for liberty is brightened by many episodes which savour almost of romance.

Leaders emerged from the patriot ranks gifted with a veritable genius for conducting war. They were supported throughout the vicissitudes of long-drawn-out campaigns with signal loyalty by high-spirited peoples sprung from a chivalrous race. Deeds of most conspicuous gallantry were per-ormed alike on sea and land. But regarding these wars solely from the point of view of the military student, the one prominent feature which stands out dwarfing every other is the supreme influence over their history which the question of sea-power exerted from their commencement to their close.

The Greek War of Liberation.

It is a long cry from the pampas to the Parthenon, from the Andes to the Ægean Sea. But while the fate of Chili was still in doubt, events in Eastern Europe were leading apace towards another war of liberation,—a war which came to be the first step towards the dismemberment of a great and once-dreaded empire. South America was throwing off the yoke of foreign domination. The Greeks were about to enter upon a struggle not only for their freedom but also for their faith.

The European provinces of the Ottoman Sultan still embraced vast tracts of country at this time. Turkey in Europe covered the whole Balkan Peninsula to the Austrian and Russian borders, it extended from the Carpathian Mountains to Cape

Matapan, and from Dalmatia to the Golden Horn. The conquering Osmanlis from the East had swept over this extensive territory in successive waves. They had won these fertile provinces by the sword. Now after the lapse of centuries they still held them by the sword, and by the sword alone. Under Ottoman rule huge tracts formerly productive and highly cultivated had degenerated into a wilderness. Within the broad limits of the Sultan's European dominions ancient and progressive races were held in bondage and trodden under foot by a reactionary and half-barbaric people. The bulk of the population held to Christian tenets; the dominant Turks were of the Moslem faith, a faith distinguished perhaps above all others for fanatical abhorrence of rival creeds. Disaffection was ever smouldering, disaffection which would ever and anon break out into sudden flame and tax the fighting resources of the Caliph to extinguish it. Such were the social conditions in the Balkan Peninsula after Waterloo; and such they are in what is left of European Turkey in the present day. Racial and religious animosity was ever in the foreground, civil war was ever looming on the horizon. Already, aided by the forces of the Tsar, the Trans-Danubian territory had gained a kind of independence. And it was here, in what we now know as the kingdom of Roumania, that a struggle commenced out of which Greece emerged

a nation, and which brought the Russian forces to the shores of the Ægean.

With the Wallachian insurrection we need not here concern ourselves. The operations were in no way influenced by naval power. But the news of what was going on in the north served as a spark which set the Peloponnesus in a blaze. Centuries had swept over Greece and left the Greeks in many respects unchanged. In spite of Asiatic conquerors, of changing dynasties and shifting laws, the Hellenes had remained a nationality. Traditions dating back to the era when Athens was the central point of the world's civilisation still lived among the people. The Osmanlis had often found this classic race a thorn in their side in times of danger. Various recent incidents had raised the mutual hatred between conquerors and conquered up to fever-heat. The Great Powers had shown their sympathy with Greek aspirations by freeing the Ionian Islands from the Sultan's rule. Preparations for insurrection had been maturing for years. Arms had been collected secretly, and were stored away in the mountain caves of the Morea. And at last, in the early spring of 1821, the standard of revolt was raised.

Peculiar strategical conditions of Greece.

The physical and geographical features of Continental Greece are such that any campaign within its confines must be governed greatly by maritime command. The naval question is, in fact, almost

paramount. It is a rugged mountainous region, where even in the present day, after half a century of enlightened rule, communications are most defective. In the days of Ottoman domination there were no communications worthy of the name. As can be seen by a glance at the sketch-map at the end of the chapter, the northern provinces are joined to the peninsular portion by an isthmus so narrow as to make of it a military defile. The coast-line is fantastically indented, and many of its deep bays and gulfs are almost land-locked. Around its shores are numerous excellent harbours, great and small. And the consequences of this peculiar configuration are, that land operations depend to a singular extent upon sea-power.

Relative strength of Greece and of the Ottoman empire.

For the facilities which the coast-line offers to shipping compensate for want of land communications. The whole commercial system in 1821 depended on ship transport. Every little port around the coast possessed its petty fleet of sailing craft. A considerable proportion of the whole population was engaged in maritime pursuits, and Greek mariners have in all ages been held in very high repute. Greece when the war broke out had at command a mercantile marine, comprising few stately vessels it is true, but made up of great numbers of brigs and lesser craft, all admirably adapted for navigation in these intricate seas. So that when the people resolved to strike a

the struggle unless they could be moved by ship. This all-important fact governed the course of the Hellenic War of Liberation to an extraordinary degree. It enabled a numerically insignificant people to set a huge military monarchy at defiance for a term of years. And it permitted the Greeks to keep the foe at bay till eventually Europe stepped in and extorted their freedom from the Commander of the Faithful.

The outbreak and successes of the rebels.

The first outbreak of revolt in the Morea in 1821 was attended by almost startling success. Patras was in the first place seized by bands from the mountains, all save its citadel. The news spread like wildfire from valley to valley. Beacons on the hill-tops called the peasants to arms. The Osmanli garrison was forced back into a few scattered strongholds, which were at once hemmed in by eager hope-bestirred rebel bands. In a few weeks only the fortresses of Tripolitsa and of Nauplia, the citadels of Corinth and Patras, and a few petty places on the coast, remained in Turkish hands. Almost at a blow the Peloponnesus, from the Gulf of Athens to Navarino, had shaken off the Moslem yoke. Nor were the islands of the Archipelago backward in this crisis of their country's fate. They vied with each other in equipping local flotillas to challenge the Osmanlis on the sea. Hydra took the lead, with Spezzia and Ipsara. And with surprising swiftness a navy

came into being which carried the banner of the Cross all over the Ægean.

The intelligence of these strange events caused a profound sensation in Stamboul and throughout Asiatic Turkey. The immediate result was one of those outbreaks of frenzied fanaticism against Christians to which Moslems in general and Osmanlis in particular are ever prone at junctures of political and religious excitement. Atrocious massacres occurred. The Ottoman troops bore a prominent part in deeds of blood which the Ottoman authorities made little if any efforts to prevent. And when the news spread abroad in Greece of the butchery of fellow-countrymen in Smyrna and elsewhere, those who had hesitated to cast in their lot with the insurgent cause felt that the hour for temporising was now past. The whole nation was roused to fury. Attica and Ætolia rose, Epirus and Thessaly followed suit. The flame spread to Macedonia, where the hillmen of the Thracian Chersonese sprang to arms, and even ventured an assault upon the great walled city of Salonika, which was beaten off. And while the Porte was only slowly awakening to the gravity of the crisis, the Greeks gained a signal victory at sea.

The islanders of the Ægean had from the first established a complete maritime command in the waters of the Archipelago. Numerous rich prizes

The Greek islanders obtain command

of the Ægean.

flying the Crescent had been captured and brought to island ports. The banner of the Sultan was flouted by the hardy mariners of the Cyclades within sight of the Anatolian shores. Highly incensed at their temerity, the Grand Seignior resolved on vigorous action to restore his authority and prestige at sea. He ordered out a squadron from the Dardanelles, and this, quitting the narrows of Abydos, issued from the fortified straits and headed southwards full of confidence. But its career in the Ægean was short and most inglorious. Before a month had elapsed it was back again, driven in panic flight from the open waters and ignominiously abandoning for the time being maritime supremacy to the insurgents.

Effect of this upon the campaign in Greece.

This naval triumph of the Greeks was singularly opportune. For, profiting by a certain hesitation on the part of the Hellenes of the north to commit themselves definitely and openly to rebellion, an Ottoman force from Albania had pushed southwards, had crossed the Gulf of Corinth, and had thrown itself into Patras. It was prosecuting an active campaign in that neighbourhood when the patriot fleet, having driven the Turkish squadron back into the Hellespont, appeared in the Ionian Sea and advanced to Lepanto; the communications of the Sultan's troops in the Peloponnesus were thus effectually severed. About the same time, moreover, a Turkish column was overthrown

with great slaughter in the hills near Tripolitsa. And had it not been for the determination of the Greek sailors to return for a time to their homes, the power of the Caliph in the Morea might have been swept away before the autumn.

All Northern Greece was, however, now in arms against the Porte. A Turkish force from Thessaly had, it is true, penetrated into Attica, and had raised the siege of the Acropolis invested by the insurgents; but a column hastening to its support met with grievous disaster in the historic defile of Thermopylæ. The hills of Bœotia teemed with guerilla bands. And the Ottoman troops in Attica were, after experiencing many dangers and adventures, most fortunate in escaping by by-paths over the mountains out of the revolted provinces. The Greek successes north of the Gulf of Corinth left the Ottoman forces in the Peloponnesus as isolated as they had been while the insurgent fleet was cruising off Patras and Lepanto. And in the autumn Tripolitsa, left to its fate, surrendered after making a most creditable defence, with all its treasure, and with the vast stores of war material collected in what had been the Turkish military headquarters in peninsular Greece.

The close of 1821.

At the close of 1821 the insurgent chiefs might justly pride themselves upon their conquests. Almost every trace of Moslem domination south of Thessaly and Epirus had passed away. Inland

only the Acropolis and the citadel of Corinth still held out. The suddenly created Hellenic navy had covered itself with glory. It had preyed upon the commerce of the enemy, and had enriched itself with his spoils. It had beaten the hostile squadron in pitched battle, and had hunted it into its lair. But its efficacy was jeopardised by the unwillingness of the *personnel* to remain more than a few weeks away from home. In the late autumn a Turkish squadron from the Dardanelles had succeeded, during one of those periods when the Greek fleet of its own accord abandoned the high seas, in revictualling Nauplia and other maritime strongholds still in Osmanli hands. And although this armada had with all speed retired to the Sea of Marmora when the insurgent flotilla sought it out, its operations had been of great importance to the Turks on land. In the campaigns of succeeding years analogous incidents were of not infrequent occurrence. The Greeks generally enjoyed the advantage of maritime command; still from time to time an Ottoman squadron would put to sea, either too strong to be attacked or else during a period when the opposing navy had returned to port, and then maritime supremacy would pass over to the Osmanlis for a time, but seldom for long. During the earlier years of the war the fleets of the Sultan never established an absolute dominion over any large area in Greek waters, nor did they

Peculiar maritime conditions.

at any time venture on more than a temporary local blockade of some short stretch of coast-line. The Greek navy was generally alert, active, and ubiquitous. The Ottoman squadrons were torpid and unwieldy, they were manœuvred with no skill, and they were not infrequently controlled by craven admirals, afraid of employing boldly and with fitting vigour the potent weapon committed to their charge.

The operations of 1821, the first year of the war, had been somewhat desultory in character both by sea and land, although the cause of liberty had triumphed all along the line. The campaign of 1822 was in marked contrast, and affords a brilliant illustration of the influence which maritime command will sometimes bring to bear upon the operations of rival armies. The Porte now fully realised that it had not to do merely with an ephemeral outburst; this was a determined effort by a down-trodden race to win its independence at all costs. It was no time for half measures; decisive action must be taken, and that quickly, or Greece would cease to be an Ottoman possession. So the autocrat of the Bosporus decreed operations on the grandest scale to restore Turkish supremacy in the revolted provinces and islands. A mighty host was to sweep down from the north. The Osmanli fleets were to harry the Hellenic coasts. And the army of inva-

The campaign of 1822. Great Turkish preparations.

sion and the naval forces were to join hands on the shores of the Morea.

Ottoman fleet ranges the Ægean.

The campaign opened auspiciously for the Moslem cause. A formidable armament quitted the Dardanelles. After throwing supplies into Nauplia and other Turkish strongholds on the Peloponnesian coast, it proceeded to Crete and Cyprus and landed troops in those islands, which, like others nearer to the shores of Hellas proper, were fighting for their freedom. Then it returned unmolested to its starting-point. Encouraged by its immunity from attack, it reissued from the Hellespont after a brief delay and sailed for Chios, an island of considerable area off the Anatolian coast, which, like its neighbours, was in full revolt.

Chios.

Chios was favoured by nature above all other islands of the Ægean Sea. Fertile, highly productive, thickly populated, and beautiful, its fame was known all over the Levant. Less exposed, owing to circumstances, to Ottoman rapacity than its fellows, it had prospered exceedingly, and was a valuable prize to whichever antagonist, Osmanli or Greek, should finally hold it in his keeping. On the Asiatic coast a horde of fanatical cut-throats had assembled, waiting for means to cross the intervening channel and to lay this garden waste; so when the Turkish squadron hove in sight the islanders knew only too well that their fate was sealed. But few probably foresaw how fright-

ful a catastrophe was hanging over them. The Osmanlis were not satisfied with conquest. Utter destruction was their aim. Thousands were massacred or carried into slavery. Fire and sword in a very few days converted what had been an earthly paradise into a desolate wilderness. And then the fleet, which had borne so great a share in the evil work, weighed and stood across to near the Bay of Chesmé on the Asiatic coast.

The anchorage was one of somewhat sinister omen to the Ottoman navy. Half a century before, a Turkish fleet had suffered a signal defeat at the hands of Russian warships almost on this very spot; but the admiral little thought that history was to repeat itself, and that his formidable armada was to go under before the insignificant vessels of the Greeks. The fate of Chios in no way daunted the spirited islanders of the Archipelago. On the contrary, it determined them to venture on a daring enterprise against the hostile shipping. They sought not victory merely but also vengeance. Hydra took the lead with Ipsara. Others hastened to send contingents proportionate to their strength of mariners and their seagoing trade. So that ere long a flotilla which comprised the whole naval resources of Greece was cruising off Chios, waiting for its opportunity. But weeks passed by and no opportunity presented itself. Then one dark night Canaris, one of the noblest

figures which these years of strife raised from obscurity to eminence, went right in at the Ottoman fleet with two fireships.

The sea-fight in the Chios channel.

The great vessels of the Sultan were riding peacefully at anchor. Their crews feared no evil, and were totally unprepared for an onslaught so intrepid. The venture succeeded beyond all precedent. The flagship was set on fire, and blew up with a terrific report. Several others were ignited. The Turkish captains lost all presence of mind, and for a time confusion reigned supreme. Canaris was allowed to sheer off and get clear. Finally, all the vessels capable of doing so slipped their cables and made for the open sea. Only a terror-stricken, crippled remnant of the fine squadron which had sailed out against Chios from the Hellespont a few weeks before regained that haven of refuge. Greek supremacy in the Ægean was established in a manner as sudden as it was complete. For a time Ottoman naval power was reduced to entire impotence. And the result of the terrible nocturnal combat was not disastrous to the cause of Islam at sea alone; its effect upon the land campaign in Greece was decisive,—it brought about the destruction of a great Osmanli army.

The naval disaster causes the destruction of a great Ottoman

Pursuant of the scheme of operations planned at Constantinople, a Turkish force of many thousand men was advancing towards the Gulf of Corinth. The Greeks hazarded no pitched

battles. They confined themselves to harassing the hostile columns on the march, and to intercepting the communications of the invaders with Macedonia. The hardy mountaineers, masters of the art of partisan warfare, proved in such terrain to be most deadly foes. So well did they perform their task, that only a fraction of the Turkish army which had assembled preparatory to the campaign ever reached the Morea at all. On the 18th of July, one month after the great sea-fight in the Chios channel, the invading forces arrived at Corinth and turned towards Nauplia. The fall of the Acropolis a few weeks earlier had given the Greeks possession of all Attica, and raised their enthusiasm to the highest pitch. Already, on the march, the question of supply had seriously troubled the Osmanli chief. Now, having performed his share in the preliminary task allotted to the Ottoman forces, he looked to the navy to make good his wants. But the banner of the Crescent had disappeared from the Ægean. The army of invasion was in a trap. Starvation stared it in the face. The Turkish general offered to retire by capitulation; but the patriot leaders insisted on unconditional surrender, and in the end, after desperate fighting, only a few individuals escaped to tell the tale of how the great Ottoman army which was to reconquer Greece from Volo to Cape Matapan had fared.

army in Greece.

The insurgent navy raises the siege of Missolonghi.

Maritime command had given this great triumph to the Hellenes. Nor did its influence upon the land operations end with the destruction of the hostile forces in the defiles near Corinth. For part of the Turkish army had gained considerable successes in Epirus and Ætolia, and in the autumn they laid siege to Missolonghi; but sea-power enabled the Greeks to throw supplies and reinforcements into that important stronghold, so that the Sultan's forces in Western Greece, despairing of reducing the place and greatly harassed by the guerilla bands which hung upon their rear, raised the siege and retired into Albania during the winter. Meanwhile a Turkish fleet from the Sea of Marmora had endeavoured to get to Nauplia, which was in the direst straits. But fearful of the narrow waters of the Archipelago, it drew back and returned to Tenedos. Here it was assailed by the enemy and turned back into the Hellespont. And the year's triumphs in the cause of freedom ended with the fall of Nauplia, which had for more than eighteen months right valiantly withstood the strenuous efforts of the insurgents to effect its capture.

The close of 1822.

Thus 1822 closed with signal glory to the arms of Greece. In 1821 the Ottoman empire had been taken unawares; some of the most resplendent victories of the struggling nationality had been gained partly by surprise. But 1822 was alto-

gether different. The despotic monarch of the vast Moslem dominions of the Levant had brought into play practically his whole available war resources in European Turkey and Asia Minor. A great army had been set in motion. A formidable fleet had put to sea. But the Ottoman forces had been worsted decisively in the encounter. Greece had single-handed overthrown the Turkish empire. In spite of centuries of oppression, the ancient race of Hellas had fairly risen to the occasion. Small wonder that all the civilised world watched the contest with awakening interest, and that the spectators of these stirring episodes displayed a growing sympathy for a people capable of deeds so heroic and of devotion so sublime.

The campaign of 1823 does not bear witness to the influence of sea-power over war on land to at all the same extent as does the struggle of the preceding year. We have seen how the destruction of the great Turkish host destined to reconquer the Morea may be attributed to Canaris' exploit in the Chios channel. The operations of the military and naval forces of the Sultan were in 1823 kept more separate. Although it gained little distinction in actual conflict, the Ottoman navy really for many months assumed a dominant position. A great fleet issued from the Dardanelles, landed forces at Volo, in Eubœa, and

The campaign of 1823. Greeks hold their own both on sea and on land.

in Attica, and then proceeded to Patras, which still doggedly kept the Greeks at bay; having revictualled this stronghold, most of the vessels remained blockading Missolonghi. But in spite of desperate efforts, the Ottoman authorities had failed to assemble as powerful an army in the north as in the previous year. The troops which advanced towards Attica were defeated in the neighbourhood of Mount Helicon, and were compelled to evacuate Greece. Those operating in Epirus and the west gained some measure of success, and for a time invested Missolonghi; but the Turkish fleet withdrew in the autumn from the Ionian Sea, and, being defeated by the Greek admiral Miaulis off the isle of Lemnos, it retired ignominiously to the Sea of Marmora. Thereupon a Greek expedition sailed from Nauplia to Missolonghi with reinforcements and supplies, and placed the garrison of what was now the point of chief importance in Western Greece in a position to defy the efforts of the enemy for many months. This success was followed by one of great moral importance. Late in the year the citadel of Corinth, which had held out since the first outbreak of the Greek revolt, capitulated, and the last inland stronghold of the Sultan's forces in the Morea was thus lost to them. At the end of the year, in fact, the situation was, in appearance at least, less favourable to the Ottoman empire

than it had been twelve months before. In reality, however, it was not so.

Exhausting effects of the struggle on Greece.

The terrible struggle was beginning to wear out the powers of resistance of a people too weak numerically to stand the losses suffered in these years of war. The Turks could spare the thousands slain in action and borne down by disease, by hardship, and by hunger. But Greece had no vast population to draw upon to make good wastage arising out of the conflict. Moreover, dissensions had broken out among the patriot leaders. Even with the enemy at their gates the chieftains in whom the hard-pressed nationality had put its trust were allowing their paltry quarrels to endanger the great cause for which they had so nobly striven. And for yet another reason the Hellenic cause was becoming seriously imperilled. The finances were at their lowest ebb. The sinews of war were beginning to fail. There was no settled Government. There were no means of collecting taxes. There was no power of tapping even the limited resources left to a country desolated by fire and sword.

On the other hand, the situation was not without some elements of hope. Europe was beginning to give practical evidence of its compassion for the Greeks. Liberal subscriptions poured into the patriot treasury from far-off lands. Foreign adventurers came to swell the fighting forces of

the country. Men eminent by their position and distinguished by their genius were not wanting in the ranks of these latter-day crusaders. Experienced soldiers and sailors offered their services to the Government which had been set up at Nauplia. Greatest of all, Lord Byron, arriving on the scene, flung into the scale his ample wealth and brilliant talents, and roused the exhausted nation to enthusiasm with the magic of his name.

Lord Byron proceeded to Missolonghi, and threw himself into the work of improving its defences with all the energy of his fiery nature. During the few months of the early spring of 1824 which elapsed before his tragic death, he proved himself a man of action and resource above the common. It was a not unworthy ending to a strange and wonderful career. Nor was his work in vain. Thanks to his exertions, this squalid, fever-stricken spot was enabled at a later date to keep at bay for months the whole power of the Ottoman empire, to draw down upon itself and retain before its walls great hostile forces which might have done incalculable mischief in other quarters, and to win undying glory in a siege the like of which the world has seldom seen.

1824. The forces of Mehemet

1824 was marked by the entrance into the struggle of a force which up to the present had

lain to all intents and purposes dormant. The Grand Seignior had not in previous years made heavy calls for aid upon his great dependency upon the Nile. Egypt had assisted in Crete and the southern islands, but it had taken little part as yet in the struggle on the mainland of Greece and in the adjacent waters. Now, however, the Caliph demanded assistance from his vassal to crush the rebels who had so long defied him; and the result was that there were brought into play an army and a navy which were only prevented eventually from re-establishing Moslem rule in Hellas by the intervention of Europe.

Ali brought into play.

The viceroy installed at this time in Cairo was one of the most remarkable figures of the first half of this century. Enlightened far above most oriental potentates, liberal in his ideas, a ruler as prescient as he was wise, Mehemet Ali combined with these qualities a soaring ambition and an iron will. He had organised an army on the European model to replace the Mamelukes, and had employed as his instruments in creating this force chosen veterans who had learnt the art of war in the great school of Napoleon. Now when the request for assistance came to him from Stamboul he had ready at his disposal a body of regular troops admirably drilled, highly disciplined, and commanded by capable and experienced officers. Nor had he neglected his naval

forces. The Egyptian fleet was thoroughly efficient as regards material, and would have represented a formidable fighting instrument had its *personnel* been of better stamp, and had it been intrusted to more vigorous and capable chiefs. In a later chapter it will be seen how the weapons which Mehemet Ali had forged so skilfully were destined in years to come to play for a period a great *rôle* in history, and to narrowly miss overturning the Sultan from his throne.

The bringing of the naval and military forces of Egypt into line with those of Turkey in Europe and Anatolia, which up to 1824 had borne the brunt of the protracted war, was largely due to the tardy recognition by the Porte that the reconquest of Greece could only be effected through the instrumentality of sea-power. All efforts directed from Albania and Thrace had failed. The pashas in those districts, moreover, reported that armies could no longer be got together to repeat the abortive attempts of former years. The Osmanlis would not answer to the call of their sovereign to rise *en masse* and sweep down on the infidels. The terror of the guerilla bands amid the mountain fastnesses was upon them. The day was past for great armies of invasion such as were mustered in Thessaly for the campaign of 1822. Foiled in his design of crushing the Greeks with Osmanli hordes operating by

land, the Commander of the Faithful now adopted the plan of transporting troops by sea from Asia Minor and from Egypt to the theatre of war.

The campaign of 1824 was principally maritime. The early months passed over quietly. But the incensed tyrant at Constantinople was merely waiting for his preparations to be completed; and in the summer an imposing armada, organised in the Golden Horn, put to sea from the Hellespont, having on board a great military force. It shaped its course for the island of Ipsara. Ipsara had been second only to Hydra in its well-regulated efforts in the cause of liberty, and its conquest, therefore, was no mean achievement, although in reality there was little or no resistance. The wanton barbarity perpetrated at Chios was repeated, the ferocious soldiery being let loose to pillage and destroy; and then the expedition moved to Samos. But here the Greek fleet was found drawn up for battle. A general engagement hard by resulted in the precipitate departure southwards of the Turks to meet the Egyptian squadron which was known to be approaching, and the junction being duly effected, the mass of shipping headed for the Cyclades. No mightier armament had appeared in the Levant since Buonaparte's ill-starred attempt to found a French dependency upon the Nile. But the Greek admiral Miaulis was not one whit dismayed. As

The campaign of the year chiefly maritime.

in the days of the overthrow of the Spanish Armada, seamanship told, and told decisively. Miaulis hovered round the great Ottoman fleet, striking home when he saw an opportunity. By a succession of most brilliant operations he so completely demoralised his antagonists that ere the winter storms set in the Turkish fleet retired to the Sea of Marmora, while the Egyptian squadron bore away to Rhodes. The Greeks were left in undisputed command of the Ægean Sea; and so the fourth year of conflict, during many months of which the aspect of affairs had filled the insurgent chiefs with consternation, terminated, like its predecessors, gloriously for the patriot cause.

Difficulties of Greece.

But the tide was on the turn. The voice of faction had been momentarily stilled, it is true. Financial straits were less acute, thanks to generous donations from sympathisers in many foreign lands. But the country was worn out by the incessant strain. The protracted war was sapping the resources of a territory possessing at the best but little natural wealth. The toiling cultivators had ceased to till their fields. The vineyards and olive-groves were not tended as of old. The staple produce of the land had lost its foreign market in consequence of maritime insecurity. Trade was at a standstill. Worst of all, the male population had in the battles and sieges been reduced

by nearly half. And now the Ottoman empire was about to put forth all its strength to tread the devoted nation down.

1825. Ibrahim Pasha succeeds in landing in the Morea.

In February 1825 a terrible catastrophe befell the Greeks. Part of an expeditionary force from Egypt, which had been primarily transported to Crete, was planted down at Modon, a few miles from Navarino. Although apprised that such a descent upon the mainland of the Peloponnesus was contemplated, the insurgent fleet, loitering in the Cyclades, failed to intervene in time. The fatal disinclination of the Greek mariners to keep the sea for long periods was chiefly responsible for this disaster. Their chieftains strove in vain to check the evil. The bent of the sailors was for daring enterprise rather than for steadfast effort for delivering staggering blows at the foe rather than for the sleepless vigilance which the guarding of an extensive coast-line imperatively demanded The Egyptian squadron was indeed permitted to cross again to Crete to ship the remainder of the troops, and managed to disembark them at Modon before the protecting navy came upon the scene.

At the head of the Egyptian forces was the eldest son of Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha, a warrior destined to acquire world-wide renown in a singularly eventful military career. This capable soldier took immediate steps to obtain a firm grip upon Morean soil. Having organised his army

after its sea voyage with all speed, he took the field, and his first undertaking was to invest the walled city of Navarino, which commanded with its batteries an admirable anchorage.

The provisional junta which sat at Nauplia grasped at once the import of Ibrahim's appearance on the mainland of Greece. The invasion imperilled most gravely the freedom gained at such great sacrifices. The chosen chieftains of the people forgot their differences, and perceiving that a blow must be struck forthwith, they prepared to meet the Egyptians both on sea and land. A force, mustered in hot haste, marched on Modon. Miaulis assembled a respectable fleet, and bore down in the same direction full of fight. But on land the Greeks met with a wellnigh overwhelming disaster in a pitched battle fought with the invading army. It was the first time that the guerilla bands of the Peloponnesus had come face to face with the trained soldiery of Mehemet Ali, and for a space the issue trembled in the balance. The Greeks, enjoying an advantage as regards position, grimly held their ground, and the attacking columns made at first but little way. The struggle was desperate, the valour displayed on both sides above all praise. Ibrahim, scimitar in hand, was in the thick of it, fighting like a very paladin of old. But at last discipline and organisation car-

ried the day. Victory decided itself in favour of the Crescent. The mountaineers of the Morea fled in terror from the field. And such was the respect which the bearing and prowess of the Ethiopian soldiery inspired in this first engagement, that from that hour they seldom met with serious resistance in the open. The immediate consequence of the battle was that Ibrahim was enabled to capture Navarino, and to establish his base of military operations in one of the finest harbours in Europe.

Greek fleet threatens communications, but not powerful enough to cut off the invaders completely from Egypt.

The Greek navy fared better than the land forces in the early days of the campaign. Admiral Miaulis by his energy and courage made some amends for his failure to prevent the Egyptian landing. He fell upon part of the hostile fleet at Modon, and dealt it serious injury. His cruisers sailed at will between Cape Matapan and Crete. The Egyptian squadron, although joined by some Turkish vessels, shrank from engaging an adversary so dexterous and determined. The great battleships, built by skilful shipwrights in the dockyards of Alexandria and Rosetta, hugged the shore while the Greek admiral ranged the open sea unchallenged. Miaulis, however, failed to confine Ibrahim's fleet permanently in the ports of Modon and of Navarino. Whether from lack of watchfulness or from the aversion of his crews to the tedium of blockade, an opportunity

was given the hostile squadron to get across to Crete, and there it was joined by a Turkish armada from the Dardanelles which also had eluded the vigilance of the Greek navy. Then the great mass of ships stood out to sea, and beating off an attack by Miaulis, it made its way to Navarino, bringing Ibrahim most welcome reinforcements.

This phase of the war is one of special interest; for the conditions were somewhat unusual, and presented an interesting strategical problem to the belligerents. Maritime command was in dispute. The Egyptian and Turkish fleets shirked encountering the squadron which had for its task the protection of the shores of the Morea. And yet these fleets succeeded not only in landing a considerable force upon the hostile coast, but also in convoying transports, with additional troops on board, on more than one occasion to the locality where the original army had disembarked. Admittedly a maritime descent is most difficult to provide against, even by a fleet holding dominion of the seas; because it may be effected by surprise at an unexpected point. But once the enemy has landed his plan has been divulged, and then the task of forbidding the despatch of hostile reinforcements to the spot by ships would seem an easy one. The Greeks did not enjoy the maritime command in the waters south of the

Peloponnesus, but neither did the enemy, and in the naval operations as a whole they held their own at this time. The campaign, in fact, serves to discredit the doctrine that a fleet "in being" necessarily secures a country from serious maritime invasion, and to demonstrate that the dogmas of one school of theorists are not infallible.

Ibrahim's skilful leadership.

Ibrahim Pasha conducted his operations for the reconquest of the Peloponnesus with a happy mingling of energy with prudence. The guerillas in their mountain valleys were appalled and paralysed by his vigour. He pushed boldly into the heart of the Morea and captured Tripolitsa. He even approached the gates of Nauplia, but judiciously fell back, solicitous for his long line of communications and determined to offer the irregular bands opposed to him no chance of gaining even a temporary triumph in rear of his main army. He was much hampered by difficulties as to supply in a rugged country desolated by previous war, and he could not act with that trenchant vigour in which a warrior of his type delights. His position was indeed far from satisfactory, owing to the insecurity of his communications across the sea. In spite of the efficiency of his troops, of the moral effect of his first victory, and of his capable leadership, he gradually felt himself compelled to abandon active operations. The Greek cruisers were producing their effect; the

fleet "in being" was doing its work quietly and without ostentation, but not without result.

A Turkish force invests Missolonghi.

Events of great importance had in the meantime taken place beyond the Gulf of Corinth. In the spring a Turkish force had advanced southwards from Albania. Meeting with no very determined opposition in the western hills, it penetrated to the shores of Ætolia and invested Missolonghi, now developed into a fortress capable of offering strenuous resistance to a besieging army. Lord Byron was gone indeed, but his influence and handiwork remained. The site was not, like that of Nauplia, designed by nature for a stronghold; as a port the place was inferior to scores of others round the coasts of Greece, and no hallowed traditions invested it with special value in the eyes of its defenders. But the garrison was resolved to hold out to the last extremity. Twice already the foe had fallen back discomfited from before its gates. The Hellenes looked upon it as the bulwark of the west. The Commander of the Faithful had made up his mind to wrest it from the giaour.

Ibrahim ordered to devote his energies to co-operating in the siege.

It was decreed, therefore, that Ibrahim should join hands with the army from the north, and compass the destruction of Missolonghi. At first, however, the Sultan's project made but little progress. A Turkish fleet destined for the Ionian Sea was signally defeated off Eubœa, and only

a fraction of it reached the Gulf of Patras. The Egyptian troops were fully occupied in the mountains of the Peloponnesus. And when in July the combined navy of the Hellenes appeared off Missolonghi, the Ottoman war-vessels blockading it put out to sea, provisions were poured into the fortress, and it was granted a new lease of life. But this failure only served to infuriate the Sultan, and made him more determined than ever to achieve his purpose. He ordered the Egyptian fleet to repair to the neighbouring roads. Ibrahim was enjoined to move against the place. And the capture of Missolonghi became the sole object of the concentrated forces of the Ottoman empire by sea and land.

The Greek fleet succeeds in revictualling the place.

Just at this time an event occurred of great importance in furtherance of the Ottoman plan. The Egyptian fleet managed to bring from Alexandria to Navarino a notable accession to the strength of Ibrahim's army which had greatly suffered in the summer operations. Besides transports with reinforcements, there were included in the flotilla numerous freight-ships crammed with the supplies which were so sorely needed by the invading force. A sufficiency of warlike stores to carry on a vigorous offensive was at the same time landed for the service of the army of invasion. As a consequence, the Egyptian chief found himself in a position to prosecute an active campaign

Reinforcements reach Ibrahim from Egypt.

just at the time when the unsatisfactory progress of the siege of Missolonghi offered him an opportunity of satisfying his ambition. He promptly set himself to transfer the bulk of his troops to Patras—some proceeding by land and some by sea. His fleet joined to the Turkish squadron in the Ionian Sea re-established the blockade of Missolonghi. The Ottoman command in these waters enabled him to transfer his military forces to the northern side of the Gulf of Patras by ship, and to unite with the Turkish army investing the fortress. So that in the early days of 1826 the beleaguered stronghold, on which the eyes not only of the contending races but also of all Europe were now fixed, was beset not alone by the troops from European Turkey and the squadron from the Dardanelles, but by the whole available naval and military power of Mehemet Ali.

Combined Turkish and Egyptian fleets in the Gulf of Patras too strong for Greeks to attack.

The place was doomed. The Greek flotilla, deftly as it was handled by Miaulis, strove in vain to aid the hard-pressed garrison. Assault after assault was beaten back by the defenders, who were ever buoyed up by the hope that even at the last the navy, which had so often saved their country in preceding years, would somehow succour them in their distress. But this was no longer possible. In face of such a concentration of Ottoman ships of war, all assembled in a cramped area where seamanship was of no avail,

the naval strength of Greece was powerless. In March it became evident to even the most sanguine amid the devoted band who manned the ramparts that a catastrophe could not much longer be deferred. Famine was imminent. The besiegers were slowly but surely drawing nearer. At last on the 22d of April the garrison made a desperate final sortie, hoping sword in hand to cleave a way through the Moslem host which hemmed them in, and so to reach the mountains. But their brave effort failed. In the confusion the Ottoman troops gained a footing within the ramparts. And thus Missolonghi fell, after a siege which has made its name famous for all time—a siege in which the maritime superiority of the attacking side in the vicinity was the paramount factor in deciding the issue.

The fall of Missolonghi.

The events during the twelve months following the appearance of Ibrahim Pasha's troops on the Peloponnesian shores afford a remarkable illustration of the effect of maritime command upon land operations under naval conditions which, though abnormal, are not by any means unique. Thanks to a powerful fleet of battleships, the Ottoman empire succeeded in effecting an invasion of Greece by landing a force upon its shores, and the formidable broadsides of the Moslem vessels enabled them from time to time to bring support to the invading army from beyond the seas. But the

Review of this campaign.

success of the undertaking at the outset was in part attributable to the apathy of the Hellenic navy, which did not arrive at the point of danger till too late, and when Miaulis put to sea the effect was at once to cut the communications of the invaders. By a great effort convoys were from time to time got through from Alexandria to Navarino, but Ibrahim's position was none the less highly precarious for several months. For although the Egyptian squadron when concentrated to safeguard a convoy ensured the safety of its charge from hostile cruisers, its influence never extended over any wide expanse of water. Its command was purely local. For all practical purposes naval supremacy on the high seas rested with the defenders as against the invaders, with the result that the expeditionary force operating in a difficult, inhospitable theatre of war at first failed to triumph so decisively as the relative excellence of the troops composing it and the abilities of its chief appeared to promise at the start.

It is not the purpose of this volume to treat of the naval art of war, or to discuss questions of sea-power except in so far as they affect campaigns on land. But it may be pointed out, because it to a certain extent explains the inability of the Greeks to cope more effectually with the Ottoman military forces which had gained a footing on their coasts, that the insurgent admirals, who handled their



commands so skilfully when in presence of the foe, showed no genius for strategical combinations. Among the Cyclades and when sheltered in the recesses of the bays and gulfs of south-eastern Greece, the patriot fleet was in a position to act on interior lines. The Turkish fleet was based upon the Hellespont, the Egyptian on the delta of the Nile. But Miaulis and his brother chiefs never turned these conditions to account. On the contrary, instead of massing their naval forces on principle to strike unitedly against one hostile squadron or the other, they usually split their maritime strength in two. They failed to prevent the combination of the hostile fleets, and these in the narrow waters between Patras and Missolonghi could bid defiance to the flotilla of far smaller craft with which Miaulis strove to save the fortress upon which for a season the whole conflict hinged. Nevertheless, even while a great Ottoman armada rode victorious in the one section of the maritime theatre of war which happened at the moment to be of supreme importance, Greece was elsewhere in full enjoyment of the advantages of unrestricted sea-power. No reinforcements could be sent by sea to swell the invading forces gathered around Missolonghi or holding the districts in the vicinity of Navarino. The Sultan's naval forces were impotent except at the one point. Their energies were absorbed in the passive block-

ade of a petty fortress of limited strategical importance.

1826. Greece in desperate straits.

On the fall of Missolonghi in the spring of 1826 the Turks moved against Attica and Ibrahim's troops embarked for Patras. The Turkish squadron eluded the hostile fleet and repaired to the Dardanelles while the Egyptian vessels retired to Navarino. The campaign languished during the summer and autumn, but the Greeks could not expel the enemy from their soil either in the Peloponnesus or farther north. Although the Sultan somewhat relaxed his efforts, and Ibrahim Pasha was, owing to the insecurity of his maritime communications, reduced to practical inaction, the strength of the little State which had fought so gallantly for years was wellnigh gone. Its condition was growing desperate. Graver symptoms than financial insolvency, than the diminution of the manhood of the country, even than the insubordination of the sailors clamouring for their pay, were becoming apparent. The people were losing courage. Their hearts were sick with hope deferred. Amid the storm-clouds which filled the sky there was scarcely one bright spot to be discerned. Fortunate was it that in the autumn a notable success at sea revived somewhat the drooping spirits of the nation. A great fleet, too formidable for Miaulis to attack, having issued from the Hellespont, separated ; part of it arrived

safely at Navarino, but the remainder was signally defeated in a general action, and fled to the Sea of Marmora before the patriot flotilla.

1827. More troops reach Morea Egypt

Events drifted on during the early days of 1827. Attica, where the Turks were besieging the Acropolis, was the scene of the most important operations. In May that classic stronghold fell, and its loss increased the gloom which was settling down upon the hard-pressed Greeks. This episode was followed by an event of still greater benefit to the Ottoman cause. The difficulty of communicating with Egypt had for several months condemned Ibrahim Pasha to idleness. His troops were exhausted by long service in the field under the trying conditions of deficient food, of worn-out clothing and equipment, and of disease induced by constant hardships. But in August a powerful fleet from Alexandria cast anchor at Navarino. It brought 5000 troops and abundant stores and clothing. Thus fortified, the masterful prince who had been chafing under inaction at once commenced a most vigorous campaign. The orders of the Porte to carry out a war of extermination against all who should resist rejoiced a chief as remarkable for the ruthlessness of his disposition as for the alertness of his faculties. He went to work systematically and with relentless energy. But while he was pushing from place to place in the interior of the Morea, leaving desolation in his

train, a blow from a totally unexpected quarter transformed in a few hours the whole situation in the theatre of war.

Great Britain, France, and Russia had some months before bound themselves to stop the conflict. They proposed to the Porte that Greece should be granted local autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. An allied fleet had assembled to enforce if necessary the terms which the diplomatists were pressing on the Ottoman Government. This fleet was cruising off Navarino. Its commanders were made aware of the devastation which Ibrahim was carrying out. And with a promptitude characteristic of the sailor's calling they resolved to act and not to wait for orders.

The battle of Navarino.

A vast assemblage of Turkish and Egyptian vessels were moored in the Bay of Navarino protected by the batteries. The combined fleet of the Allies bore down upon them, cleared for action, and without explanation or negotiation the formidable armament brought up alongside of the imposing line of Moslem men-of-war. To challenge a general action was not the design of the allied admirals; but their menacing proceedings could have but one result. The tension was too great. A British boat was fired upon. And in a moment a furious fight was raging at the closest quarters. The result was the utter destruction of the Ottoman fleet. At a stroke the sea-power of the great

Moslem empire was demolished. Few maritime battles have been more decisive than the two hours' struggle in which the formidable navy of the Sultan was brought to ruin by the warships of Powers with which the Porte was still at peace. And as regards the Greek War of Liberation, the battle was as decisive strategically as the allied triumph was tactically complete.

Its far-reaching consequences. Greece liberated.

The Egyptian army in the Morea was cut off from all hope of succour and of sustenance. Ibrahim Pasha's position in Greece became analogous to that of Napoleon after the battle of the Nile. The allied fleets, it is true, established no blockade, and it was found possible to remove part of the invading force to Egypt unmolested. But the whole Ottoman plan of operations for subduing the revolted dependency depended on sea-power. Had the war continued, the Hellenic navy would henceforward have enjoyed undisputed maritime command. Desultory operations did not cease absolutely for some little time; they were, however, but the dying embers of the conflagration into which the Levant had been plunged six years before, when the hillmen of the Peloponnesus sounded the tocsin of war. The conflict was over and Greece was free.

General observations upon the war.

Greece is a land designed by nature for amphibious war. The race which inhabits it becomes, by the irresistible force of circumstances, a mari-

time nation. It was inevitable that sea-power would govern the course of the struggle which burst out with such fury when the peasants from the adjacent valleys seized Patras. The non-recognition by the Porte of this paramount principle till shameful disaster compelled its acceptance, was the salvation of the patriot cause. The overwhelming naval strength of the Ottoman empire was not thrown into the scale till the Hellenes had, by their heroic fight for freedom, won the moral support of Europe. It was Canaris with his fireships off the Anatolian shore who dealt the deadly stroke which laid the only really formidable Turkish army of invasion low on the threshold of the Peloponnesus. It was by the agency of sea-power that Ibrahim Pasha gained important triumphs in the districts which had been the cradle of the insurrection. It was the absence of undisputed maritime command which prevented those Egyptian triumphs from ending in the subjugation of the Greeks while the Great Powers were still hesitating. It was the concentration of the great naval forces of the Sultan in one locality which planted the banners of the Crescent on the ramparts of Missolonghi. It was the catastrophe of Navarino which wrested Hellas from the grasp of Islam.

There are certain points in connection with this war which deprive its lessons of some of their

GREECE AND THE ÆGEAN SEA.

value. The naval operations of neither side can be taken as a model of judicious application of maritime resources. The conduct of the Greek fleets was signalised rather by brilliancy of isolated enterprise than by a sound continuity of naval policy adapted to the circumstances of the case. The behaviour of the Ottoman squadrons was generally discreditable, and was often quite beneath contempt. But if sea-power was not always utilised to the best purpose during the vicissitudes of this singular struggle, it controlled every varying phase of the campaign ; there were episodes in the conflict of vital moment to the belligerents, during which its influence was all-powerful on land ; and when at last the crisis came, it decided the issue, and turned the scale in favour of the cause of liberty.

CHAPTER III.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1828–29.

Circumstances attending the outbreak of the war.

THE battle of Navarino, which virtually terminated the protracted efforts of the Porte to subdue insurgent Greece, was but the prelude to a war in which the Ottoman empire encountered a far more dangerous foe. The feud between the Russians and the Osmanlis was of time-honoured standing. The clashing interest of two powerful nations did not constitute its principal cause. Race hatred and religious animosity were the origin of the vendetta. The conflict which had been impending during the troubled years covering the emancipation of the Greeks was merely another in a long succession of struggles between the forces of the Sultan and the Tsar—struggles dating back to the days when all Christendom trembled before the followers of Othman. Russia, in genuine sympathy with the oppressed Slav nationalities of the Balkan peninsula, and with

Peter the Great's reputed last testament spurring her people on towards the Golden Horn, looked upon the prosecution of the coming war as a solemn duty. The Turks, with typical oriental fatalism, accepted it as their inevitable destiny.

Into the immediate causes of the rupture we need not enter. It is easy to pick a quarrel where the will exists. Russia had stood aloof while the Wallachians, fighting for their freedom, had been crushed and trodden under foot by the forces of the Crescent. The Greeks were wellnigh wiped out of existence ere the champions of Christianity in the East moved hand or foot to help them. Until the Western Powers had shown themselves prepared to take an active part in favour of the Hellenes, the Tsar had offered his co-religionists in that historic land scanty encouragement. But when the allied fleets had destroyed the sea-power of the Ottoman empire in the Bay of Navarino, preparations for invading the Sultan's European dominions were set on foot in the great Northern empire. And in the winter of 1827-28 it became manifest that war was at hand.

Normal strategical conditions of Russo-Turkish struggles.

There have been three mighty struggles between these traditional antagonists since Waterloo, and they have had one notable feature in common. In each the fact that the rival empires are in contact both to the west and to the east of the Black Sea has brought it about that what have been

from the purely military point of view two totally distinct campaigns have been in progress simultaneously. On each occasion there has been a European theatre of war and an Asiatic theatre of war. And they have been separated by a vast landlocked stretch of water on which the navy of one Power or the other has during the conflict held practically undisputed sway. The northern half has, speaking generally, been enclosed by Russian territory. The southern half has been included within the dominions of the Sultan. And before proceeding further, it will not be out of place to point out how these conditions serve to illustrate what is one of the most remarkable principles in the art of war.

Command of Black Sea enables side enjoying it to act militarily on interior lines.

The command of the Black Sea places that side which enjoys it in a position to act on interior lines as regards the two campaigns in progress respectively in Europe and in Asia, and the belligerent with the more powerful fleet is enabled to shift his troops from one theatre of war to the other to a certain extent at will. Neither Russia nor Turkey put the principle in force on a great scale in any one of these contests; but advantage was taken of it on more than one occasion as regards the transfer of military forces of sufficient strength to make their presence felt in their new sphere of action. There can be no difference of opinion that, were the

armies of either empire absolutely under the guidance of one single will, this power to act on interior lines, in virtue of maritime ascendancy in the Euxine, might admit of brilliant feats of strategy. To a master mind not deadened by routine such conditions would open out a splendid field for enterprise.

The straits enable Turkey to act navally on interior lines.

Naval predominance in the Black Sea favours, then, the working of land forces on interior lines. But there is an extraordinary geographical feature, amounting to a freak of nature, which under certain circumstances permits the warships of the Sultan to act upon interior lines. This involves a question of purely naval strategy, but the point is so important and so peculiar as to justify a reference to it in these pages.

The narrow straits which join the Euxine to the Ægean, and which mark the line of cleavage between the continents of Europe and of Asia, have exerted a momentous influence over history. The Bosporus and Dardanelles, with the intervening Sea of Marmora, constitute the most singular maritime defile upon the surface of the globe. It is unique. And the fact that within this defile is situated the great city of Constantinople, with its incomparable harbour fringed by arsenals and dockyards, its busy commerce and its teeming population, gives to it from the point of view of naval strategy an extraordinary importance. Its exits have been for cen-

turies adequately fortified relatively to the military conditions of the time. It lies in the very heart of the richest districts of the Ottoman realm. As a base for the maritime forces of the Sultan it possesses almost every attribute which could be wished for. We have already seen how, during the Greek War of Liberation, not once, nor twice, but many times, the Turkish fleets sought sanctuary within the narrows of the Hellespont when they found themselves to be in jeopardy. And in any naval war in which the dominions of the Padishah are menaced by the squadrons of the foe both on their Black Sea and their Mediterranean shores, the fact that from this secure maritime asylum Ottoman fleets can strike first on one side and then on the other must be of momentous consequence. But in 1828-29 the Turkish navy, shattered at Navarino, was too enfeebled to profit by its power of acting on interior lines; and neither in 1853 nor yet in 1877-78 did the Russian flag appear in the Ægean. In earlier wars, however, the Porte has put this principle in force to great advantage.

Importance of maritime command of Black Sea for movement of troops.

Up to within very recent years communications in the territories bordering upon the Black Sea have been lamentably backward. On its southern side they are defective still—defective to the extent of being almost non-existent. To-day, in spite of the development of roads and railways throughout

the length and breadth of Southern Russia and of Transcaucasia, great masses of men with the war material indispensable to put them in the field cannot be transferred from the basins of the Don and Dneiper to the highlands of Armenia without most serious difficulty. And in Asiatic Turkey, where there has been no corresponding progress, the strategical conditions are still more unfavourable to vigour and vitality in military operations. In Anatolia and Kurdistan, and in the elevated plateaus round Erzerum, there are no roads and no railways. Nature has provided no navigable waterways to take their place. Communications are bad in the present day all round the Euxine; but early in the century they were even worse. And it is when communications fail in theatres of war bordering on the ocean that the influence of sea-power over the course of struggles on land generally becomes most apparent. Maritime routes then take the place of roads and railways. The power to move their troops across the Black Sea, simply with a view to assembling an army either on the lower Danube or in the neighbourhood of Kars, is alike to Tsar and Sultan a first step towards undertaking a campaign at all.

Command of the Mediterranean essential to Turkey.

But the Ottoman empire is also a Mediterranean Power. In 1828 the coast-line from Tunis to Dalmatia, enclosing the eastern half of the great tideless sea, was, excepting for virtually inde-

pendent Greece, under Turkish sway. So vast were the dominions of the Sultan that the only hope of assembling his forces from the more distant provinces of the State to meet the Russian armies lay in the power of transporting them by sea. And this power was to a great extent denied him. For in the Ægean there was a Russian fleet, not large enough perhaps to blockade the whole Turkish coasts but large enough to render the transport of troops by ships from Tunis, from Egypt, or from Syria to the Dardanelles and neighbouring ports, most hazardous.

Relative naval and military strength of the antagonists.

The disaster of Navarino had indeed been far more fatal to the Porte than had been apparent at first sight. The Western Powers meant to liberate Greece. They succeeded in placing the Ottoman empire at the mercy of the Tsar. In 1828 Russia enjoyed the incalculable advantage of maritime command, not in the Black Sea alone, but also in the Mediterranean. The effect of these conditions north of the Bosporus is depicted clearly in the military history of the campaigns which followed. But the sinister influence exerted by the Russian ships of war outside the Dardanelles upon the fortunes of the Sultan, if not equally obvious, was none the less a grave reality and one cause of the Emperor Nicholas's triumph.

It was not only because of the effete condition of its navy that Turkey entered upon this struggle

at a singularly unpropitious juncture. The Ottoman land forces also were at their very lowest ebb. The Sultan Mahmoud was a not unworthy descendant of Amurath and Byazid and the long line of Moslem conquerors. He possessed both energy and resolution, qualities conspicuously absent in most caliphs of these later days. But his suppression of the janissaries, although it displayed him to the world as a man of inflexible will, was carried out at an unlucky moment. The janissaries had been the kernel of Osmanli military power from an early era. They had been the first of standing armies on the continent of Europe. In its prime this celebrated force had been the mainstay of the Sultan's throne. But its day was past, its glory had departed, its zeal and loyalty in its master's cause declined from year to year. Into the organisation of the janissaries, their statutes and their privileges, we need not enter. Suffice it to say that they had degenerated into a danger to the State, that for endeavouring to crush them Mahmoud's predecessor had paid the penalty of his life, and that they were only blotted out after a sanguinary struggle in 1826.

The Grand Seignior had found the destruction of a military system a herculean task. He found the creation of one to replace it a task to the full as difficult. The new Turkish army had barely emerged from its embryo stage when the storm-

clouds long gathering on the northern frontiers burst. And so it came about that the Ottoman empire was, with untried military institutions, with the mere wreckage of a navy, and with an exchequer drained by many years of war in Greece, about to enter the lists against the colossal power of the Tsar.

The campaign in Europe of 1828.

It has been intimated that the war of 1828-29 involved operations in two distinct and far-apart theatres of war. The campaign on either side of the Black Sea was by both belligerents carried on without much regard to the course of events upon the other. It is best, then, to treat of the struggles in Europe and in Asia separately; and since the operations in Europe were the more effectual in deciding the issue, the contest in the Balkans will be taken first. It illustrates far more vividly than does the contemporaneous struggle in Armenia and Circassia the results of maritime command. Russia being the aggressor, it took place of necessity upon Turkish soil; her troops were throughout based to a certain extent upon the sea in their invasion of the dominions of the Sultan; and the chief incidents of the protracted conflict were so remarkable that the history of the campaign possesses a strategical interest above the common, and merits attentive study.

What is now the kingdom of Roumania still formed in 1828 an integral portion of the Ottoman

realm. Bulgaria was at that time little more than a name. Thus the Russo-Turkish frontier virtually coincided with the line of the Pruth and with the mouths of the Danube.

The theatre of war.

A glance at the sketch-map at the end of chapter viii. shows that a Russian army in Bessarabia aiming at Roumelia is confronted by two great natural obstacles, the river Danube and the Balkan range; also that, following the shortest line towards the Bosporus, the invading forces will move at no great distance from the Black Sea coast. The Danube in its lower course is of great volume; till very recently it was unbridged below the Iron Gates. The strategical geography of Europe affords no parallel to it as a river obstacle; in every Russo-Turkish war it has exerted a supreme influence over the course of operations. The lofty mountain-chain of the Balkans is, however, to the full as important a bulwark shielding Roumelia against aggression from the north. The passes over it are difficult and far apart, forming defiles where a handful of resolute men may hold in check a host. In 1828, moreover, the geography of this upland tract was not at all well known.

Nor did Turkey trust to natural obstacles alone to aid the Osmanli armies in repelling the invader. The quadrilateral of fortresses—Rustchuk, Silistria, Shumla, and Varna—added vastly to the Ottoman power of resistance. Shumla, situated at the

meeting-point of several routes, was generally held to be the key of the Balkans, although the actual experience of war has proved that this is not the case. Varna commanded an important harbour. An invading army hesitates to leave great places of arms like Rustchuk and Silistria unblockaded in its rear. And besides the quadrilateral there were minor fortresses in the Dobruja, of which Matchin, Hirsovo, and Kustenji were the most important; while beyond the Danube lay Braila, a formidable stronghold.

Russians cross the frontier.

Authorities differ in their estimates of the numbers which the antagonists succeeded in putting in the field. The question is not of great importance, but it should be noted as explaining the opening phases of the contest that at the outset the Turks were totally unprepared. When early in May a considerable portion of the Russian forces, which were under the supreme command of Wittgenstein, a veteran of the Napoleonic wars, crossed the Pruth, and, after investing Braila, headed for Bukarest, there were no Osmanli troops to bar the way and the invaders overran half Wallachia unmolested. Then in the first half of June the main Russian army forced the passage of the Danube below the influx of the Pruth and poured into the Dobruja. Matchin fell and Hirsovo. And, most important of all, Kustenji was captured after a short resistance by the forces of the Tsar.

Kustenji owes what little reputation it possesses as a seaport town rather to the lack of good harbours on the Bulgarian coast than to any natural advantage of its own. But its seizure was the most important step towards a campaign of conquest which the Russians had yet taken. It enabled them to turn to account their maritime supremacy. On the morrow after its capitulation no less than twenty-six vessels from Odessa laden with provisions cast anchor in the roadstead. From that time forward the invading army south of the Danube was to a great extent based upon the sea. The question of supply was a burning one to a host operating amid the sterile dunes of the Dobruja, and the capture of Kustenji almost solved it. The invaders in Bulgaria were, moreover, about the same time reinforced by the besiegers of Braila, which had succumbed after making a worthy defence, so that the opening of communications across the Euxine with the productive tracts of Southern Russia was the more opportune owing to this access to the numbers of the invading host.

And base themselves in part on Bulgarian ports.

During the six weeks, however, which had elapsed since the commencement of hostilities in Europe the Turks had not been altogether idle. The Sultan Mahmoud in this crisis displayed a vigour and decision which put new life into his Ministry, and which made itself felt throughout

Slow progress of invaders.

the length and breadth of his dominions. Not without great exertions a considerable force was collected and sent across the Balkans to Shumla. Provisions were thrown into the fortresses. Reserves were assembled in Roumelia. Operations were undertaken to check the invaders in Wallachia. So that, as the Russian army advancing out of the Dobruja towards the Shumla-Varna line pressed forward, it began to feel the presence of a formidable enemy. The nearer it drew to Shumla, which was to be its principal goal, the more it was harassed. Several sharp engagements took place, in which the Turkish cavalry showed that the fiery ardour which in the days of Soliman the Magnificent had brought the banners of the Crescent to the gates of Vienna, was not yet dead in the Osmanli horse. What the Emperor Nicholas had hoped would be a mere military promenade turned out to be a tedious, inglorious, and doubtful campaign. It was found impossible to rigidly blockade Silistria. The force detached to operate against Varna could make no progress. Before Shumla the bulk of the two hostile armies stood face to face. The invaders had got to a certain point, but they could get no farther. And thus the operations drifted from August on into September.

As the Russian army had advanced, detach-

ments on the left had occupied the various seaport villages from Kustenji to within a few miles of Varna. Still, in spite of the facilities for victualling the troops which the acquisition of these places afforded Wittgenstein, he found himself more and more troubled by the question of supply. Bulgaria was at this time a roadless, sparsely populated, inhospitable tract. His commissariat and transport services were totally inadequate for the prosecution of an active campaign. The horses of the cavalry, of the artillery, and of the train were dying of starvation. Autumn had set in. If anything was to be done it must be quickly done. And so, rather perhaps from the fear that the invading army might be compelled to retire into winter quarters without having gained anything substantial than from a just appreciation of the value of its possession in the future, the capture at all hazards of Varna was decided on.

Siege and capture of Varna.

A considerable part of the force in front of Shumla was moved eastwards so as to complete the investment of the renowned coast-fortress; and just as preparations for the siege were being made, most welcome reinforcements arrived by sea. The troops which disembarked at this juncture had played an important part in a far distant theatre of war. They had shared with the fleet in the capture of the stronghold of

Anapa on the Circassian coast, the first event of importance which had occurred in the campaign east of the Black Sea. Their transfer from Asia to Europe illustrates how Russia, dominating the Black Sea, could act upon interior lines in reference to the two distinct wars which were in progress; the episode is therefore worthy of especial note. And inasmuch as the transports conveying these detachments arrived simultaneously with a Russian fleet which at once commenced an active blockade of the beleaguered place of arms, the effect which maritime command may, under certain circumstances, exert upon a land campaign is demonstrated strikingly by the incident.

The story of the siege of Varna is full of interest to the soldier. The technical operations connected with its progress were in the highest degree instructive. The efforts of the Turks to raise it from the side of Shumla afford a capital example of the difficulties which beset a besieging army when attacked by a relieving force. To us, however, the point of main importance is that the place was taken. It capitulated on the 7th of October. And Russia thus acquired a stronghold on the sea within the Sultan's territory as a base for the campaign to be undertaken in the following year.

Having achieved this hard-won triumph, Witt-

genstein closed his operations for the year. A large garrison was left in charge of Varna. The rest of the army marched off northwards into the Dobruja and recrossed the Danube. This retirement was not interfered with by the Turks; but in spite of the fact that the invaders enjoyed practical immunity from attack owing to the lethargy of their adversaries, the movement was disastrous. Immense quantities of war material were abandoned owing to the collapse of the transport. The retreat resembled rather the flight of a beaten army than the methodical transfer of a military force from one district to another for purposes of administrative convenience. All Europe scoffed at the spectacle presented by the soldiers of the mighty Tsar as they returned to their native soil after their bout with the despised Osmanlis in a condition bordering on demoralisation. Combatants and spectators alike failed to rate at its true value what the possession of Varna by the Russians would mean in the next encounter. In spite of Paskievich's victories in Armenia, which will be dealt with later on, the year 1828 closed in gloom at Moscow and St Petersburg. At Stamboul, on the other hand, Sultan, Divan, and populace alike were stirred with hope and full of confidence.

Retreat of the Russians and preparations for next year's campaign.

One of the first steps taken by the Emperor Nicholas during the winter towards retrieving the

prestige of the Russian arms upon the Danube was to replace Prince Wittgenstein by a younger commander, and the selection fell upon General Diebich, whose subsequent achievements amply justified the choice. The new chief devoted his abundant energy and great administrative talents to thoroughly reorganising the shattered Russian forces. The commissariat was placed upon a proper standing. The transport service was reconstructed. And while this bleak region was still clothed in its winter mantle of snow, he concerted with the navy a scheme by which a footing was to be gained beyond the Balkans as a prelude to recommencing hostilities in the early summer.

Campaign of 1829. Capture of Sizeboli.

On the 18th of February the castle of Sizeboli, a stronghold perched upon a rock projecting into the Black Sea south of the Bay of Bourgas, yielded to the cannonade of a Russian squadron and was occupied by the troops which accompanied it. In itself an insignificant affair enough, the results of this capture were far-reaching. Up to the present the fleet had followed the movements of the army of invasion; now it was taking the initiative and paving the way for the military advance. The news that the Russian flag was planted on Roumelian soil caused consternation on the Golden Horn. The presence of the giaour so near his capital goaded the Sultan into taking immediate action. Advantage was taken of the

raising of the blockade of the Bosporus by the Russian fleet from stress of weather for a Turkish squadron to put to sea bound for Sizeboli. A resolute attempt to recapture the miniature Gibraltar by land was made simultaneously, which nearly proved successful. But both efforts failed. The Ottoman fleet, after capturing a hostile war-vessel by a singular accident, sped back to the Bosporus without making even an attempt to carry out the duty with which it had been intrusted. And the Russian garrison remained secure in its point of vantage far ahead of the army still at rest in winter quarters—an outpost inside the last great natural line of defence of the Ottoman empire in Europe.

During the winter the Osmanli army almost disappeared. The soldiery trooped off to their homes by scores — not an unusual feature in forces of inferior discipline. The apathetic pashas allowed the early months of 1829 to roll by, taking no heed of the enemy within their gates. The Sultan failed to inspire his subordinates with his own energy and vigour. So that when the time for action was at hand Turkey in Europe was little better prepared to withstand invasion than it had been at the outset in the previous year.

Russians advance again prepared to use Varna

The possession of Hirsovo and Braila enabled Diebich to avoid the barren unhealthy region of the Dobruja, and to pass the Danube at the former

as their base.

place. Sufficient supplies for the siege of Silistria had been collected in advance. Three months' provisions for 50,000 men were ready stored at Varna. The Russian troops left in occupation of that fortress had, moreover, been reinforced by sea and had seized and fortified Pravadi on the way to Shumla. The Turks had not reoccupied the portions of eastern Bulgaria which the Russians had overrun the previous year. When, therefore, the main army of invasion passed the Danube at Hirsovo early in May, little difficulty was experienced in investing Silistria and in opening up communications with Pravadi. And within a few days a cordon of Cossack detachments stretched from the Danube near Rustchuk to the extreme Russian left near Varna, behind which the combinations of the forces of the Tsar could be completed unobserved.

Diebich's masterly strategy.

A Turkish army was assembling at Shumla under the Grand Vizier. He decided upon an attack against Pravadi, and finding its defences somewhat formidable he commenced a regular investment of the improvised stronghold of the Russian forces. Diebich saw his opportunity. Manœuvring his army with consummate skill, he endeavoured to wedge it in between the Turks in front of Pravadi and Shumla, their great place of arms. He succeeded only partially in his purpose; but the result of his advance was a general action,

the most important of the war in Europe, in which the Osmanlis were so heavily defeated that they only succeeded in regaining Shumla by circuitous routes and as a terrified disorganised rabble. This was on the 12th of June. Then Diebich paused for a space, waiting for Silistria to fall.

He manœuvres by his left and reaches Bourgas.

The Grand Vizier convinced himself that Shumla was the objective of the Russian general. Failing to recognise the significance of the loss of Varna and Sizeboli, and of the undisputed supremacy which the enemy enjoyed in the Black Sea, he made no adequate efforts to secure the Balkan passes to his right rear. And Diebich manœuvred his forces so that the Ottoman commander became more and more convinced that Shumla was the invader's goal. At last on the 1st of July Silistria capitulated. Diebich at once drew the troops thus liberated southwards. Then, while his right contained the inert army of the Grand Vizier, he thrust his left forward into the Balkans. On the 18th the extreme flank column reached Missivri. Another column on the 24th entered Aidos. On the 26th Bourgas was in Russian hands, and the invaders gained touch with Sizeboli. A fleet awaited the advancing force in the Bay of Bourgas. And by the 1st of August Diebich was safely established south of the Balkans, based upon the best harbour on the coast between the mouths of the Danube and the Bosporus.

His bold advance through Roumelia.

The Russian chief had by masterly strategy established himself in a commanding position within the borders of Roumelia. But he foresaw that the Porte would make supreme efforts to muster adequate forces for a final struggle. The need of watching Shumla and of finding garrisons in Bulgaria and Wallachia was proving a serious drain on his resources. His fighting force had dwindled to less than 20,000 men. But Diebich grasped to the full the peculiar conditions of this war and knew the nature of his adversaries. He understood that boldness and vigour were the most effective weapons for dealing with Osmanlis, and that a masterful military policy would confound them. So he advanced along the southern Balkan slopes to Slivno, sweeping away all vestiges of opposition; then he turned southwards, paralysing the Turks by his audacity, and on the 19th of August he entered Adrianople at the head of his victorious troops amid the joyous plaudits of the Christian populace, and fixed his headquarters in the ancient metropolis of the Ottoman empire. But his position, isolated in the enemy's country, many leagues from his base at Bourgas, and with only a few thousand men at his disposal, was precarious. He rightly trusted, however, to the effect which his resplendent achievements must exert upon the oriental mind, and thrust his force forward with restless energy. One slender column reached the

Black Sea coast at Midia. Another advanced straight on Constantinople. The right wing arrived at Enos near the Dardanelles, and joined hands with the Russian Mediterranean fleet. Few more dramatic incidents have occurred in war than this meeting on the shores of the Ægean between the Cossacks who had fought their way from the Danube and the sailors who had circumnavigated Europe. Seldom has a triumph been, at least in outward appearance, more complete.

Diebich had not miscalculated the effect of his resolute advance. His daring strategy imposed upon the Porte. Rumour multiplied the numbers which he had at his command. Stamboul was in a ferment. The populace was panic-stricken. The Sultan feared for his throne. The foreign ambassadors were instant in counsel that negotiations should be opened with the conquerors while there yet was time. And so, cowed by the mere shadow of an army, by bodies of troops amounting scarcely to the advanced guard of the Russian legions which had passed the Danube, the Ottoman Government craved for peace. No time was wasted on preliminaries. The victors were not in an exacting mood. The terms which they offered were, considering the circumstances, far from onerous. And on the 14th of September was signed the Treaty of Adrianople, which brought the struggle to an end.

Peace of Adrianople.

The decisive effect of maritime command on this campaign.

The influence of Russian maritime command had been decisive. Thanks to it, Wittgenstein had been able in 1828 to maintain his ill-organised force for months in the barren inhospitable uplands of the eastern section of Bulgaria, and to compel the surrender of Turkey's great coast-fortress Varna. Then in 1829 Wittgenstein's successor, in concert with the Russian fleet, turned the great mountain bulwark which bars the road to an invader from the Danube towards the Golden Horn. A maritime base was secured upon its farther side, and thence a final blow was aimed at the very heart of the Ottoman empire. The Sultan found his capital apparently at the mercy of an invading host which stretched across from the Euxine to the Mediterranean Sea, and was supported on its flanks by formidable fleets. Sea-power permitted Diebich with a mere fraction of the army under his command to threaten the hostile capital, regardless of great gatherings of Osmanli troops at Shumla and elsewhere almost in contact with the long line of land communication which connected him with Bessarabia. Naval preponderance, in fact, decided the issue in the invader's favour and caused the Russian triumph in the European theatre of war.

The war in Asia.

But while the Tsar was thus trampling on his ancient enemy in the Balkan peninsula, his troops had not been idle on the Asiatic frontier. And

although the campaigns on the eastern side of the Black Sea were not governed by Russian maritime supremacy to the same extent as those in Europe, this exerted sufficient influence over the operations as a whole to justify a brief narrative of what occurred.

Strategical conditions at the outset.

The Russian dominions beyond the Caucasus were at this time far less extensive than in the present day. Practically only the eastern side of Transcaucasia acknowledged the authority of the Tsar. Circassia was virtually independent, although its coast-line was in Turkish hands. Russia had in fact no proper footing on the eastern Black Sea coast till the war began.

The greater part of Transcaucasia and Armenia is an elevated mountain region, very ill suited for the operations of great armies. Owing to its height above the sea and its proximity to the steppe lands of Asia, the climate is most rigorous. The rugged nature of the country offers scanty encouragement to the tiller of the soil. It is a thinly populated territory, offering but limited supplies for the consumption of military forces engaged in war. In 1828-29 the mountain-ranges bordering upon the coast from Anapa to Trebizond were the home of warlike tribes, mostly followers of Islam and therefore hostile to the extension of Russian influence. But the most important strategical feature from the point of view of sea-

power in this theatre of war is the fact that, except about Poti, the districts on the Black Sea coast are so rugged as to forbid military operations on any important scale.

A Russian army from Georgia is almost compelled by the geographical features of Armenia to follow either the caravan-route from Tiflis by Kars and Erzerum to Trebizond, or else the Persian route by Byazid to Erzerum. The fact that these two great highways of commerce meet near Erzerum, constitutes that city a place of rare strategical importance. For centuries it has been encircled with defence works and has been looked upon as the key of eastern Turkey in Asia, and in 1828 it was a fortress calculated to offer strenuous resistance to an invader. Nor did it stand alone. The Osmanlis held the famous stronghold of Kars and the mountain fastness of Akhalsik. Akhalkali and Byazid were fortified, and also on the Black Sea coast Batoum, Poti, and Anapa.

The Russian troops which were assembled in Georgia in the spring were numerically very weak for the prosecution of an aggressive war. Nor was the prospect of reinforcements at all hopeful. Communications over the mountains from Transcaucasia to European Russia scarcely existed, and the vast distance of this outwork of the empire from the Muscovite centres of wealth offered almost insuperable difficulties to military move-

ments. Still the Tsar's army had certain points in its favour. It was composed of veterans who had just triumphed over the cohorts of the Shah. At its head was General Paskievich, one of the most capable and illustrious of modern leaders. The enemy was wholly unprepared — only scattered detachments guarded Armenia. Many of the Ottoman fortresses had fallen into disrepair and were not provisioned to stand a siege. Nothing, in fact, was ready on the Turkish side, while the Russian force, small as it was, was thoroughly organised, was in a high state of efficiency, and was eager for the fray.

Campaign of 1828. Capture of Poti.

In his preliminary dispositions Paskievich showed how fully he appreciated the significance of maritime command. While directing the bulk of his forces upon Kars, he detached his right wing to the Black Sea coast. The capture of Anapa has been already mentioned; it was effected by an expedition from the Crimea in the early days of June. About the same time Paskievich's right wing appeared before the gates of Poti and compelled its surrender after a feeble resistance. Thus the Russian army invading the Ottoman provinces in Asia was at the very outset of the campaign brought into touch by sea with the great Russian ports Odessa and Sebastopol. The consequences of this did not immediately make themselves felt. Sea-power, in fact, scarcely influenced the first

year's operations at all. But, as we shall see later on, the possession of Poti was directly instrumental in bringing about the startling Russian triumphs of the following year.

Paskievich's brilliant operations.

Paskievich first advanced on Kars, a place of high renown all over Asia. Throughout the world of Islam it was regarded as a pillar of the Moslem faith. A century before, in the days of the famous conqueror Nadir Shah, its ramparts had turned the tide of Persian victory when at the very flood. Its prompt surrender to the invading troops swept away the chief obstacle to an advance on Erzerum, and the moral effect of this great feat of arms was perhaps of even greater value to the small Russian army than the strategical advantage gained thereby. Moreover, Paskievich was not a man to rest upon his laurels when there was work to do. He promptly moved on Akhalkali and captured it. Then he turned towards Akhalsik, a mountain stronghold deemed almost impregnable, and after a desperate struggle he made himself master of its defences. His left wing captured Byazid. Then, as the season was advancing, the Russian army retired into winter quarters with good reason to be proud of its achievements.

Reinforcements reach the Russians by sea during winter and enable

These brilliant successes had been gained with a relatively insignificant force, but for Turkish unpreparedness so much could certainly not have been accomplished with such limited numbers.

them to take the field again the following year.

It was not to be expected, however, that the Ottoman Government would in the following year so shamefully neglect the defences of Armenia. If, therefore, the campaign of next summer was to have a favourable issue, an augmentation of the Russian army destined for its execution was imperative. The vast stretches of steppe-land which intervened between the Caucasus and Russia proper almost forbade the idea of seeking reinforcements from beyond the lofty snow-capped range; the successes on the Black Sea coast had, however, opened up a new and shorter route. During the winter considerable bodies of troops and great stores of war material were sent from Sebastopol to Poti, whence they were despatched to join Paskievich's headquarters between Kars and Tiflis. In virtue of maritime command the army of the Caucasus was swelled into a force capable, under the able guidance of its illustrious chief, of carrying war into the enemy's country in spite of the great accessions to the hostile strength which were taking place. For the Sultan was thoroughly alarmed for the safety of Armenia. The loss of Kars and of Akhalsik had created a profound impression on the Bosporus. Such fitful activity as the effete Ottoman military institutions were capable of was displayed in pushing troops from Anatolia towards the theatre of war. Emissaries were despatched in all haste to stir up the religious fan-

aticism of the semi-independent mountain tribes. In the depth of winter a desperate attempt was made to recover Akhalsik. And when hostilities recommenced in June, Paskievich found himself confronted west of Kars by a Turkish army far greater than his own.

Campaign of 1829.

The Asiatic campaign of 1829 does not illustrate the effect of maritime command to any appreciable extent. This had done its work before hostilities began in enabling the Russian army to be brought up to a strength capable of undertaking an offensive war. Paskievich, by one of the most masterly feats of soldiership recorded in the military annals of modern times, beat the vastly superior forces in his path in detail and decisively. Then, giving the Osmanlis no time to recover, he pressed on to Erzerum and planted the Russian standard on the citadel of the Armenian capital. A portion of his army pushed on by Baiburt nearly to within sight of Trebizond, but the supremacy of the naval forces of the Tsar in the Black Sea was not sufficiently absolute to permit of a squadron being detached from the Bosporus and Bourgas to co-operate with Paskievich in an attack upon that important city. Fearing for his long line of communications, the conqueror resolved to advance no farther. And the peace of Adrianople soon after put an end to a campaign of singular glory to

the Russian arms. The genius of Paskievich had triumphed over difficulties which few would have cared to face. Napoleon himself could have done no more, and might not have done so much.

Sea-power at the root of Russia's triumph in this war.

So ended the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29. That a great military empire like Russia should, after years of preparation, gain some measure of success in conflict with the decaying Ottoman State is not a subject for surprise. The fact that the rupture occurred when Turkey was prostrated by its efforts to subdue the rebel Greeks, and just at the time when its ancient standing army had been dissolved and a totally new system was in course of introduction, was, moreover, most favourable to the forces of the Tsar. But the triumph of the Muscovite had been complete almost beyond precedent. The Ottoman power of resistance had utterly collapsed. And the cause of this is to be found in the maritime supremacy of Russia.

It is no disparagement to Paskievich to say that, but for the reinforcements sent to him by sea prior to his final campaign, it would have taxed his ability and resource to the very utmost merely to retain his hold on Kars and Akhalsik in the second year of war. It was sea-power which rendered Diebich's sudden passage of the Balkans possible, and which gave him a base in Roumelia for prosecuting his dramatic advance

through Adrianople to within striking distance of the Golden Horn. It was due to the naval forces of the Tsar in the Mediterranean that the military resources in outlying portions of the vast Ottoman empire remained in great part idle spectators while the invading hosts from north and east forced their way into its heart. The campaigns alike in Europe and in Asia were land campaigns,—actual fighting on the sea there was none worthy of the name; and yet maritime command was the dominant note throughout. To outward appearances the Russian navy played a very secondary part during the war; in reality its undisputed supremacy governed the operations and shaped their course from start to finish.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY IN 1853.

THE year following the signature of the Treaty of Adrianople was signalised by a most memorable operation of war, an operation in which an army by the instrumentality of maritime command achieved a very great success, and achieved it speedily, with comparative ease and at the cost of losses insignificant relatively to the results obtained.

The French descent upon Algiers.

Impelled by popular disquiet to take measures for distracting attention from home affairs, the French Government planned an attack upon Algiers, and having committed themselves to the enterprise they threw themselves into the task of preparation with characteristic energy and enthusiasm. Algiers had recovered from Lord Exmouth's stern chastisement. The ruined batteries

of the pirate lair had been built up again. The dismounted guns were in position. The seaward defences had been in part remodelled under renegade advice. The stronghold offered in fact, in 1830, so serious an obstacle to a maritime attack of the kind which had been successful fourteen years before, that there were grave doubts on the Seine whether such an operation could be undertaken without incurring unjustifiable risk. And there were, moreover, other causes at work to deter the French from trusting to a purely naval campaign, and to induce them to throw their army also into the scale. They aimed at something higher than the mere coercion of the Dey. Their design was conquest, and the creation of a colonial empire in North Africa. With this ambitious purpose in their view they assembled an expeditionary force upon an elaborate scale at Toulon and other convenient Mediterranean ports. An imposing fleet of transports was got together to convey the troops to their destination. And as soon as all was ready the army was despatched under escort of a squadron of stately battleships to the Barbary shores.

An excellent example of an operation of this class.

Few better examples of a descent in force upon a hostile coast could be quoted than the expedition to Algiers. The arrangements had been framed with anxious care for every detail. The landing was carried out without a hitch. The

spot selected lay a few leagues to the west of the great stronghold in which the tyrant ruler put his trust. The army was on shore before the Algerian military forces could arrive upon the scene. Thus the command of the sea—which in conflict with a barbaric foe a great Power can always depend upon—enabled the admirably trained and organised troops of Charles X. to surprise a secure footing on the soil which they hoped to make their own, and at a point within easy striking distance of the hostile capital.

To a campaign opened with a stroke so sudden and so adroit there could be but one ending. The army of the Dey offered a brave resistance, but his forces were no match for the disciplined soldiery of France, and their efforts to arrest the progress of the invaders were unavailing. The land defences of Algiers were not of a formidable character, and the city was occupied by the conquerors within a few days of their appearance on the southern coasts of the Mediterranean. The Government of the Dey was overturned, and the dream of African dominion seemed ripe for fulfilment.

Subsequent struggles in Algeria.

But the sequel showed how vast a difference there is between the carrying out of a campaign against the forces of a savage potentate when there is a clearly defined objective in view, and the subjugation of great tracts of unexplored territory peopled by predatory mountain tribes and by

nomads with a natural bent for irregular war. It took years of conflict to establish the French in the huge area now included in Algeria. Throughout these protracted hostilities sea-power was of incalculable benefit to the victors. Based successively on various of the numerous ports scattered along the extensive Algerian coast-line, the French forces gradually conquered the different districts. They dealt with their opponents piecemeal as it were. Sea-power enabled the active portion of the army of occupation to be transferred from one minor theatre of war to another with ease. This was a distinctive feature of a very remarkable struggle, and it deserves mention in these pages, although the nature of the operations was not such as to demand that a narrative of them should be included.

Mehemet Ali's revolt and invasion of Syria in 1833.

The appearance of the French upon Algerian territory was another blow added to the many which the Ottoman empire had suffered in ten disastrous years of war. The Dey owed a nominal allegiance to the Porte, and it is possible that, had the Sultan felt his position stronger, complications between the Governments of Paris and Constantinople might have arisen. But the crumbling structure which formed the remnant of the once dreaded empire of the Osmanlis was too shattered by its recent misfortunes for the Grand Seignior

to interfere in favour of this remote dependency. Moreover, a storm was already brewing which was to shake the power and position of the Caliph more than the destruction of his fleets at Navarino, the fall of Kars and Erzerum, or even the humiliating peace of Adrianople.

In an earlier chapter the character of Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, has been referred to, and his success in creating for himself a powerful fleet and army has been dealt with. That the fighting forces of the Nile provinces were a factor to be reckoned with in the Levant was indeed abundantly shown in the later phases of the war of Greek emancipation. Navarino had, it is true, almost wiped the Egyptian navy out of existence. But the prolonged struggle had afforded the new-formed army what it wanted most—practical instruction in the military art. And Mehemet Ali was not the man to repine over the disaster to his fleet and make no effort to repair his loss.

While Turkey was in the throes of the Russian war the Egyptian ruler devoted himself to building up afresh the sea-power of which the Allies had so suddenly deprived him. His army had recovered from the severe strain thrown upon it in the campaigns of Missolonghi and the Morea. And when, after the catastrophe of 1829 to the Ottoman empire, the astute, far-seeing viceroy came to reckon up the chances of a possible conflict with

his sovereign, he recognised at once how favourable these were to him. His troops had shown a superiority to the Turkish soldiery in Greece which could not be mistaken. His fleet was now more than a match for the squadron which had been locked up in the Sea of Marmora for so many months by the warships of the Tsar. The resolute, ambitious prince chafed at his state of vassalage to the Porte. He felt that if he was to win for himself a place as independent potentate the opportunity was at hand. Justly confident in the efficiency of his fighting forces, he dreamt of raising up afresh the empire of the Ptolemies. The emigration of some thousand peasants from the Nile delta to Syria, whom the Pasha of Acre when peremptorily called upon from Cairo to do so refused to send back, served as a pretext for entering on hostilities. And Mehemet Ali, placing his son Ibrahim at the head of a force of 40,000 men, bade him advance into Syria, and thus fairly flung down the gauntlet to the Sultan.

Syria as a theatre of war.

Syria, regarded as a theatre of war, possesses one feature which in importance overshadows every other. The physical conformation of the country is such that military communications are confined to the narrow strip of rich and level country which borders on the sea. The mountainous and in great part desolate interior does not permit of the ready movement of great armies. The only route

leading from the Nile basin into Asia Minor by which large bodies of troops can operate freely skirts the Mediterranean shore. This route has been for ages the main highway of commerce and of conquest between the two continents which come together here. There are few more typical strategical defiles in existence, and there is not perhaps one single one which has played a more important part in shaping the world's history. From the days of Sesostris down to those of Buonaparte it has been traversed by the hosts which at intervals Asia and Africa put in motion one against the other, according as the dominant race of the particular epoch dwelt east or west of the Suez isthmus. It has been the scene of conflicts which have decided the fate of empires long since decayed and passed away. And now in the course of a very remarkable civil war it was to illustrate with signal vividness the strategical import of a military line of communications the security of which is entirely dependent on maritime command.

What a paramount influence sea-power may exert over land operations when these hinge on a line of communications which traverses a defile having the ocean on one hand, was pointed out in the opening chapter. The Riviera was quoted as an illustration. Manifestly the shore route along the Syrian coast presents precisely these

conditions. To justify the advance of an army along it, or to permit of its employment as a line of communications, maritime command is indispensable. The records of ancient and of modern conflicts in the territories which abut on the eastern end of the Levant show that it is so. The Persian, Macedonian, and Tartar conquerors, whom the riches of the Nile delta tempted from Asia into Africa, were aided by flotillas which made them masters of the adjacent waters. Egyptian triumphs over Syrian dynasties were gained as much by sea-power as by victories on land. But when Mehemet Ali, judging the time ripe for the execution of his ambitious projects, launched his army into the dominions of his sovereign lord, undisputed ascendancy in the Mediterranean did not necessarily at once open to his forces this historic line of operations. And for this reason.

Strategical conditions.

At intervals along the route there were situated fortresses which in hostile hands effectually barred it to an advancing force. Beyrout and Jaffa were strongholds demanding to be treated with respect, other walled seaport towns served as barrier forts, but by far the most important strategical point upon the coast was Acre, which was, indeed, justly named the key of Syria. A flourishing city under the name of Ptolemais in the Roman era, for decades the scene of wellnigh ceaseless conflict in

the stirring times of the Crusades, a place which had won for itself world-wide renown some years before as having inflicted on Napoleon one of the very few defeats suffered by him in the early stages of his meteoric career, Acre had borne no mean share in moulding oriental destinies. Its defences were in good repair. Its battlements bristled with an imposing ordnance. The Turks, mindful of 1799, maintained an adequate garrison to man the walls. Fully aware of this, and appreciating at its full value the importance of capturing the famous place of arms, Ibrahim Pasha in the first instance shaped his plans solely with a view to wresting it from the Osmanlis. The sketch-map facing p. 138 illustrates the campaigns of which the siege of Acre formed the opening scene.

It was by no means certain at the outbreak of hostilities whether either side could calculate on maritime dominion. On paper the relative naval strength of the antagonists appeared to be about the same. But Ibrahim and his father had not forgotten the Hellenic war, nor its tale of wellnigh unbroken Turkish maritime disaster. Counting on the incapacity and cowardice of the Sultan's admirals, they assumed from the outset that their fleet would be supreme in the Levant, and their estimate of the sea-power of the Turks turned out to be correct. The Egyptian navy maintained

maritime command practically unchallenged, as long as the forces engaged were confined to those of the Porte and of the Khedive.

Siege and capture of Acre by Ibrahim Pasha based upon the sea.

So when, in the autumn of 1831, the troops of Ibrahim swept forward to the gates of Acre, and invested that historic stronghold, they did so with the moral and practical support of a friendly fleet. The place did not yield without offering an obstinate resistance. For months the Egyptians were kept at bay. The siege taxed the energies of Ibrahim to the utmost. But, during its progress, sea-power enabled him to draw food supplies and war material across the water from the Nile delta. Heavy guns were shipped from the Egyptian arsenals to batter down the parapets. By the agency of maritime command the siege was carried out with obstinacy and vigour. The great Syrian bulwark of the Ottoman empire, however, kept the invaders engaged till May. Its devotion gave the Sultan time to assemble an army near Aleppo which threatened Ibrahim's troops surrounding it. Still, based on the sea, the Egyptian commander found little difficulty in detaching a force northwards to hold the Turks in check, and when at last Acre succumbed, the theatre of war was promptly extended northwards. At the battle of Homs, early in July, the Osmanli army was signally defeated. And a few days later, Ibrahim at the head of his victorious troops entered Aleppo,

Capture of Aleppo.

and by the capture of its principal city completed the conquest of the pashalic of Syria.

Throughout this brilliant campaign the Egyptian chief had depended upon his fleet. The sea had been his main channel of supply. He had manœuvred with a freedom and confidence which maritime command alone could justify. And in his further operations he placed the same reliance on the navy, and derived from its presence and protection the same advantages.

Still based on the sea, the Egyptians enter Anatolia.

The triumphs gained in Syria only whetted the appetite of Mehemet Ali and his son for territorial extension and military glory. After a brief pause, Ibrahim was on the move again. He forced the passage of the hills separating him from the Cilician plain in spite of Turkish efforts to block the defiles. The defending forces were overwhelmed and dispersed. Then, having established an advanced base on the shores of the Gulf of Alexandretta, he crossed the Taurus range, and his victorious army poured forward into Anatolia.

The Sultan Mahmoud, now no longer in the prime of manhood, had watched the progress of the enemy through Syria with dismay. For more than a decade his reign had been marked by a succession of unparalleled disasters. Still, to the descendant of Othman it seemed impossible that the despised Ethiopians could prove a real menace to the caliphate. While the campaign was confined

to distant Syria, the Porte temporised after the manner of oriental Governments. Mahmoud's energy and force of character seemed to have spent themselves in the anxieties and disappointments of the early phases of his reign. No adequate steps were taken to muster the vast reserves of latent military force which the empire undoubtedly possessed. No real effort was made to gather together a mighty army and to forbid the entry of Ibrahim Pasha into Asia Minor. So that when the Egyptian leader, whose methods of war were characterised by a dash and daring in striking contrast to the irresolution and ineptitude of the Ottoman Government, burst through the last great natural barrier which separated him from the Sea of Marmora and manifested an intention, should fortune smile on him, to push on even to the Golden Horn, it was really too late to arrest his advance by force of arms.

Aroused by the imminence of the peril, the Grand Seignior by desperate efforts succeeded indeed in gathering together a host formidable in numbers, if not for any other reason. And he ordered the Ottoman fleet, which had lain idle for many months when it might have played so important a part in shaping the course that the struggle was to follow, to put to sea and to strike a blow in defence of his threatened throne. The failure of the Turkish naval forces at this alarming crisis

to create even a diversion gave a foretaste of the catastrophe which was in store on land. On the 21st of December was fought the great battle of Konia, one of the most decisive combats chronicled in the annals of modern war. In point of numbers the Osmanlis had a great advantage. In every other element of strength Ibrahim Pasha's army was superior. The troops of the Sultan bore themselves bravely in the fight, but they were overmatched by their highly disciplined and organised opponents, accustomed to victory and commanded by a general who on this great day proved himself a tactician of the foremost rank. The defeat of the Turks was complete and overwhelming. The Grand Vizier himself was taken prisoner. The legions sent to arrest the progress of the conqueror ceased to exist as an army. The road to Constantinople was open to the invaders. The Ottoman empire was on the brink of dissolution.

The battle of Konia.

But Ibrahim's triumph by its very magnitude proved fatal to the ambitious projects of his father. The Sultan, driven to the last extremity, sought for foreign aid. He turned first to the British Government; but the Cabinet of St James's declined to move. Mahmoud would not appeal to France which had so recently annexed Algeria, claimed as an Ottoman dependency. So the Commander of the Faithful in his dire distress

The Sultan requests and receives Russian aid.

sought assistance from his traditional adversary the Tsar.

The request met with a response, affirmative, cordial, and prompt. Nothing could be more satisfactory. The Tsar prepared to send his Black Sea fleet to the Sea of Marmora and an expeditionary force to Scutari. Negotiations between the combatants, brought about by the good offices of the Paris Government, delayed Russian action for a few weeks. But they fell through, and thereupon the military and naval forces of the Tsar appeared in the Bosporus.

Mehemet Ali comes to terms with the Porte.

Mehemet Ali was not so intoxicated by the triumph of his troops as not to perceive how completely Russian intervention transformed the situation. His army had gained resplendent victories over the ill-armed, ill-disciplined, and disorganised forces of the Padishah. Now it would, unless it paused, cross bayonets with the soldiers of the Tsar, and would have to face the boundless military resources of the great Northern empire. More than this. The Russian fleet would not lie idle in the Sea of Marmora should hostilities continue. Its appearance in the Mediterranean would inevitably mean the loss of that maritime command upon which Ibrahim Pasha had based his brilliant operations, and upon which his army, now in the heart of Anatolia, depended for its very existence. So negotiations were resumed.

The Porte, eager to get rid of the deliverers whose presence within sight of the Golden Horn was highly irksome, was in a most accommodating mood. It was agreed that the Egyptians should evacuate Asia Minor, and that Syria should be practically annexed to the dominions of the Khedive. And on these terms a peace was patched up which really amounted merely to a suspension of hostilities, and which lasted only for the space of six years.

A truce of six years followed by resumption of hostilities in 1839.

War broke out afresh in 1839. This time it was the Sultan who began hostilities, and the campaign opened under conditions far more favourable to the Turks than had obtained at the outset of the previous conflict. The Grand Seignior had employed the intervening time to good purpose in reorganising the shattered naval and military forces on which the safety of his throne depended. Europe, moreover, no longer regarded the domestic quarrel between the Caliph and his truculent vassal with unconcern. The action of the Tsar in 1833 had brought into prominence the preponderance which Russia was acquiring in the East. The doctrine that Turkey was necessary to the existing Continental system had grown to be an accepted article of political faith. The Powers, France alone standing aloof, endeavoured to prevent a breach of the peace. Their demeanour showed plainly that their sympathies were

in favour of the Porte. But lack of agreement between the Cabinets most interested rendered their efforts unavailing. A great Turkish army was set in motion against Syria from Anatolia; and the naval forces of the Osmanlis proceeded to the Egyptian coast.

Turks advance into Syria and are defeated.

Mehemet Ali was too experienced a statesman not to interpret the political portents correctly. Little disposed to brave the will of Europe, he instructed Ibrahim to act on the defensive, and recalled his warships to the Nile delta. The Turkish army, meeting no opposition in the mountains of the border, advanced full of confidence into Syria. But before it had proceeded many miles it found itself in presence of the enemy. The Egyptian troops were drawn up in position at Nezib, near where the Euphrates issues from the hills of Kurdistan. A general engagement ensued. The forces of the Sultan were far superior in numbers to those confronting them, but Ibrahim showed that his hand had not lost its cunning during six years of peace, and his soldiery were steadfast and formidable as of old. At the crisis of the fight a portion of the Osmanli army went over to the foe. The defection of this body decided the fortunes of the day and the Turks were utterly defeated. Konia had scarcely been more disastrous to them. Their rout was irretrievable. The battle of Nezib had important and far-reach-

ing effects, — its result ensured the Egyptians in Syria against aggression from the north. But to us in the present day it has a special and peculiar interest. For attached to the staff of the vanquished force was a young German officer who was destined in after-life to win imperishable renown. It was under the untoward circumstances of connection with an army ignominiously overthrown in its first encounter that Von Moltke learnt one of his earliest practical lessons in the art of war.

The Turkish fleet joins the Egyptians.

In spite of his victory at Nezib the situation of Ibrahim's troops would have been most critical had the Sultan's project of dominating the Levant with his warships been carried into execution. But the novel activity of the Ottoman navy was to have a singular termination, and the fortune of war was not to favour Mehemet Ali on land alone. The Turkish squadron reached Egyptian waters without mishap, it appeared before Alexandria, and a struggle seemed to be imminent, when suddenly the formidable armament peacefully entered the harbour and delivered itself up treacherously to the enemy. By the perfidy of the Turkish captains Ottoman sea-power ceased to exist. Maritime command, from which Ibrahim Pasha had derived such great advantage in 1833, was definitely transferred to the Egyptian side. At sea, in fact, Mehemet Ali had, without firing a shot,

achieved an even greater success than on land—a success which appeared to assure to him absolutely the territories wrested from the Sultan six years before. But he had now to reckon with adversaries more formidable than the military forces which formed the sole remains of the fighting power of the Porte.

European intervention.

The Great Powers of Europe, with the exception of France, were resolved for their own various ends to uphold the Ottoman empire against its dangerous dependency. Mehemet Ali with characteristic caution avoided any aggressive measures in spite of the commanding position which his forces enjoyed in the theatre of war, and affairs remained at a standstill during the winter of 1839-40. But in the following summer the Powers—France still remaining isolated, and apparently supporting the viceroy—took the decisive step of practically ordering Mehemet Ali to abandon his conquests, and they at the same time insisted on his restitution of the Ottoman fleet.

Quarrel between the United Kingdom and France.

Reference to political questions is generally inconvenient and undesirable in a work dealing with a military subject. The situation created by the European coercion of Egypt involved, however, the gravest issues. It brought into prominence the question of the relative strength of the British and French naval forces to a greater extent than any incident which has occurred since Waterloo.

Therefore a short digression from the narrative of military events in Syria appears to be permissible.

Great Britain was heading a coalition against Mehemet Ali. France was supporting him. The merits of the dispute are immaterial; the point of real importance is that the news of the peremptory demand addressed by the Powers to the Egyptian viceroy created a tremendous sensation in Paris. There was an outburst of warlike enthusiasm on the boulevards, directed especially against England. The relations were strained almost to the breaking point. For a time conflict between the two countries appeared to be almost inevitable, and all the circumstances pointed to the probability of the quarrel being brought to a head in the Levant and to the struggle opening with a combat between the British and French Mediterranean fleets.

Unpreparedness of Great Britain for war, and observations with regard to it.

The strength of the British navy was not at this time commensurate with the greatness of its obligations. The number of vessels in commission scarcely sufficed to make the flag respected in foreign waters. The *personnel* had shrunk till it barely came up to the standard demanded for the sea-going fleet. Fine battleships were decaying at their moorings in Portsmouth harbour and the Medway for want of funds to keep them in repair. The dockyards, which a few years before had been the scene of feverish activity,

were lying idle. British maritime supremacy was merely a name and rested only on the unsubstantial foundations of prestige. Popular interest in questions of national defence had declined from year to year as the seasons passed and brought no foreign complications. The country was justly proud of the great share it had borne in the overthrow of Napoleon. The splendour of the British victories by sea and land had imbued all classes with an overweening confidence in British might. Retrenchment therefore became the order of the day. The bent of the Legislature was for parsimonious limitation of the naval and military forces of the Crown. The Government took its cue from Parliament and people. And so when, to frustrate Mehemet Ali's plans of conquest and to prop up the Sultan's tottering throne, Great Britain prepared to act decisively in defiance of the will of France, the navy upon which national prosperity and national existence depended could barely have stood the strain of war with the Great Power which seemed about to side with the Egyptian viceroy.

Fifteen years later the country was to reap the harvest which it had sown in an era of indifference to its most vital interests. Then the fury of the populace knew no bounds. A distinguished commander for failing to perform impossible deeds of daring in the Baltic with an insufficient fleet was

assailed with the fiercest invective. For the administrative collapse under the burden of which the army in the Crimea endured such sufferings the Cabinet of the day was reviled and held up to scorn. The people did not recognise their own responsibility for the unsatisfactory condition of the navy and the army. They sought for scapegoats. Every disaster was laid at the door of the Government in office — a Government which had neglected its duties as to national insurance no more than Governments which preceded it, and which had only followed the drift of popular opinion as every Government must in a land with democratic institutions. It must be admitted that till within a few years of the Syrian crisis legislative and executive power had rested with the upper classes, and that during the early periods of Queen Victoria's reign democracy being a plant of recent growth lacked experience. But for many years after the Crimean war the country remained in apathy with regard to the question of imperial defence, except during occasional periods of sudden panic. It has remained for the closing decade of the nineteenth century to show that command of the sea and an efficient army are not incompatible with the most liberal forms of self-government, and that the British people can be trusted to maintain fighting forces sufficient to safeguard the empire which is their heritage.

The operations of the allied fleets on the Syrian coasts.

It was fortunate for Great Britain in 1840 that the Government of Louis Philippe hesitated to commit itself finally to an adventurous policy. The weakness of the Mediterranean fleet, discreditable as it was, was not so serious but that in capable hands and aided by a small but efficient Austrian squadron it was well able to act with crushing effect against Mehemet Ali. And the promptitude of the British Government and its supporters settled the Syrian imbroglio while France was pausing irresolute. In August the naval forces of the Allies appeared before Beyrout, and a squadron was detached to Alexandria to watch the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleet controlled by the Khedive. Ibrahim Pasha having ignored a peremptory summons to evacuate Syria, Beyrout was attacked and captured and the Turkish flag was rehoisted on its battlements. Then Sidon was taken. The ports from Alexandretta to the mouths of the Nile were strictly blockaded. Tripoli and Latakia fell. The mountaineers of the Lebanon rose against the Egyptian authorities. And finally Acre, in spite of the gallant resistance of its garrison, succumbed to the broadsides of the battleships and to the daring assaults of British and Austrian storming-parties landed from the attacking war-vessels.

Their decisive influence upon

The operations of the allied fleet had been attended by conspicuous success. One tactical

triumph had followed another with startling rapidity. The capture of the renowned stronghold of Acre, which a few years before had for many months kept at bay and held in check the forces of Ibrahim Pasha destined subsequently to win such fame by their achievements, was just one of those striking episodes of war which work on the imagination of oriental races. But it was not the reverses suffered on the Syrian coast which in themselves brought the Egyptian chief to book. It was the strategical influence exerted by the loss of his communications which compelled his father to bow to the will of the allied Powers. The loss of maritime command had in fact made Ibrahim Pasha's position an impossible one. Mehemet Ali consented to the terms imposed by Europe, and the war which the Egyptian viceroy had waged with such resolute energy and such good fortune against the Ottoman empire came to a sudden and abrupt conclusion. The Turkish fleet was restored to its rightful master, and the troops of Ibrahim Pasha withdrew to the Nile delta.

the land campaign.

Thus, in consequence of the sudden transfer of maritime command from one side to the other, terminated a most memorable struggle. It had given to the world a signal illustration of the fighting power of a State which is governed by a despot who has profited to the full by the military organisation and good order which are

Strategical lesson taught by the war.

habitual in civilised countries with a more liberal form of government. Although confined throughout to Asiatic territory, it had at one time threatened to set all Europe in a blaze. The story is almost forgotten now of how the Egyptian ruler nearly overthrew the Ottoman empire with an army scarcely equal to a modern army corps. But the great strategical lesson which it teaches has not lost its value. A military force cannot depend upon a line of communications running along the seashore if the enemy enjoys maritime supremacy. Ibrahim Pasha planted the banners of Egypt on the plains of Anatolia in virtue of the command of the Levant which his fleet was permitted to assume. When the allied squadron appeared upon the Syrian coast his scheme of operations, however, collapsed, just as it had collapsed in the Morea when the naval power of the Ottoman empire was annihilated in the Bay of Navarino.

Peace in Europe up to 1848.

For some years after the conclusion of the war in Syria no military events of a character to illustrate in noteworthy fashion the effect of maritime command on land campaigns occurred. A British expeditionary force, it is true, carried out some interesting operations on the coasts of China, and showed how a powerful nation with the forces of civilisation at its back can compel the submis-



SYRIA—TO ILLUSTRATE IBRAHIM PASHA'S CAMPAIGNS.



sion of a barbaric empire when the geographical conditions admit of its naval and military forces combining to carry out its purpose. But the hostilities only took the form of bombardment of various Chinese strongholds on the coast or their reduction by landing troops in their vicinity.

The year 1848, however, was the most troubled on the continent of Europe since the close of the Napoleonic era. And although most of the fighting which resulted from the wave of revolutionary excitement which started in Paris and spread eastward to the Russian borders took place in theatres of war uninfluenced by sea-power, the annals of this turbulent epoch tell of one conflict in which the question of maritime command was all-important, and of another in which it played a prominent part.

Undoubtedly the most memorable struggle of this period of general unrest was that between the Magyars and the house of Hapsburg. The efforts of Hungary to gain political freedom shook to its foundations the most powerful State in Central Europe. The course of the campaign was most eventful, its vicissitudes surprising. But from its initiation when the Hungarians appeared before Vienna, to its close when the legions of the Tsar compelled the revolted nation to submit, no question of sea-power ever was involved, and it

need not be considered further. Still the distracted condition of the Austrian empire consequent upon this frightful civil war was not without its effect upon another conflict, the course of which was influenced to no small extent by the maritime command which one side could depend upon at a critical stage of the campaign.

Campaign in Lombardy and Venetia.

What we know as Italy to-day consisted at this time of a strange collection of kingdoms, principalities, republics, and dependencies. Of these the most important were the kingdom of Sardinia or Piedmont, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies with its centre of government at Naples, and the extensive territory in the centre of the peninsula governed by the Pope. Austria held Lombardy and Venetia. And the conditions were such that while in each separate State revolutionary feeling was smouldering, a vague desire for Italian unity was universal, and this sentiment was considerably strengthened by the presence of alien soldiers in the basin of the Po. When news came of the overthrow of the French monarchy by the Paris mob, there was uproar in many of the Italian cities. Excitement grew till the whole country was in a ferment. And the King of Sardinia, seizing upon the opportunity which a rising in Milan in March 1848 afforded him, placed himself at the head of a general movement for driving back the Austrians over the eastern Alps.

Austria's naval power was not imposing at this time. Her fleet, such as it was, was unready. The admirals were slow to put to sea. Sardinia, on the other hand, and others of the Italian States, owned ships of war which hurried to the Adriatic. Handled with decision, these made themselves practically masters for the time being of its northern end. During the opening phases, therefore, of the operations which followed on the Mincio and the Adige Marshal Radetzky, the Austrian chief, was not a little hampered by the command of the adjacent waters being virtually in the enemy's hands. It was impossible for him to draw supplies and reinforcements from Trieste by ship. Maritime power gave a life and force to the insurrectionary movement in Venetia which imperilled his communications with his base beyond the hills. For a space the position of the imperial commander, a veteran with a European reputation dating back to 1814, was most insecure. Excellent troops confronted him; the Venetians, supported by corps brought by sea from distant provinces, harassed his rear; and affairs on the Danube were too unsettled for additional troops to be detached to Northern Italy. Then there came a sudden change. The Neapolitan Government, threatened by internal convulsions, recalled its land and naval forces. The Austrians recovered command of the Adriatic. A reserve army from

Italians command the Adriatic for a time and hold the Austrians in check.

They lose this command, and are in consequence defeated.

beyond the Alps poured into Venetia. The old marshal was relieved of fear for his communications, and he at once assumed the offensive and startled the world by the vigour of his combinations.

His campaign was a masterpiece. His strategy was of the robustest type, his tactics were singularly deft and trenchant. He speedily gained the upper hand on the Adige. He swept the Sardinians back through Lombardy. He recoverd Milan in August, and he imposed an armistice upon the vanquished foe. Venice alone held out. The ocean city defied the Austrians by land and sea, and the struggle for its possession was not affected by the cessation of hostilities in Lombardy.

The truce was short-lived. Before the vernal equinox Austria and Sardinia were at war again. The Italians trusted to the struggle in Hungary to keep the imperial troops employed. But Radetzky never faltered in his operations. No hostile fleet now threatened his communications. With the small army which the Vienna Government could spare from the Danube and the Theiss he assumed the offensive, overthrew the Sardinians at Novara, and brought the campaign to a conclusion most glorious to the Austrian arms. In 1848, while maritime command was in dispute, the result had been in doubt. In 1849 the imperial

navy ranged the Northern Adriatic unopposed, and this was fatal to the cause of Italian freedom.

The first war between Germany and Denmark.

It is not unusual for nations agitated by political excitement to vent it upon neighbouring peoples; the French, when in consequence of the great Revolution the whole fabric of society was tottering, eagerly embarked upon external war. In 1848 the German Confederation was seething with revolutionary propaganda. Every petty principality indulged in an *émeute*. In Prussia the populace were clamouring for they knew not what. From Oldenburg to the Vistula there was turmoil, anxiety, and disaffection. The situation was serious, and statesmen fully realised its gravity. All Central Europe was in a volcanic state, and an appalling eruption in North Germany might occur at any moment. It was at this juncture that the march of events in the Cimbric peninsula suddenly attracted attention, and by furnishing a pretext to the Teutonic race to intervene between the Danish king and a section of his subjects opened a safety-valve which relieved the pressure.

The Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein formed an integral portion of the dominions of the Danish Crown. They contained, however, numbers of inhabitants of German origin who were discontented with their lot. A recently promulgated constitution

had aroused in these provinces the dormant sentiment of dissatisfaction at union with Denmark. The revolutionary effervescence in adjacent lands changed passive disaffection into active rebellion. German emissaries fanned the flame, and promised succour. And the Confederacy in the excited state of public opinion readily espoused the cause of the Duchies and demanded the recognition of their independence at Copenhagen.

The theatre of war.

A glance at the map facing p. 214 shows the similarity of the Denmark of 1848 and 1864 to Greece as a theatre of war. Both are peninsulas. Both have an enormous extent of coast-line. Both include an archipelago. But the physical configuration of the interior of Denmark differs greatly from that of Greece. The Cimbric peninsula is level. The obstacles to military movement arise not from inhospitable mountains and rugged valleys, but from the lagoons, the dykes, and the marshes usual in flat tracts of country raised little if at all above the level of the sea. In 1848, moreover, its conditions as regards its communications and as regards its local resources differed widely from the Hellas of 1821. Most of its districts were prosperous and fertile. Well-constructed roads traversed it from end to end. It was, in fact, a land where a considerable army could hope with confidence to find sustenance for a time by living on the produce of the theatre of war.

On paper the Danish army was small contrasted with the military forces of the German Confederation. But it was composed of excellent troops. Its organisation was effective. Its staff was admirable. And at its head were valiant, capable soldiers, who had mastered the art of operating in the peculiar terrain which was to be the scene of conflict. On the other hand, the Germans were to have the assistance of insurgent levies which rapidly developed into fairly efficient troops. Prussia, which took the lead against the Danes, was already growing into a military monarchy with a model army organisation and great reserves of force. Minor States of the Bund could put respectable contingents into the field. And there was no question but that the fighting resources of the coalition were infinitely greater on land than those of Denmark.

Relative strength of antagonists on sea and land.

But at sea the ocean-girt kingdom stood in a very different position. From ancient times the Danes have been a seafaring nation. The blood of the Vikings courses in their veins. Civilisation has curbed the predatory instincts of the Norsemen but has not robbed them of their genius for fighting on the waters. In 1848 Denmark possessed a little navy which was almost perfect in its way, and to this the Germans had nothing to oppose. Maritime command was never in dispute. The Prussian coasts were insulted by

the vessels of the enemy with impunity; and the course of the land operations was to show that in certain theatres of war supremacy at sea will go far to counteract the effect of military weakness.

Germans at first successful.

The first incident of the campaign was favourable to the Danes; the royal army moving southwards through Schleswig came early in April upon the insurgents in considerable force, defeated them, and drove them into Holstein. But thereupon a large German army advanced under General Von Wrangel to support the rebel forces. On the 23d of April a battle was fought near the town of Schleswig. The Danes, greatly outnumbered by the invading host, met with a severe reverse although they bore themselves most gallantly; the enemy pressed forward in overwhelming force, and the Danish general, finding himself overmatched, adopted the happy expedient of withdrawing his little army to the islands of Alsen and Funen and waiting for his opportunity. Here, separated from the mainland by channels commanded by friendly ships of war, the troops whose duty it was to defend the Cimbric peninsula from the aggression of a powerful foe were situated on the flank of the invaders should these continue their advance and attempt to carry war from Schleswig into Jutland. And the wisdom of the Danish dispositions was soon made manifest.

Von Wrangel, confident in strength of numbers, divided his army into two parts. One portion remained in Schleswig, keeping Alsen in its ward. The remainder of the German forces headed northwards, crossed the frontier into Denmark proper, and arrived unchecked at the town of Kolding.

But this invasion of Jutland aroused a storm of disapproval in the Baltic States. Sweden lost no time in sending troops to Funen to be ready for all emergencies. A Russian squadron hastened to the Danish coast. Strong diplomatic pressure was brought by the Powers of Europe to bear on Prussia, the prime mover in the attack on Denmark. So strong was the opposition to the German plans of proceeding to extremities against the little kingdom that the Berlin Government judged it wise to bow before the storm, and the invading army was drawn back. Its retirement was, however, precipitated by the bold strategy of the Danish forces. Strong detachments from Alsen landed unexpectedly in Northern Schleswig, and fell upon the German troops as they retired. The result of the fight proved most disastrous to the invaders, who were defeated and driven pell-mell southwards to Gravenstein, while the victors took up position at Düppel with their backs to the Alsen Channel, and awaited the next move. By the agency of sea-power, in fact,

They are attacked and defeated by a Danish force landed on their flank.

the defenders had of a sudden brought nearly their whole strength to bear on a portion of the hostile army, and had beaten this decisively.

The Danes hold the lines of Düppel.

At Düppel the Danes now threw up strong intrenchments. Gunboats ranged the straits behind them, ready to support the military with their fire. Retreat was secured by maritime command should a German onset drive them from their lines. Their position menaced any hostile force in flank which might again venture towards the Jutland frontier. The invaders found themselves challenged by a weaker force, which had, however, the strategical and tactical advantage. Humiliated by their previous ill success and driven out of Northern Schleswig, they had no alternative open to them but to risk an attack upon these formidable lines; otherwise they would have to acknowledge themselves beaten by an enemy whom they affected to despise. Early in June they ventured on an assault, and a desperate conflict ensued. The Danes fought with the stubborn valour for which their troops are famed. The columns of attack advancing with intrepid determination carried part of the position, and prepared for a final stroke. But the defenders, supported by the fire of their war-vessels, succeeded in holding their ground in their second line of intrenchments and in repulsing the assailants with heavy loss. A pause ensued in the operations. Europe showed

unmistakably that public sympathy was with Denmark. And after some preliminaries an armistice was agreed upon between the belligerents as a prelude to peace.

A temporary truce.

But there was no peace. Prussia was smarting under the indignity of defeat by a third-rate Power. The Duchies were disappointed. The terms of the armistice were unsatisfactory. Under its conditions Schleswig was to be evacuated by both sides, but the Germans encroached during the autumn till their outposts were almost on the Jutland frontier. The Copenhagen Government protested against this violation of the agreement, but its remonstrances were disregarded. During the winter it became evident that a lasting peace would not be secured without further bloodshed. Denmark prepared openly for a renewal of the struggle, and massed a considerable force on the confines of the Northern Duchy. Neither antagonist would yield. So after some months of negotiations, conducted without sincerity, the conflict recommenced, the Germans enjoying the great advantage of starting when in practical occupation of half the peninsula.

The Germans again invade Jutland.

At first the Danes gained some measure of success. Under pressure of their vigorous onset the more advanced bodies of hostile troops felt compelled to give way and retire. But the Teutonic coalition was altogether too strong on land

for the forces of the King of Denmark long to arrest the progress of invasion. On the 20th of May the Prussians captured Kolding, and part of the invading army followed up this success by advancing to Fredericia, a coast fortress of somewhat antiquated type but too strongly held to justify immediate assault. Although a detached body of their troops suffered a reverse in the vicinity of the place, preponderance of force enabled the Germans to invest it on the land side during May, and to firmly establish themselves in that part of south-eastern Jutland nearest to the Little Belt. Some of the Danish troops withdrew northwards; the bulk were transferred by sea to Fünen. The Confederation had gained the upper hand, and the cause of the defending side appeared to be declining. The Danes had borne themselves most valiantly against heavy odds, their leaders had profited freely by the peculiarities of terrain which favoured defensive tactics, but the forces of invasion were too powerful to withstand and they had succeeded by sheer weight of numbers. The situation in the theatre of war appeared to promise certain victory to Prussia and her allies.

But the course of operations was about to undergo a change. Sea-power was to assert itself afresh. And the happy co-operation of the navy of Denmark with its army at this alarming junc-

ture was to offer to posterity a remarkable object-lesson in the art of war.

The siege of a coast fortress the garrison of which is backed by an active fleet is no easy task. The investment cannot be complete. Supplies reach the place from the sea. Reinforcements can be poured into it to swell the ranks of the defenders. There is always the fear that a relieving force may set foot on shore and compel the beleaguering army perforce to raise the siege. It is an enterprise not to be lightly entered on or without good cause. But the German army, relying on its formidable size, undertook the reduction of Fredericia and commenced a regular attack upon the defences of this maritime stronghold. The result was unfortunate. Ere the besiegers had gained any material advantage the whole project was brought to a sudden and ignominious conclusion by an ably planned and most skilfully executed feat of arms on the part of the Danes.

Siege of Fredericia raised by the agency of sea-power.

Turning maritime command to account most brilliantly, and profiting by the concealment which forests adjacent to the fortress afforded, Danish forces were disembarked both north and south of it. These and the garrison simultaneously delivered determined attacks upon the German army of investment, which was quite unprepared for such an onset, and which was in ignorance of the sudden hostile concentration in its vicinity.

The triumph of the Danes was complete. The siege-artillery of the invaders was captured. 3000 Germans were slain or taken prisoners. Many field-guns fell into the hands of the victors. And so great was the moral effect of this damaging blow, and of the evidence which it had given of the enormous advantage enjoyed by the Danes in virtue of their supremacy at sea, that it is uncertain whether the invaders could have kept the field in Jutland after it. A convention, however, signed soon afterwards at Berlin, brought military operations to an end for the time, under conditions most favourable to the little kingdom which had maintained so bold a front under circumstances most discouraging. The German troops withdrew from Schleswig, and so the campaign of 1849 came to a conclusion.

Closing incidents.

But the struggle was not over yet. The disaffected in the Duchies, secretly aided by the Germans, continued to defy the authority of the King of Denmark. The troops of the Confederacy were openly granted furlough with a view to their flocking over the borders to join the rebel standard in Holstein. The insurgent bands had given ample proof already that they represented a force which must be reckoned with, and a Prussian general officer was now allowed to head this motley force. When the Copenhagen Government initiated coercive action against Holstein it found not

merely rebels to tread down. There was a hostile army, organised, disciplined, and under the guidance of practised chieftains, to overthrow, and a well-contested campaign was the result. A pitched battle was fought at Idstedt, in which the Danes were the victors. All Schleswig was occupied by the royal troops, ably and strenuously supported by the fleet whenever this could act. In the end the insurgents, gradually abandoned by their German allies, bowed to the inevitable. The Duchies laid down their arms. And Denmark issued triumphant from a contest most glorious to the sturdy thrifty race which has peopled the Cimbric chersonese for countless generations.

Conclusion.

The Danes look back with no little pride to this protracted conflict, and not without good cause. They came through the fiery ordeal of combat against the powerful Germanic Confederacy almost unscathed. Their little army covered itself with honour in a fight against far superior forces. Modern history affords scarcely a parallel instance of a weak State at bay beating off the onset of a great military Power in two successive campaigns. But although it detracts from the credit due to Denmark for its resolute and successful defence of its just rights, the fact cannot be gainsaid that owing to command of the sea the little kingdom was a really formidable antagonist to Prussia and her satellites. Maritime supremacy compensated for

deficiency of military resources. It was a fair fight. Every conspicuous Danish triumph is traceable to the liberty of action which the dominion of the Belts and Pomeranian Baltic accorded them. The geographical features of the theatre of war favoured amphibious warfare. In a later chapter it will be seen how the conditions changed when the question of command of the sea was in dispute, and a comparison between the two wars about Schleswig-Holstein makes it abundantly clear how much the Danes owed their success in the first to their naval supremacy.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR IN THE EAST FROM 1853 TO 1856.

THE Peace of Adrianople had not involved conditions very humiliating to the Ottoman empire. Considering the brilliancy of the achievements of Paskievich and Diebich in Asia and in Europe, the terms imposed by the victors on the vanquished had been far from onerous. The practical independence of the Danubian provinces wrung from the Porte did not constitute a vital injury to Turkey as a State. The incorporation of Circassia and western Transcaucasia in the realms of the Tsar bereft the Commander of the Faithful of no territory which he could claim as undisputedly his own. The magnitude, indeed, of Russia's triumph became apparent only gradually. It was not foreseen upon the Bosporus how vastly the events of 1829 had enhanced the prestige of the conqueror till too late. That Moldavia and Wallachia would become Russian

Russia and Turkey after the Peace of Adrianople.

protectorates, in fact if not in name, was not contemplated by the Sultan when, appalled by the mere phantom of an invading army marching on Constantinople, he craved for peace. And yet the Russian gain was incalculable. The preponderance of the Tsar in everything connected with the Euxine was established. His dominions beyond the Caucasus now stretched from the Black Sea to the Caspian shores. Where Europe and Asia meet, balance of power had become a myth. And when, following close upon the treaty of Adrianople, came Konia and the Caliph's prayer for succour from his hereditary foe, the great Northern empire became paramount in Eastern Europe and the countries which border the Levant.

It cannot be disputed that the military and naval forces of the Tsar in 1833 averted a catastrophe to the Ottoman realm. But their opportune and decisive interposition was purchased by the Sultan at a crushing cost. The Russian conditions, which had been eagerly accepted in the hour of peril, proved highly embarrassing when the crisis passed away. The Porte had bartered away the free control over the Dardanelles, claimed for centuries as an inalienable right of the house of Othman, for Muscovite assistance against the Egyptian conqueror. By the act of the Caliph the straits were now closed

to the warships of all nations other than Russia and Turkey. Such had been the compact with the Northern autocrat, and in consequence the Black Sea became to all intents and purposes a Russian lake.

The agreement as to the Dardanelles was modified in 1841 by a European convention. Under deed signed by the plenipotentiaries it was enacted that the straits were to be closed only while the Ottoman empire was at peace. But this alteration did not greatly affect the situation. For twenty years after the battle of Konia the predominance of Russia in the Euxine was an accomplished fact, and in effect the obligations which the Porte had contracted afforded frequent opportunities for the interference of the Tsar in the domestic concerns of Turkey. This state of subordination was most galling to a proud and ancient race. The conditions clearly endangered the peace of Europe. The great war in the East in which Great Britain and France leagued themselves with the Commander of the Faithful against the Muscovite empire was the result of the political circumstances arising out of the events of 1829 and 1833. For the interference of the Emperor Nicholas in Ottoman internal affairs led to a dispute with the Porte; hostilities between adversaries who were now so ill matched obviously menaced the existence of the weaker; and the jealousy and

alarm with which the great Powers watched the growth of Russia caused the two great Western nations, rivals as they were, to combine against the common enemy and to draw the sword in defence of the Sultan and his decaying empire.

The quarrel which brought on the Crimean War.

The causes of the rupture between the Caliph and the Tsar in 1853 need not be traced in detail. A dispute over the Greek Church in the Ottoman empire was its origin. During months of negotiations at Constantinople over this question the attitude of the Cabinets of Paris and St James's encouraged the Sultan to resist Russian pretensions. While diplomacy pursued its tortuous course the great Northern empire was arming for the coming fray. In the summer of 1853 the Government of St Petersburg decided to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia so as to give point to the arguments of Prince Mentschikoff upon the Bosporus, whereupon the British and French fleets moved up to Besika Bay ready for all emergencies. For some months no actual hostilities occurred, Turkey delaying the decision to treat the invasion of the Danubian Principalities as an act of war till better prepared for entering on a struggle. But on the 23d of October relations were finally broken off. The Sultan formally declared war. And so commenced the first great European conflict since the battle of Waterloo.

On the very day before the Grand Seignior

issued his challenge to the Emperor Nicholas Great Britain and France had taken a step of most momentous import. In defiance of the convention of 1841 the allied fleets passed up the Hellespont into the Sea of Marmora. This act of open unfriendliness to Russia was almost tantamount to war. The Tsar had grounds for regarding it as a wellnigh unbearable affront, he resolved to retaliate forthwith with his Black Sea fleet, and while on the Danube hostilities were still confined to petty encounters of vedettes, Russia dealt the Ottoman empire a tremendous blow upon the coast of Asia Minor. A Turkish flotilla was anchored in the roadstead of Sinope. Its position having been ascertained, a powerful armament put to sea from Sebastopol. On the 30th of November the weakly Ottoman squadron was destroyed under the guns of the shore batteries of the ancient fortress. And thus the war opened with a Turkish naval disaster almost as decisive for the moment as had been Navarino.

The British and French fleets move up the Dardanelles. Battle of Sinope.

The news created a profound sensation in the west of Europe. Russia was, most unjustly, accused of a treacherous infringement of the laws of war. Public opinion is in France readily stimulated to patriotic enthusiasm when the country's honour appears to have been wounded. The more phlegmatic British are less easily moved; but when the nation is aroused the voice of the people

speaks with no uncertain sound. Napoleon III. welcomed foreign complications, well knowing the passion for military glory of the race over which he had seized sovereignty. The British public, moved by one impulse, demanded that Russia should be humbled for what was termed the massacre of Sinope.

Allies assume maritime command of the Black Sea.

War was not declared by the Allies for some little time. But on the 4th of January 1854 the British and French fleets entered the Black Sea and completely transformed the positions of the belligerent Powers. Even before Sinope Russia had been practically assured of maritime command in the Euxine in a duel with the Ottoman empire. The annihilation of a considerable portion of the Turkish fleet gave the naval forces of the Tsar complete dominion over the maritime theatre of war for a few weeks. The presence of the allied squadrons off Stamboul, however, forbade the Russians to use their maritime command, except for despatching troops and stores by sea to the Circassian ports and to Poti in view of the Asiatic campaign contemplated in the summer. And when the white ensign and the tricolor made their appearance within the Bosporus, Russian naval power in the Euxine for all practical purposes ceased to exist. Transit by sea to Transcaucasia became most hazardous. Maritime command, which had been the mainstay of the

operations which in 1829 brought the Cossacks almost to within sight of the dome of St Sophia, passed over to the enemy, and the whole strategical conditions in the theatre of war in Eastern Europe were reversed without a shot being fired.

Sea of Azov neglected.

But while the Russian flag vanished from the Black Sea, while the Allied Powers established maritime dominion over the larger of the two unequal portions into which the great inland surface of water is divided, they neglected the Sea of Azov. The fact that the British and French war-vessels shirked forcing till a much later period the fortified straits of Kertch may be attributed to two causes. In the first place, the vast strategical importance of the inner waters was not perceived till after the invasion of the Crimea had become an accomplished fact. In the second place, the Allied admirals, while strong enough to confine the Russian fleet in port, were for several months barely strong enough to challenge combat with the batteries of the foe. Later on the incalculable advantages which maritime command of the Sea of Azov conferred on the army defending the Crimean chersonese will appear. But during the earlier part of 1854, while Bulgaria and the Danube littoral remained the theatre of war, the question was not of manifest importance, and the Allies lost little by leaving the Russians in undisputed possession up to the time that

Sebastopol became their goal. Still it is expedient thus early to emphasise the fact that the naval dominion of the Allies stopped at the portals of the Cimmerian Bosporus, and that Crim Tartary was not isolated from the basin of the Don.

Campaign on the Danube.

The operations on the Danube during the winter and early spring were insipid, uneventful, and uninteresting. But when the invading army, inspired by the veteran Paskievich, at last crossed the river and opened parallels before Silistria, the campaign assumed a more decisive character. The dogged resistance of the historic stronghold checked the progress of the Russians. Some signal Ottoman successes nearer Rustchuk aroused the enthusiasm of the Turkish soldiery and carried dismay into the camps of their antagonists. Then the appearance of the French and British troops at Varna obliged the forces of the Tsar to halt, and ere long to abandon all hope of triumph in this theatre of war. The hostile attitude assumed by Austria enhanced the difficulties of the situation. And finally in July the Russians evacuated the Danubian Principalities, and with their disappearance from the Sultan's realms the ostensible grounds for war came to an end.

Invasion of the Crimea resolved upon.

But the real grounds for war between the Allies and the Tsar remained. Russian naval supremacy in the Black Sea was only in abeyance; the retirement of the British and French squadrons

to the Mediterranean meant its immediate revival. The withdrawal of the forces of the Tsar over the Pruth was merely a temporary check to Slav ambition, and afforded absolutely no guarantee whatever of future safety to the Ottoman empire. The British public was clamouring for an offensive war. The Emperor Napoleon wanted military triumphs, and not merely successful conclusion to a forward policy. Rightly or wrongly, the Allied Governments resolved upon an attack on Russian soil, and in undertaking the invasion of the Tauric chersonese they embarked upon an enterprise without precedent in military history.

The Crimea.

Sebastopol was the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Within its splendid harbour were spacious dockyards, victualling establishments, factories of war material, and every requisite of a first-class naval port. Solidly constructed batteries bristling with guns defended the approaches from the sea. From this maritime fortress the Tsar had dominated the Euxine for half a century, and public opinion in England, when it openly demanded that Sebastopol should be attacked, showed sound appreciation of broad principles of military policy. The capture of this cherished stronghold ensured the destruction of Russian naval power in the East, and could not fail to damage Russian prestige most seriously. The basis of the project was the utilisation of the

maritime command which the Allied forces were assured of. The conception was bold and judicious. And if its execution differed greatly from what had been expected, the enterprise achieved its purpose most effectually in the end.

When in the summer of 1854 it was decided to transport the Allied armies from Varna to Crim Tartary and to destroy Sebastopol, the information of the French and British staff with regard to the prospective theatre of war was most defective. The condition of the land defences of the fortress was not known. Little was known of the country about to be invaded, of its resources, of its topography, or of its people. The probable strength of the hostile forces to be encountered could not be even guessed at, owing to the very varying estimates of the few authorities on the subject. So that a great military force was embarking upon an obviously hazardous enterprise with but a vague idea of the nature of the task which it was undertaking, of the perils to which it was about to be exposed, and of the time which would be required to achieve its object.

The Allied army proceeds to the Crimea. Danger of this operation.

The duty of convoying the vast flotilla required to transport a field army of some 60,000 men was no light responsibility for the admiral charged with it. For, owing to the want of shipping, the French and Turkish war-vessels were employed as transports, and the British squadron alone was

available as escort. The Russian naval forces, although they had abandoned the high seas and were lurking under cover, were still intact. It appears that at the time when the great armada was making for the Crimean shores, there were anchored in Sebastopol a number of battleships equivalent to those protecting the expeditionary force in its transit: the Allied commanders, in fact, incurred a terrible risk, which the successful landing on the enemy's shore alone can justify. When Ibrahim Pasha ventured a descent upon the coast of the Peloponnesus in defiance of the Greek fleet "in being," he moved his force in dribblets, but the French and British naval and military chiefs ventured to commit the whole Allied army at one time. The admirals of the Tsar, unaware that the French and Ottoman fighting-ships were crammed with troops and not available for battle, lost a great opportunity. Few campaigns have illustrated the influence of sea-power upon military operations on land more strikingly than the Crimean war. But no incident throughout its course is worthier of note than the failure of the Russian fleet "in being" to make its presence felt in the opening scene.

The landing and the march on Sebastopol.

The plan of the south-western portion of the Crimean peninsula given with the sketch-map of the Black Sea at the end of chapter viii., shows the position of Sebastopol on the southern side

of the inlet which forms its harbour. The Allies projected an attack upon the northern side. On the 13th of September Eupatoria was occupied, and on the following day a disembarkation commenced at a place called Old Fort, twenty miles to the south. It lasted several days. On the 19th the invading army moved southwards along the coast towards Sebastopol, and on the morrow it attacked a Russian force assembled in a strong position on the Alma to bar the way and drove it from its ground. The Allied fleet, now at its full strength after the troops had landed, gave some assistance in the battle; and during the further progress of the forces under Lord Raglan and Marshal St Arnaud along the west coast of the Crimea, the squadrons were always at hand and in communication with the troops.

When the invaders reached the shores of Crim Tartary, there were quartered in the peninsula some 60,000 Russians under Prince Mentschikoff, the bulk of whom were in and round Sebastopol and participated in the battle of the Alma. The beaten army retreated unmolested to the fortress, and was conveyed across the harbour to the southern side. So that when after some delay the invaders again advanced southwards, they found no hostile troops to arrest the movement. And on the 24th they came in sight of the northern defences of the fortress.

The delay of the Allies in following up their victory arose from the necessity of embarking the wounded. For it was not intended to establish a base at the point of disembarkation, and the great army moved forward as a flying column. The shore between Eupatoria and Sebastopol was destitute of harbours of any kind. As the army was wholly dependent on the navy for supplies after the field-magazines should be exhausted, it was essential either that the fortress should be captured speedily, or else that some point upon the coast should be secured which would serve as a suitable base. There is now no doubt that if the Allies had attacked the northern defences of Sebastopol at once, they would have carried them. The commanders, however, after some debate determined not to make the attempt. They decided instead on a flank march round the fortress towards its southern side, so as to obtain possession of Balaclava and other neighbouring points where ships discharge their cargoes with facility.

The flank march determined on.

The invaders had clearly established their superiority to the army of Prince Mentschikoff at the Alma. Although formidable as against attack from the sea, Sebastopol was at this time nearly defenceless on its land sides. Mentschikoff was fully alive to its shortcomings. He never anticipated that the hostile army which had stormed the strong position taken up by him a few

days before would hesitate to attack the weakly defences of the north front when they arrived before them. He was in a difficulty. History affords numerous examples of the perils which beset a field army which clings to a fortress. Should the invaders make themselves masters of the northern side of the harbour and then extend their left round to Balaclava, they might succeed in shutting up the Russian force in the south-western corner of the peninsula. To remain in Sebastopol might be to court irretrievable disaster. Under the circumstances, Mentschikoff's decision to evade the Allies while there was yet time was not merely justifiable, but was apparently the best he could have taken. He determined to quit Sebastopol, he intrusted its maintenance to the sailors of the fleet, probably with no great hope that they would keep the foe at bay, and on the 25th he marched north-eastwards.

The story of how the two armies in column of route escaped collision by pure accident is a familiar one — the advanced British troops actually came in touch with the tail of the Russian force. This was on the 25th. On the morrow the Allies had recovered communications with their fleet upon the southern shores of the Crimea, and were assembling in the tongue of land on which the town of Sebastopol is situated — the invading army had, in fact, established itself in a fairly

secure position resting upon the sea-coast. The harbours of Balaclava and Kamish turned out to be well adapted by nature for use as maritime bases. The topographical features of the neighbourhood favoured defence. The flank march had succeeded, and the Allied forces had gained comparative security. The movement from Old Fort to the position now taken up shows what latitude of action maritime command permits to an army, although, judged by what we now know of Sebastopol, it was a blunder.

Fortification of Sebastopol while the Allies pause.

When Mentschikoff left the fortress which was obviously the objective of the invaders to its fate, its southern land defences were as feeble as those on the other side of the harbour where the Allied onset had been expected. No sooner, however, was the hostile march on Balaclava discovered than the garrison set to work with feverish activity to prepare against attack from this unforeseen direction. The command of the place had been left to a man who was not unequal to a great emergency. At his side was the renowned engineer whose master mind was to plan the transformation of a line of straggling breastworks into a formidable fortress under the eyes of a hostile army. Admiral Kornilof by his vigour and enthusiasm inspired the sailors manning the defences with hope and confidence. Colonel Todleben developed the fortifications with rare resource and

skill. The townspeople and dockyard *personnel* worked with a will. From hour to hour the intrenchments gathered strength. Shelter-trenches grew into elaborate earthworks. Batteries were built and armed with amazing rapidity. And while the Allies paused, doubtful whether to venture on a *coup-de-main*, what a few days before had been little better than an open town became a military stronghold. The expeditionary force which had by the agency of maritime command gained its footing in the enemy's country, which had beaten back the army sent out to arrest it in its course, and which at one time had its object almost in its grasp, found itself constrained to undertake the formal siege of a fortress too extensive to be invested; and it was obliged at the same time to guard itself against the attacks of a formidable field army with the military resources of a powerful empire at its back.

The Allied position after arriving south of the fortress.

The Allies having occupied Balaclava and Kamish and reconnoitred Sebastopol, completed its investment south of the harbour. Lord Raglan and General Canrobert (who had succeeded Marshal St Arnaud) having decided not to attempt an immediate assault, the force under their command was thrown at once on the defensive. The peninsula, which forms the south-western corner of the Crimea, was, however, from its topographical character most difficult for the Russians to attack. It forms a plateau sloping northwards towards

Sebastopol harbour, but with an abrupt drop eastwards towards the Tchernaya valley. With Mentschikoff in the field and gathering his forces for offensive operations, the Allies instinctively assumed the general position which they held for many months fronting north and east. The northern face, which invested the fortress, formed a concave arc, its eastern end resting on Mount Inkerman overlooking the head of the harbour where the Tchernaya joins it. The eastern face ran from Mount Inkerman to the sea near Balaclava. The French were on the left, the British on the right; the former army was based as regards supplies upon the Bay of Kamish, the latter upon Balaclava. Except for an unsuccessful naval attack upon the sea-defences of Sebastopol, nothing of great importance occurred for nearly a month.

On the 25th of October, however, the Russian field army advanced and delivered an attack upon the Allies from the east. An indecisive battle ensued, memorable chiefly for the great cavalry exploits which have immortalised the name of Balaclava. The assailants drew off. But this attempt to raise the siege and drive the invaders back upon their ships proved to be but the prelude to a far more formidable onset of the legions of Prince Mentschikoff.

A considerable portion of the army which had withdrawn across the Pruth when the active hos- Transfer of Russian forces by

land from the Pruth to the Crimea.

tility of the Western Powers and the menaces of Austria obliged Russia to abandon the Danubian Principalities, was all this time toiling painfully round from Bessarabia to the Crimean theatre of war. Nothing could better illustrate the value of sea-power than the contrast between the rapid transit of the Allied army from Varna to Old Fort and the tedious, exhausting move of the forces of the Tsar from the Danube to the Tauric chersonese. But for that stolid endurance and great marching power which makes the Russian soldier so potent a force in the combinations of a Suwaroff, it is doubtful if this host from the west could have reached the scene of action before the winter. Actually, however, these sorely needed troops had reached the vicinity of Sebastopol early in November. And so there assembled under the orders of Prince Mentschikoff, ready to make one supreme effort to drive the French and British into the sea, an army of 120,000 men, while the Allies remained in complete ignorance of the huge accessions to the ranks of their antagonists. The result was the famous fight of Inkerman. The invaders were

The battle of Inkerman.

quite unprepared for the admirably planned assault of their opponents in great preponderance of force upon the heights. Mentschikoff's design was a very remarkable move in the game and it proved very nearly successful, but the stubborn resistance of the British soldiery and the prompt

and strenuous co-operation of the French checkmated the plan at the last moment. The Russians were heavily defeated, and withdrew in confusion from the field. It was a great victory, and the Allies were justly jubilant at having foiled so completely what was manifestly a fine combination of war on the part of the foe. But Inkerman revealed to the chiefs in the invaders' camp, and also to all Europe, that so far from the French and British forces dominating the Crimea, their very existence would have been in jeopardy but for the assured retreat which command of the sea would at the worst afford them. It was clear that the Allies in their corner of Crim Tartary were blockaded to the full as effectually as they blockaded the fortress which they had come to capture and destroy.

Position of the Allies after Inkerman.

During the immediately ensuing months the position of the invaders bore a striking analogy to that of Wellington's army within the lines of Torres Vedras. Balaclava and Kamish Bay afforded no splendid anchorage for freight-ships like the Tagus. There was no great city within the Allied lines like Lisbon. For defence against attack the French and British lines in the corner of the Crimean peninsula could not compare in strength with those in Portugal. But in each case an army based upon the sea was clinging to a patch of territory in a land elsewhere occupied by a powerful foe, and managed to hold its ground. Welling-

ton was driven back on Torres Vedras by superior forces. The Allies in 1854 took up their ground in pursuance of an offensive plan of operations. The circumstances differed widely, but the situation came to be the same. In each case the enormous advantages derived from a position based upon the sea, and with its flanks secure owing to their resting on the coast, were demonstrated with singular force.

The winter. Affairs before Sebastopol remained almost at a standstill after Inkerman till winter gave place to early spring. The Russians were disheartened by defeat. Their losses had been very heavy. The numbers of the slain in the fierce struggle on the November morning when they made their mighty effort had created a deep and lasting impression among a soldiery not prone to panic or readily depressed by failure. While they held aloof watching the invaders' encampments from afar, these were suffering terribly from the hardships of service in the field in the rigorous winter climate of the Steppes. The French were fairly well provided for. But the British almost broke down under the strain put on them by administrative mismanagement at home. The troops who had borne the brunt of battle at the Alma and at Inkerman were left without warm clothing and almost without food. British sea-power could plant them down in a remote province of the Rus-

sian empire and assure them of a safe retreat, but it could not protect them from the effects of years of gross official neglect and of a military system rotten to the core.

Omar Pasha at Eupatoria.

With the melting of the snows the position of the invaders grew more hopeful. Reinforcements arrived apace. Heavy guns were landed and dragged up on to the plateau to batter the defences which Todleben had created. Moreover, a Turkish force under Omar Pasha, a leader who had shown his mettle by holding the Russians in check the previous spring upon the Danube, disembarked at Eupatoria. Eupatoria threatened the communications of Prince Mentschikoff with Perekop and the north. The presence of a hostile army at such a point justly caused the Russian chief no small concern, and it afforded a fresh and striking illustration of the incalculable benefits which the Allies derived from their maritime command. Alarmed by the concentration of a large body of troops upon the flank of the artery roads connecting him with the mainland of the empire, he detached great bodies of troops to hold the Turks in check. But an attack delivered in the middle of February upon the lines which the Ottoman chief had constructed round the town met with ignominious failure.

Importance of Sea of Azov to

Had it not been for the fact that during the winter and for several months to come the Sea

the Russians.

of Azov remained available to the Tsar to pour supplies and reinforcements into the Crimea, the position of the Russians, now that the Allies were daily gathering strength, would have been desperate. The theatre of war was not generally productive, and it was soon swept bare by foraging detachments. The distance by the Isthmus of Perekop to the granaries of Podolia and Kherson was great. The transport service was miserably inefficient. But the Sea of Azov afforded a ready means of tapping the corn-lands of the Don; and if Mentschikoff's strategy had, except when he massed his forces against Inkerman, been somewhat halting and undecided, he showed admirable foresight in his energetic efforts to collect supplies by water while there yet was time. All through the winter and the spring the mercantile marine which in less troubled times plied from port to port of the Sea of Azov was busy conveying grain and other produce to the seat of conflict. Vast magazines of food were established for the troops. And thus the great military forces which the Tsar was collecting in his threatened province were assured of subsistence not only at the time but also for the future.

Gradual change in the Allied scheme of campaign.

The original design of the French and British Governments when they despatched their armies to Crim Tartary had been to capture Sebastopol

by a *coup-de-main*. Attack upon it by regular siege process had been no part of the initial plan. But as months passed and the critical winter period closed without mishap, the nature of the war assumed a gradual change. The development of the trenches proceeded slowly. Successive bombardments achieved but limited success. But while the Allies, based upon the sea, were firmly fixed on Russian soil, the military resources of the Tsar were being eaten away by the drain which the war now put on them.

Enormous advantages conferred on the Allies by sea-power.

The general defence of the peninsula absorbed vast numbers. The dread of Allied descents along its coasts broke up the Russian army into fragments. With numbers considerably superior to the invaders in the theatre of war, Mentschikoff and his successor Gortchakoff could not muster a force before Sebastopol to give them battle. And while French and British and Turkish, and later on Sardinian troops, reached the scene of conflict rapidly and without hitch or friction by ship transport, the soldiers of the Tsar were perishing on the march along the roads which lead from the heart of the empire towards the defile of Perekop. Russia was striving in vain to use her mighty strength. The snows of winter had stayed the progress of her legions. The droughts of summer were to prove no less fatal to her cause. Day by day sea-

power was weighing down the scale more markedly in favour of the Allies. And it was not only the maritime command of the Black Sea enjoyed by their fleets which was serving to illustrate how naval strength will sometimes more than compensate for comparative military weakness. British and French war-vessels in the Baltic also contributed to hamper the Russian army in the far-distant Crimean theatre of war.

Baltic campaign. Retention of vast Russian forces in the north.

The possibility of naval operations in the Baltic had exercised the British Admiralty as early as 1853. The prospects of war naturally attracted attention to the great stretch of Russian coast-line in the north, and to the tempting objective which it offered to a hostile maritime Power. But British naval supremacy had come to be little better than a name. In dealing with the Syrian crisis of 1841 it has been pointed out how popular apathy and official neglect were allowing the national armour to go to rust. The momentary alarm created at that time had only given place to increased confidence when news of the extraordinary success of the naval operations in the Levant reached the country. The triumphs of Beyrout and Acre were gratifying to a people proud of its heritage of glorious maritime traditions, but their consequence was that for a dozen years all classes dwelt in a fool's paradise. No one perceived that the

vaunted dominion of the British on the seas was an imposture, and that its mighty naval forces were a myth. Then the country awoke to find war with a great and powerful empire looming in the near future, and those in high places tardily took stock of the national resources.

The British navy had not fallen so low but that a respectable fleet could be mustered in the Ægean, which, when the war broke out, sufficed with the French squadron to sweep the Russian flag off the Black Sea. But in home waters ships were scarce, and men were scarcer still. And it was only by dint of great exertions that in the early months of 1854 a naval force was got together and despatched to the Baltic under Sir C. Napier.

The squadron quitted the British shores with no small pomp and circumstance. The highest expectations were formed of what it would achieve. The public took for granted that Kronstadt would fall when the ice disappeared from its approaches. Responsible statesmen blinded themselves to the inefficiency of the fleet, which its commander impressed upon them in blunt sailor fashion. In the Baltic it was joined by a French flotilla. The Allies established a blockade of the Russian coast. They reconnoitred several of the hostile strongholds. But the only exploit of a kind to draw down popular applause was the capture of Bomar-

sund, not a very brilliant feat of arms. Whether much more could have been done of a nature to please the populace even had the British fleet, which formed the larger portion of the Allied naval forces, been better equipped and manned, is doubtful. It is a fallacy, which this campaign was not the first to demonstrate, to suppose that ships alone can wrest great maritime fortresses from a determined foe. But from the absence of any tangible triumph when approaching winter drove the fleet southwards it was assumed that the operations as a whole were a fiasco. The disappointment in England at their apparent ill success was as keen as the hopes had been buoyant when the fleet was led to sea from Spithead by the Queen. And this shows how little the relations of maritime command to war on land were understood in a country the whole history of which abounds in object-lessons in this branch of strategy.

For the influence of the Baltic campaign upon the struggle in the Crimea was enormous. The Allied fleet had embarked on no fantastic projects. Its operations had not been signalised by any brilliant victory. But by its reconnaissances and its cruisings to and fro it held great hostile armies in its grip. The Tsar well knew the greatness of French military resources, and the despatch of an expeditionary force from the

Channel to Livonia or the Gulf of Finland was a contingency which he had to keep in view. He dared not send away his soldiers from the Baltic southwards to Crim Tartary. Nor did the disappearance of the hostile navies before the winter ice make any difference, for it was practically certain that, as actually occurred, the enemy would return in spring. The dread of enterprises never attempted, and never indeed contemplated, by the Allied Powers forbade the concentration of the Russian legions in the real theatre of war.

The operations in the Baltic in 1854 and also in the following year were almost purely naval. Any detailed description of them would be therefore out of place. In 1855 Great Britain was in a position to despatch a fleet more in consonance with its dignity as the traditional leading naval Power than that on which the honour of the flag in Northern Europe had depended in the first campaign. But the destruction of some shipping, the blockade of the hostile coasts, and the bombardment of certain fortresses were all that was effected. To those who judge war merely by salient episodes, the results seemed very disproportionate to the force employed. And yet the consequences of these desultory naval operations were momentous. Russia was striving in vain to meet the Allied army in the Crimea on

equal terms, while all the time tens of thousands of her soldiers were lying idle near the Baltic shores, magnetised by the sea-power of the foe.

Siege of Sebastopol pushed with vigour.

With improving weather in the spring of 1855 the French and British forces before Sebastopol began to push the siege with energy. Omar Pasha's force was brought round by sea from Eupatoria to swell the besieging army. In May a Sardinian contingent arrived at Balaclava. The Allied army now amounted to 180,000 men. A huge siege-train was scattered through the trenches. The approaches were being pushed with vigour towards Todleben's works. But there was still a formidable field army under Gortchakoff upon the watch, and an investment of the fortress north of the harbour could not be attempted. Reinforcements and supplies could still be thrown in by the Russians without let or hindrance. The struggle in the corner of Crim Tartary was coming to be one of endurance in which the Allies, based upon the sea, were bound eventually to wear their opponents down.

The Allies too late enter the Sea of Azov.

In May a naval expedition was decided upon by the French and British chiefs, which, had it been undertaken in the previous autumn, might have been of great effect. This was the forcing of the Straits of Kertch. Some troops assisted in the seizure of the batteries guarding the defile, but there was practically no fighting, and it was

with the greatest ease that the Allies entered the Sea of Azov. In a few days, and almost without firing a shot, they established as undisputed a command over its surface as they enjoyed in the Euxine. Important captures of vessels laden with grain were made and immense supply stores were destroyed. But the blow was struck too late. The Russian intendance had collected sustenance for the army sufficient for many months in the interior of the Crimea. And although the appearance of hostile war-vessels in the estuary of the Don was most damaging to Muscovite prestige, although the loss of the Sea of Azov precluded all hope in Russia of presenting a bold front to the invaders beyond the date when the supplies stored in the magazines should be exhausted, this tardy naval success of the Allies did not in the end greatly influence the course of the campaign.

Difficulties of the Russians gradually increase at Sebastopol.

On the 18th of June a general assault was delivered on Sebastopol. The defences had been subjected to a terrific bombardment. The arrangements had been drawn up with the greatest care. But the stubborn fortitude of the garrison would not yield to the impetuous onslaught of the Allied troops. The attacking columns were beaten back, and the Russians remained masters of their works, undaunted by the perpetual rain of projectiles and resolved to hold out to the bitter end.

Lord Raglan died a few days afterwards; and his successor General Simpson, and General Pélissier who had succeeded General Canrobert, had no course open to them but to continue the siege operations in view of another attempt to carry the defences by storm at a later date. The repulse of the general attack of the 18th of June had raised the drooping spirits of the Russian forces; but the outlook for the garrison was not promising. The bombardments were causing fearful havoc. While the Allies daily grew in strength in consequence of their maritime command, it was becoming ever more difficult to replace the losses due to wastage in the beleaguered fortress. The streams of reinforcements poured from the great centres of population in the heart of the vast dominions of the Tsar reached the Crimea merely as a feeble trickle. Worst of all, Todleben had been wounded and forced to quit the scene of his achievements. In August Gortchakoff resolved on one last attempt to raise the siege, and at daybreak on the 16th an attack in force was delivered on the flank of the invaders in the Tchernaya valley. The Russians were repulsed with heavy loss; and the Allies, relieved by this victory from fear of further interference, redoubled their activity in the trenches. The devoted garrison was allowed no rest nor breathing-time. The ever-present dread of an assault kept the defenders massed in exposed

works under the concentrated fire of miles of artillery. The interiors of the Malakoff and the Redan, on which the besiegers were centring their efforts, were a shambles. The struggle was becoming hopeless. At last, on the 8th of September, the final attack was delivered. The British columns failed, but the French made good their footing at a vital point. During the night following the Russians withdrew across the harbour to the northern side. And so Sebastopol was taken.

Its fall.

The whole story of the capture of this great naval place of arms is strange. The Western Powers embarked upon the enterprise without fully counting up the cost. Their design was to deliver a sudden crushing blow; but it was by a process of slow exhaustion that their fighting forces wore down the hostile capacity for resistance. The place might have fallen before a *coup-de-main* on the day when the Allies appeared at its gates; but it was only taken after one of the most protracted sieges of the century. And the oddest feature of the Crimean war is, that neither the failure of the scheme of operations as originally contemplated by the French and British Governments, nor the blunder of the commanders in not promptly storming the feeble defences of Sebastopol when they reached its outskirts, turned out to be disadvantageous. For the unexpected conditions which arose brought into play the sea-power

The enormous influence exerted by sea-power on the struggle for Sebastopol.

of the invaders, which was their real strength. The military resources of the Russian empire melted away in the vain efforts of the Tsar to maintain the struggle in the Tauric chersonese. The losses sustained by the Muscovite soldiery on the battle-fields of Inkerman and the Alma, and the slaughter incurred behind the improvised defences mapped out by Todleben, were inappreciable compared to the ravages which climate, hunger, and exhaustion caused in corps and regiments which strove to reach the theatre of war and never reached it. And all the time the invading army close to the harbours which formed its base was in easy communication with the military centres at home. The British force, it is true, suffered terribly for a short space of time; but this was due entirely to the administrative system governing the army, and not to the strategical conditions in which it found itself; this state of things was, moreover, merely temporary. Seldom has there been a more remarkable example of what co-operation on a great scale between military and naval forces can achieve in war.

The Asiatic campaign of 1854.

The fall of Sebastopol, upon which the attention of the whole civilised world had for many months been fixed, was followed by a lull in military operations in the Crimea, and interest became centred on another point. The Russians were besieging Kars. Although news percolated slowly through

the mountains from the uplands of Armenia, the impression was daily gaining strength that the famous Asiatic stronghold was in gravest peril. Too late, operations had been set on foot to endeavour to relieve the place. But before tracing in outline the autumn campaign in the districts bordering on the south-eastern corner of the Black Sea, it will be necessary to go back to the summer of 1854, and to follow up the struggle in that theatre of war from its commencement.

The great plateau of Armenia, as a consequence of its elevation and of its proximity to the steppe lands of Turkestan and Central Asia, suffers from a most rigorous climate in the winter months and spring. Military operations are seldom undertaken earlier in the year than July, owing to the melting snows. And to this general rule the campaign of 1854 was no exception. Russia, thwarted on the Danube by Omar Pasha and the assembling French and British forces, was resolved upon offensive war at the point where there was every prospect that the Sultan's forces alone would be engaged. And in pursuance of this plan the army of Transcaucasia was set in motion as soon as the advancing season justified a forward movement.

Advantages derived from sea-power not taken

Since the commencement of the year the Allied fleets had been supreme in the Black Sea. Turkey therefore enjoyed the advantage—denied in 1828

advantage of by Turkey.

—of transporting troops destined for the Asiatic theatre of war to Trebizond by sea. Erzerum is only a fortnight's march from Trebizond, and Kars not a week's march from Erzerum. Therefore, had the Porte risen to the situation, a considerable portion of the splendid fighting material of Anatolia should have been assembled on the Russian frontier to meet the soldiers of the Tsar. But the mutual jealousies of the pashas, the corruption of the officials, the incapacity of the staff, and the apathetic fatalism of the Sultan and his *entourage*, all combined to deprive the Osmanlis of the benefits which the strategical conditions conferred on them. A considerable army was indeed assembled, but it lacked every quality desirable in a fighting force other than individual bravery among the rank and file. Its commander was incompetent, pusillanimous, and wanting even in common courage. The troops were not fed, nor clothed, nor paid. The most ordinary precautions which service in the field demands were disregarded. So that when in August the Russians advanced in two columns far apart, thereby offering the Turks a splendid opportunity of acting against them on interior lines, the whole of the Osmanli army was, although far superior in numerical strength, ignominiously defeated in front of Kars by only a portion of the hostile forces. Had the victors indeed followed up this brilliant

success, they might have entered that great fortress almost unopposed.

The Circassians rise and compel the Russians to close their offensive operations near Kars.

But the Russian general had not to reckon only with the Turkish host. For more than a quarter of a century the forces of the Tsar had been engaged in striving to subdue the warlike mountaineers of western Transcaucasia, and had but partially succeeded. The terror of the hillmen's forays still haunted the law-abiding inhabitants of Georgia. The army of occupation, scattered in its strongholds between the Euxine and the Caspian, was ever on the watch against some sudden rising. Now, when British war-vessels appeared on the Circassian coast and it became known that far-distant races were uniting with the Caliph against the Muscovites, it needed only the stirring appeal of the great warrior chieftain Schamyl to rouse these formidable tribes to arms and bring them forth to battle. The Russians knew the famous guerilla leader of old, but years of desultory conflict had not taught them how to cope with his daring methods of conducting war. A few days after the overthrow of the Osmanlis on the road to Kars, Schamyl appeared with a formidable array of freebooters at Tiflis, and vanished again into the mountain fastnesses with a rich booty and many high-born captives. Threatened in rear, the forces of the Tsar, instead of seizing Kars and pressing on towards Erzerum,

were forced to halt. Their communications by sea with Odessa and Sebastopol were cut by the Allied fleets. Their roads over the Caucasus were seriously endangered by the mountaineers. The Caspian Sea had become the only channel for supply and reinforcements on which they could rely. And the campaign of 1854 in Armenia came to an abrupt conclusion just when a signal overthrow of the Ottoman army on the field of battle appeared to promise a repetition of the triumphs of Paskievich.

The failure of the Russians partly due to Allied sea-power.

To assert that the collapse of the Russian invasion of the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan in 1854 is mainly to be attributed to the sea-power of the Allies would be incorrect. But the maritime command which the Western fleet had established over the Black Sea undoubtedly contributed to bring about the failure of a campaign which had opened most auspiciously for the forces of the Tsar. The sight of the British flag gave a force to the insurrectionary movement in Circassia and the Caucasus which it certainly would not have acquired otherwise. The loss of the easy route from the heart of the empire by Poti to the theatre of war made a decisive campaign wellnigh impossible. The Allied navies undoubtedly exerted an adverse influence over the Russian operations on the road from Tiflis into Ottoman Armenia. Still it must not be forgotten that communications

over the great plains north of the Caucasus had developed greatly since the Peace of Adrianople. The waterway of the Volga had been opened up as a commercial route from the central regions of the Muscovite realm to the Caspian and to Georgia. The campaign of the following summer showed, as did also the struggle of 1877, that the mere fact of the Euxine being under hostile control was not an insuperable bar to advance on Kars and Erzerum.

Campaign of 1855.

France was at no time keenly interested in the Asiatic operations. The British Government, however, displayed considerable anxiety with regard to this remote theatre of war, and Colonel Fenwick Williams, with a few chosen comrades, was despatched to aid the Turks with his counsel. These officers on arrival found the Osmanli forces in deplorable plight, and their efforts to improve the situation met with scant success. With an apathy typical of the rulers of a decaying oriental race, the pashas of Stamboul turned a deaf ear to the vigorous remonstrances of the British Commissioner at Erzerum. The Turks, finding two of the Great Powers fighting in their cause, trusted to their allies to defend them, and were content with very feeble endeavours on their own behalf. The Porte had learnt nothing from the disasters of the previous war. Armenia was left almost to its fate, and even Kars, which had escaped falling into

Russian hands the previous year by a mere stroke of luck, was not properly equipped to stand a siege when summer heralded the resumption of hostilities.

Siege of Kars, and efforts to relieve it.

In the middle of June a Russian army advanced across the frontier. There was no field force capable of offering it battle, and by the middle of July Kars was invested and completely cut off from Erzerum and the west. Now when there was imminent danger of a serious disaster in Armenia the Sultan and his advisers were eager to relieve the threatened stronghold. But such was the disorganisation of the Ottoman military system that no reserve of soldiers existed to draw upon in this emergency. Pélissier would not hear of Omar Pasha's army quitting the Allied camp before Sebastopol to strike a blow in Asia. Omar Pasha himself, however, managed to organise a force of some thousand men about Constantinople, and late in September, after the fall of Sebastopol, this sailed for Redoute Kale on the Circassian coast and landed there.

Effect of maritime command illustrated by the doubt as to best mode of succouring the fortress.

It has been pointed out in an earlier chapter how in a Russo-Turkish conflict command of the Black Sea enables the belligerent enjoying it to act on interior lines in respect to the two distinct theatres of war which are a necessary consequence of the geographical conditions. The most prominent incidents of the Armenian campaign of 1855,

and the difference of opinion on the Allied side as to how the perils besetting the Ottoman cause in Asia should be dealt with, are cogent evidence of the truth of this. The question was most anxiously debated whether the Turkish contingent should remain in the Crimea or cross the Euxine to the other theatre of war. Maritime supremacy, in fact, made it optional whether the only army which the Sultan could put into the field should fight in Europe or in Asia. Then, when at last after fatal delays a force was got together elsewhere, it became a subject of controversy whether this should be landed at Trebizond to march by Erzerum to the point of danger, or whether it should proceed to Russian territory and create a diversion in rear of Mouravief's army besieging Kars. Maritime command offered such liberty of action that the failure to succour the beleaguered fortress ere it was too late was the more discreditable to the Allies.

The British commissioner and his brave associates did all that men could do to hold the stronghold. By untiring energy and extraordinary exertions they had collected provisions sufficient for some months of siege. The defences had been repaired and strengthened under their watchful guidance. Animated by their noble example, the Osmanli rank and file fought with admirable courage, and endured privations of no ordinary

kind with uncomplaining fortitude. A tremendous assault was repulsed with disastrous loss to the besiegers. But as September and October passed, food became scarcer and scarcer. Pestilence followed in the train of hunger. Efforts to relieve the place, made in half-hearted fashion from the side of Erzerum, proved unsuccessful.

The fall of Kars.

And at last, on the 24th of November, Kars surrendered, after a defence which proved conclusively that the decline of Turkish military power is not due to deterioration of the soldiery.

Omar Pasha's maritime descent on Russian territory.

It is a matter of opinion whether Omar Pasha's force, when at last it took the field, was used to the best purpose. The appearance of a Turkish army at Redoute Kale did not raise all western Transcaucasia against the Russians, as had been hoped. The advance of the invaders towards Tiflis had not the effect of drawing off a sufficient portion of the hostile force besieging Kars to enable the exhausted garrison to break through the ring which Mouravief had drawn around it. There is some reason to believe that under a chief so capable and energetic as Omar Pasha troops landed at Trebizond might have fought their way to the hard-pressed fortress in time to save it. It is probable that had this force been disembarked six weeks earlier at either one point or the other, the honour of the Allied arms would have been upheld in the theatre of war in Asia.

But this is mere conjecture. We have to deal with facts, and actually the Ottoman chief, although his campaign was pressed with vigour and executed with considerable skill, failed to achieve the task which had been set to him. Kars was lost; and on winter setting in, the Ottoman force in Transcaucasia fell back to the sea-shore with no appreciable successes to its credit.

The end of the war.

The closing months of the tremendous struggle which had drifted on so long were unmarked by any signal operation of war. The Allies, secure in Sebastopol, showed little inclination to embark on risky undertakings in the Crimea, or elsewhere on the Black Sea coast. A joint naval and military expedition despatched to Kinburn, at the outlet of the rivers Dnieper and Bug, was completely successful, and the Russian batteries at the place were dismantled by the landing-parties. Some minor incidents occurred near the Straits of Kertch. But the political portents all pointed to a termination of the conflict during the winter, and in the early part of 1856 negotiations were initiated, which ended in the Treaty of Paris. Russia had come to the end of her resources. The Ottoman empire longed for peace. France was weary of a struggle in which vital national interests were not involved. Great Britain alone, with military forces vastly developed by two years

of war backed by a fleet now equal to the navies of all Europe, was ready and eager to go on.

Concluding remarks.

The war, which ended with the Treaty of Paris, is the only great European struggle since the Napoleonic era in which sea-power has played a principal and conspicuous part. The coasts of one of the mightiest of empires were for two years a prey to the raids of hostile ships of war. Naval attacks were delivered upon fortresses of acknowledged strength. The greatest expeditionary force which has been despatched across the sea in modern times was safely landed in hostile territory, and almost in presence of a formidable hostile army. The full extent of the influence which maritime command exerted over the conflict as a whole is not, however, apparent from a mere narrative of its leading episodes. The Baltic campaign of 1854, denounced by an unthinking public as a miserable failure, achieved more than many a brilliant naval exploit has done, with the history of which every schoolboy is familiar. There were few who thought when the Allied armies stood out to sea from Varna, that in the struggle to come in Crim Tartary sea-power was to be the prime factor in governing its course, and that the issue was to hinge on the greater facilities for feeding an army in the field with men and food and war material afforded by maritime communication, than by vast plains offering no obvious

obstacles to military movements on the greatest scale. Napoleon invaded Russia from the west with half a million men, and planted his victorious banners on the towers of the Kremlin, and yet a few months later the armies of the Emperor Alexander were foremost in trampling down the conqueror in Champagne. The Allies in 1854, with no great fighting force, established themselves in a remote province of the Tsar's dominions, but by maintaining their grip on it they broke the strength of the greatest of military Powers for several years and thereby gained the end for which they strove. The Crimean war was a struggle in which sea-power was pitted against military force, and vanquished it decisively. It was the navies of the West which crushed the Tsar and arrested the advance of Russia for the space of twenty years. The lesson is one which the people of this country cannot lay too much to heart.

CHAPTER VI.

EVENTS IN THE OLD WORLD FROM THE TREATY OF PARIS TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR IN 1877.

The war of 1859.

THE battle of Novara had for a brief period given pause to the great popular movement for freeing Lombardy and Venetia from Austrian domination. The participation of Sardinia in the Crimean war delayed for a few years fresh hostilities between the truculent little kingdom, which with the illustrious Cavour at the helm was becoming paramount in Italy, and the mighty empire whose hold on the fairest territories in the basins of the Po and the Adige was a standing menace to the peace of Europe. But the whole peninsula was in a state of revolutionary ferment. Its social and political conditions proclaimed it to be ripe for change. Scarcely had the Treaty of Paris terminated the tremendous conflict in the East when it became evident from the feverish agitation

in a country distinguished by the excitable temperament of its people, from the gross and palpable misgovernment of certain of its provinces, and from the open expression given to its national aspirations, that stirring events were at hand. And when the French emperor manifested an unmistakable inclination to side with Victor Emmanuel in the case of war, Europe recognised that a great struggle was impending beyond the Alps.

Influence upon this of French and Sardinian naval power.

The campaign of 1859, by which Lombardy was wrested from the house of Hapsburg, was fought out in a theatre of war many days' march distant from the nearest sea. And yet it was by no means uninfluenced by the question of maritime command. France was a great naval Power, and Sardinia possessed a respectable number of vessels of war. Austria, on the other hand, was represented only by a comparatively small and weak flotilla, which was quite incapable of coping with the banded fleets of the Allied States. The coasts of Istria and Dalmatia were rigorously blockaded. The military authorities at Vienna, conscious of impotence, abstained from all effort to dispute the supremacy of the enemy upon the waters; and it is possible that, had the war been long continued, the difficulties of the forces defending the Mincio and the Quadrilateral might have been seriously aggravated by hostile landings in Venetia as in 1848.

Actually, however, the maritime command of the French and Sardinians influenced the operations in Lombardy chiefly by the facilities which it afforded the Emperor Louis Napoleon for rapidly moving his legions towards the Ticino. And inasmuch as the Austrian armies on the outbreak of hostilities assumed the offensive and invaded Piedmont, the promptitude with which the French appeared upon the scene was an element of no small importance in deciding the issue.

While part of the French army crossed the Alps by the Mont Cenis and adjacent passes, a considerable portion of it took ship at Marseilles and at other ports of Languedoc and Provence, and was conveyed to the Italian Riviera by sea. Thanks to railway communication and to maritime command, troops were, within a week of quitting Paris, tramping northwards from Genoa to the valley of the Po. And this was not alone beneficial to the Allied cause because of the celerity with which masses of troops were poured into the theatre of war, — the direction necessarily given to their march was also very fortunate. For they came naturally upon the flank of the Austrians advancing over the Ticino against Piedmont, and they thereby brought these to a sudden halt. The events which followed—the forward movement of the French and Sardinian forces, and the great battles of Magenta and Solferino—belong to purely

military history. But the short and sanguinary contest is, taken as a whole, a striking example of the indirect and not always at once obvious effect which sea-power will often exert upon campaigns on land. The Austrian downfall cannot be attributed to the Allied navies. The result would probably have been little different had the entire host which Louis Napoleon threw into the scale traversed the defiles of the great range of hills which part France from the plains of Northern Italy. But the course of operations would not have been the same, the Allies would not so readily have gained the upper hand, and Lombardy might conceivably have remained under alien government in place of being ceded to a victorious coalition by a proud empire fairly beaten in the field.

Subsequent campaigns in the Italian peninsula.

The conflict in the basin of the Po was but the overture to a period of protracted turmoil in the Italian peninsula as, one after another, the States which covered its surface were incorporated in one kingdom under the sovereignty of the house of Savoy. Over the desultory operations which ended in the realisation of Italian unity sea-power was not without its influence. The dramatic struggle in the south which overturned Bourbon rule at Naples began with the landing of a band of filibusters under Garibaldi on the Sicilian coast. But the hostilities do not, taken as a whole, offer a

clear enough presentment of the relations between maritime command and the successful conduct of war on shore to justify detailed narrative. The brilliant career of conquest of the renowned guerilla chief is illustrative rather of what a valiant partisan leader striving in a popular cause can achieve against regulars according reluctant loyalty to unpopular Governments, than of well-defined operations between opposing armies in a sea-girt theatre of war. Such being the case, it will be best to pass on at once from the strange series of events which closed at Gaeta to the brave efforts of the Danes to maintain their rights in Schleswig-Holstein against the military and naval resources of the whole of Central Europe.

The second war between Germany and Denmark.

The struggle of 1864 in the Cimbric peninsula does not compare as regards strategical interest with that of 1849 and 1850. But it presents some remarkable and special features, and it derives a peculiar interest from having for its scene the same theatre of war as the earlier campaign. Sympathy cannot be denied to a people who appealed to arms ere they would let themselves be trampled upon by infinitely more powerful neighbouring nations banded together to do them mischief. The noble conduct of the Danish troops fighting against impossible odds extorted grudging eulogy even from their enemies. The sacrifices freely sub-

mitted to by the little kingdom in defence of its honour commands applause without perhaps in the eyes of all justifying its action in the quarrel. There has been no instance in modern civilised warfare of conflict on land between antagonists so ill matched.

Relative strength of the belligerents on sea and land.

In 1849 Denmark had enjoyed, it will be remembered, the priceless gift of maritime command —as was shown in chapter iv., the operations were most glorious for the Danish arms. The Duchies, the source of dispute, had remained part of the kingdom. The issue had been, it is true, governed to a certain extent by the attitude of Europe and by the practical sympathy with Danish interests displayed by the Baltic Powers. So vigorous, however, had been the defence of their soil by the descendants of the hardy Norsemen, and so remarkable the strategical skill and resource of their leaders, that the capacity of the invaders to maintain their grip on Schleswig had remained undetermined at the close. In a military sense the campaign had been inconclusive, and the defenders could claim that they had held their own.

But when in 1864 the quarrel came to a head again and the dispute was referred to the tribunal of a second war, the relative fighting strength of the belligerents had undergone no little change. In 1849 Austria, menaced with disruption by the Hungarian convulsion and engaged up to the hilt in

the basin of the Po, had held aloof. Now in 1864 the Danes had to reckon with the whole might of the Germanic Confederation, and had to prepare for the attack of two Great Powers instead of one.

The Confederation did not require to put into the field more than a fraction of the vast armies scattered over the face of Europe from the Baltic to the Gulf of Venice; the military strength of its antagonist did not call for a great display of strength. The forces which invaded Holstein and swept onwards into Schleswig were far superior in numbers to the few thousand Danish troops available to bar the way. The disproportion was so great, that only under abnormally favourable strategical conditions could Denmark hope to stave off invasion of the peninsula. But the maritime conditions compensated somewhat for the inequality of the opposing armies. It will be remembered that in the former war the Danes enjoyed an undisputed maritime command; then their control over the seas adjoining the scene of military operations was absolute. Prussia had, indeed, since those days developed a feeble navy, and the participation of Austria in the second struggle placed the Adriatic squadron at the disposal of the Allies — a squadron which, against an adversary of somewhat limited resources, was a very appreciable item. But the southern empire arrayed its naval forces in such leisurely

fashion for service in the north of Europe, and so many weeks passed before the vessels laid up in Pola and those in commission in the Mediterranean appeared at the mouths of the Elbe, that during the early stages of the war the Danes were predominant at sea. Their maritime command was never absolute; the Prussian flotilla was quite formidable enough to demand attention and to contain great part of the opposing naval forces. But the transport of troops between the great islands and the mainland of Schleswig and Jutland could always be carried out undisturbed, and a few war-vessels remained available to aid the Danish troops when the course of the war led to conflicts on the coast.

The Danes appear hardly to have realised how gravely their chances of holding out against the formidable combination which they had to face were prejudiced by their uncertain tenure of maritime dominion. Fired by recollections of what had been achieved within the memory of all grown up to manhood, they hoped to confound their enemies by amphibious operations. They failed to recognise that progress in artillery forbade the intervention of unarmoured vessels in channels where in 1849 gunboats had been safe from batteries on shore. In the council-chambers of Copenhagen, among the generals in high command, and among the brave, patient, phlegmatic soldiery, there prevailed

a confidence which the conditions did not justify. This confidence caused the troops to fight with a martial spirit and martial discipline under untoward circumstances which excited general admiration. But serious tactical and strategical blunders may be traced to it. Incorrect appreciation of the maritime conditions is moreover discernible in the blockade of German commercial ports; for this absorbed a portion of the navy, the support of which was urgently needed by the troops struggling for existence in positions where battleships and gunboats could participate in the fray.

Opening of the campaign and occupation of the Duchies by the Confederation troops.

The campaign opened in the depths of winter. The Allied forces entered Holstein in January 1864, and by the end of the month had occupied the whole Duchy without meeting with any opposition. The Danish army assembled in the lines of Dannewerk, which formed a chain of defence-works south of the town of Schleswig. They stretched across the peninsula at a point where fiords and marshes narrowed it into somewhat of a defile. The extensive position was strong, swamps and lagoons rendered the approaches difficult, and the intrenchments were of stout design and profile. But the troops available to hold it were insufficient for the purpose. The scheme of arresting the formidable host which the Confederation could muster for an attack on Den-

mark, here near the frontiers of Holstein, was too ambitious for a country so lacking in military resources. The occupation of the lines was indicative rather of spirit than of judgment. When on the 1st of February the invaders advanced into Schleswig, the intrenchments had to be abandoned; and so the Danish army commenced its operations in face of the enemy by a retreat which spread a natural dejection through the ranks, and which would have induced demoralisation among a soldiery less resolute and disciplined. As in 1849, the Danes retreated partly to the island of Alsen, holding the lines of Düppel on the mainland, and partly northwards into Jütland. The Prussians and Austrians pressed forward energetically. A portion of the invaders wheeled to the right heading towards Düppel; the remainder moved on unopposed through Schleswig; and by the 17th of February the whole province was in occupation of the invading army, with the exception of the line of works covering the bridges into Alsen, and of the western seaboard which was unsuited for military operations and which had been abandoned by the defenders.

Danes command the sea and move their troops about by ship.

In the meantime the Danish fleet had not been idle. Most of the Prussian Baltic ports were still partially closed by winter ice, but a blockade was established at all points where hostile warships were known to be located, and a careful

watch was kept lest the newly created navy should escape from harbour and make its presence felt in Danish waters. The German coasts were also blockaded in the North Sea, causing considerable damage to the Hamburg trade. The maritime forces of Austria were still in the Mediterranean, or else loitering in neutral harbours on the way to the theatre of war, so that the Danes were assured for the time of the command at sea. Nor did the disappearance of the ice make any immediate change. All through February and March the Allies were reduced to helplessness upon the waters. The Danes, although they attempted no bold combinations against the flank of the invaders as in 1849, enjoyed the full benefits of maritime supremacy, and could mass their troops at different points at pleasure. At first by far the largest portion of their army had made Alsen its asylum; but before the Allies crossed the border into Jutland a whole division was despatched by sea from Alsen to Fredericia, destined to assist in the defence of the last mainland province unoccupied by the foe.

The Prussians and Austrians at first displayed no great eagerness to extend their operations beyond the limits of the Duchies. Europe sided with the weaker party, and the conduct of the Allies called forth general reprobation. It was no part of their programme to injure Denmark further than to deprive it of Schleswig-Holstein. But when the

Copenhagen Cabinet showed no symptoms of surrender the invaders passed over into Jutland, and before the end of February Fredericia was invested on the land side. The Danish field-army, endeavouring to protect the northern districts of the peninsula, was by the irresistible pressure of superior numbers forced away from the vicinity of the Little Belt and driven northwards.

Sieges of Fredericia and Düppe and their capture.

For a brief space interest was centred on the sieges of Fredericia and Düppel, strongholds acting as it were as bridgeheads affording access from the islands to the mainland. Their strategical significance was incontestable. The Danes had not, however, devoted an attention to their development commensurate with their importance. Technical engineering skill and laborious intrenching operations had been lavished on the Dannewerk, while positions had been neglected where the little army, backed by sea-power, might have caused legitimate anxiety to the hostile legions. Neither at Fredericia nor yet at Düppel had the fortifications broadened out so as to be able to cope with the rifled artillery of the day. The Düppel lines were enfiladed by Prussian batteries set up on an adjacent promontory which in 1849 had been out of range. Here the investing forces were commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, a hard, determined man of action, who pushed the siege with relentless vigour. The armament of the cramped, old-

fashioned defences was obsolete, their parapets were pierced by the besiegers' projectiles, their magazines were a perpetual source of peril to the garrison, but the Danes clung to them with obstinate bravery. In the previous war the navy had played a conspicuous part when the Germans made their unsuccessful onslaught; in 1864, however, the fleet was too deeply engaged elsewhere to assist effectively, and the one vessel which watched the struggle failed to intervene to any purpose. On the 18th of April the intrenchments were stormed, their defenders suffering severely ere they fell back over their bridges into Alsen. Nor was this all: Fredericia was perforce evacuated a few days later, the troops which had held it retiring across the Little Belt. And thus both the positions which linked insular Denmark to the Cimbric peninsula passed almost simultaneously into the power of the invading host.

The Allies at once set on foot projects for crossing the narrow channels which divided them from Funen and from Alsen. The occupation of the last-named as a portion of Schleswig was especially desired by the Confederation. But before any further active operations could take place on shore an armistice, agreed to early in May, interrupted hostilities—not, however, before the rival fleets had met in the North Sea and striven for the mastery in a well-contested action.

Insecurity of maritime command hinders the Danes from effectively supporting their army with their fleet.

The Danes had not profited by sea-power as in the earlier war. They had throughout adopted a persistently defensive attitude. Their navy, too much absorbed in lying in wait for hostile war-ships and in preying upon Prussian commerce to throw its weight into the scale at Fredericia or Düppel, had not influenced the land campaign, except in so far as it secured military traffic between the islands and the mainland. Owing to the introduction of steam, the defending troops could be transferred from place to place by sea with a rapidity and certainty impossible in 1849; but there had been no landings on the flank of the invaders, no sudden disembarkations when the foe was unprepared. Moreover, just before the truce, the omens began to point to a probability that Danish supremacy on the high seas was no longer to go unchallenged. The Austrian squadron was approaching. The Prussian navy plucked up courage with the prospect of support. The blockade of the Elbe was relaxed. And an engagement took place off Heligoland which, although the Danes gained the upper hand, was really indecisive.

The hopes entertained by both sides that the suspension of hostilities would promptly lead to peace turned out to be delusive. The antagonists could not come to terms. Denmark would not yield, and the central Powers declined to abate their demands.

The negotiations came to nothing. Therefore on the 26th of June the contest was resumed under conditions very unfavourable to the weaker State.

Increasing strength of the Confederation at sea exposes the islands to attack.

The whole Danish army was now practically concentrated in Alsen and in Funen, and in the Baltic the Danish fleet was still dominant; but the naval situation in the North Sea and the Kattegat was by no means so favourable to the little kingdom. The Allied war-vessels were now in superior force in these waters, and it was impossible for the Copenhagen Government to ignore the danger of maritime command passing into the hands of the enemy. Denmark was, in fact, in a serious dilemma. Unwilling to withdraw from the open sea, but appreciating to the full the gravity of the danger that a maritime disaster might be followed by a hostile descent upon Zealand itself, the executive finally decided to withdraw the western squadron to the vicinity of the archipelago. The troops still remaining in Northern Jutland were brought over to Funen, and every effort was now directed towards the defence of Funen and Alsen, which it was evident the Prussians and Austrians would shortly try to occupy.

Alsen occupied by the invaders.

The Allies acted with no little promptitude. Within a few days they forced a passage across the channel which divides Alsen from the mainland, the single Danish war-vessel on the spot creating no diversion. The defenders gave way

before the impetuous onset of superior numbers, and in a very few days the whole island was in the enemy's grip. The garrison retired to Funen, and thus the entire military forces of the Danish monarchy were massed within that island.

Austrian and Prussian troops thereupon overran all Jutland. The victors dealt most harshly with the unfortunate inhabitants of the province. Heavy contributions were imposed upon a people little capable of complying with exorbitant demands. These drastic measures were much condemned, but they were not wholly without justification. The Confederation wished for peace, and if the ruin of private fortunes in territory occupied by the invaders excited implacable resentment, it served also as a warning to the islands which had been spared the horrors of war of what might be in store for them should hostilities continue. The fear was spreading over the archipelago that a naval catastrophe was imminent. The controllers of public opinion were appalled by the prospect of hostile landings upon the islands, and of the frigates of the enemy appearing in the Sound. It was ascertained that the Austrian squadron had been reinforced. The Frisian archipelago off the western coast of Schleswig was passing into the hands of the invaders now that the Confederation dominated the North Sea. The hopelessness of the struggle was from hour to hour growing more

Denmark yields.

apparent, so at last the King of Denmark appealed for a truce. This was granted, and the negotiations which ensued resulted in a peace on the broad basis of the transfer of the Duchies to the conquerors.

Conclusion.

The Allies were on the point of attempting a passage of the Little Belt into Funen when the war came to an end. It is uncertain whether the project would have succeeded. For a short distance only is the channel so contracted as to forbid effective intervention by ships of war. Along this narrow zone the Danish troops might have beaten the assailants back, and the defending flotilla might have prevented the passage at a wider part. Still their fleet had not afforded much help tactically to the Danish military forces on other critical occasions; and if this was perhaps due mainly to the fact of the navy having been busily engaged on purely maritime operations, the menacing presence of an Allied squadron in the Kattegat could hardly fail to prejudice the effectiveness of the defending vessels in the Little Belt.

In 1849 it had been different. Then the flag had been supreme in the Baltic and in the Kattegat and in the North Sea. There had been no question of maintaining maritime supremacy—it was never in dispute. While formidable invading forces had filled Schleswig and menaced Jutland, the Danish flotilla had watched in the fiords and


Scale of English Miles
JUTLAND
KATTEGAT
SWEDEN
NORTH SEA
ZEALAND
THE SOUND
Copenhagen
Fredericia
Kolding
FUNEN
GREAT BELT
LITTLE BELT
SCHLESWIG
Düppel
Gravenstein
Alsen
Flensburg
Friesian Islands
Denmark
Heligoland
HOLSTEIN
BALTIC SEA
PRUSSIA

DENMARK.

channels, and had borne a hand in more than one dubious land engagement. Nor had the Danes in the earlier war adhered to a strict defensive. Utilising their strength upon the waters, they had pounced down at times upon the enemy, compensating for numerical weakness by the direction given to their attacks and by the suddenness with which these were delivered home. In 1864 there was none of this. There was no audacity, and little skill was displayed. The troops bore themselves most gallantly in the field, but the commanders refrained from the initiative, and the navy afforded perfunctory support. Consequently the whole Cimbric peninsula was soon in the invaders' hands, and Funen would probably have been added to their conquests had the Danes not yielded at discretion.

The war of 1866 in Italy.

The struggle for Schleswig-Holstein was speedily followed by another and a greater war. Prussia and Italy ranged themselves against Austria and the rest of the Germanic Confederation. Vast forces took the field. But although the campaigns of 1866 in Germany, in Bohemia, and on the Po and Mincio are of great historical and strategical interest, sea-power influenced them very slightly, and only in the case of the conflict in Venetia.

The Austrian fleet confined its operations to the northern Adriatic, and maintained an attitude of observation till within a short time of the conclusion

of hostilities. Hence it followed that the Italian forces from Sicily, from Sardinia, and to a certain extent from the southern provinces of the peninsula, could depend on water transport to convey them to the theatre of war in the north. This materially facilitated the concentration of the army with which King Victor Emmanuel hoped to drive the Austrians over the Alps. But in spite of it Italy suffered the humiliating reverse of Custozza, a grievous disappointment to a people panting for military distinction. And it is a singular fact that the battle of Lissa, the greatest fight at sea from Navarino to the Yalu, exerted absolutely no influence whatever over the campaign near the Quadrilateral.

The battle of Lissa.

The combat of Lissa was a naval incident pure and simple. It occurred when the war on land was practically over. Even had the encounter between the fleets taken place some weeks earlier, before Custozza, its effect upon the operations in Venetia would have been almost inappreciable. Still, from the point of view of the maritime art of war, its story is full of interest and instruction. Italy had shown extraordinary enterprise in building up a modern fleet. The experiences of the recently concluded American Civil War had not been lost upon the budding State. When the rupture came with Austria there were lying in the harbours of Spezzia, Taranto, and Ancona several for-

midable ironclads, the most novel products of ship-building craft. The opposing navy, on the other hand, consisted for the most part of vessels of an older type, mounting a far less powerful armament. There could not, in fact, as regards material, be any comparison between the maritime forces of the antagonists. But the Italian crews were quite untrained, the officers generally were inexperienced, and the commander to whom the country intrusted the potent squadron which was to sweep the hostile flag off the face of the Adriatic proved unworthy of the confidence reposed in him. The Austrians had Tegethoff for their chief—an admiral who off Heligoland had made a most creditable fight against a superior Danish fleet, and to whom his country looked with hope in this hour of trial. Seldom has the influence of a great personality over a maritime campaign been illustrated in more striking fashion. In a few weeks Tegethoff's energy and force of character developed to an extraordinary extent the efficiency of the Austrian marine. He inspired unbounded confidence in all ranks under him. And when the Italian admiral was at last, after unpardonable procrastination, forced by public opinion to put to sea, his masterful antagonist bore down eager for the fray and utterly defeated him.

The cession of Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon immediately after Lissa brought the Austro-

Italian conflict to an abrupt conclusion. The memorable naval engagement was of no effect. The campaign of Custozza was fought out in the same theatre which the veteran Radetzky had, in spite of his strategical and tactical skill, failed to hold in 1848 when Italian sea-power bore upon his rear. But the struggle of 1866 was uninfluenced by the navy which Victor Emmanuel and his counsellors had strained the financial resources of their country to build up. The lesson to be learnt from this remarkable conflict in the Adriatic is a purely naval one. It is that ships alone do not make a fighting fleet. Maritime nations of infinitely riper experience than Italy sometimes forget this fundamental truth.

The Franco-German War.

The Franco-German war is often quoted as a case where sea-power did not noticeably affect a campaign in which both belligerents owned an extensive seaboard, and it must be admitted that the question of maritime command exerted singularly little influence over the course of the struggle. The supremacy of the French upon the waters admitted of no doubt. Their vessels were of modern type and were equipped with the most recent creations of the nation's inventive genius. A portion, at least, of their *personnel* was excellent. Against a foe so powerful the navy of the Confederation could not hope to keep the sea. The

Germans bowed to the inevitable,—they tacitly admitted their naval powerlessness, and they abandoned the North Sea and the Baltic to the squadrons of the enemy as soon as these appeared.

During the forty years preceding, the military prestige of France had steadily grown. The conquest of Algeria and the victory of Isly, the efficiency of army organisation which had been so manifest in the Crimea, the triumphs of Magenta and of Solferino,—all had combined to establish the French in the eyes of Europe as the foremost military nation. Capable and experienced observers were dazzled by the Empire. They failed to realise the rottenness of the structure, and to discover that the fighting forces of the country were not in a condition to stand the strain of war with the conquerors of 1866. The Paris War Office entered upon the conflict with a confidence which, judged by the light of after-events, is almost incomprehensible. And in nothing is this confidence more apparent than in the design, which was entertained for some weeks upon the Seine, of maritime attack in force upon the enemy's shores.

French scheme of military operations in the Baltic rendered impossible by disasters in Alsace and Lorraine.

An elaborate project appears to have existed. The fleet had been ordered to prepare for the transport of 30,000 men. It was vaguely hoped that Denmark would assist. In addition to marines some land-service troops were told off to share in the proposed enterprise. During the

troublous period prior to Weissemburg, Wörth, and Spicheren, when confusion reigned supreme and when it transpired that the whole military organisation was a miserable sham, that the process of mobilisation involved difficulties undreamt of and delays fatal to the hopes of speedy glory which filled the mob, that so far from a triumphant march to Berlin the soldiers of France would be hard set to keep the foe at bay, fantastic designs for descents upon the Prussian coasts were not abandoned. It was not till the legions from beyond the Rhine had passed the frontiers, had overwhelmed the troops of Frossard and Mac-Mahon, and were in full march for the Moselle, that the scheme of a Baltic expedition was definitely abandoned. The corps waiting in the Channel ports for the signal to embark were hurried eastwards to defend Lorraine and to guard the capital, already threatened by the irresistible advance of the invaders. And the vain hope that sea-power might be used against the Teuton with decisive effect, that the naval forces of France were destined to participate in operations more damaging to the foe than the mere blockade of maritime commerce, passed away and was forgotten.

Effect of French sea-power on the war.

Students of the literature of this tremendous struggle will remember that the movement towards the Rhine of considerable German forces

territorially located near the coast was delayed for the space of a fortnight. To a certain extent this was caused by the dread of hostile landings. The staff under Von Moltke were too fully informed of what was going forward beyond the frontier not to be aware that the despatch of troops by sea was planned and ripe for execution. The naval position of France obviously suggested the transport of military forces to the exposed shores of Prussia and the adjoining principalities. But the pause of these German troops in the maritime districts was not wholly attributable to solicitude on this account. The fact is that the divisions so detained could scarcely have moved in any case. Being farthest from the French borders, they were obviously the last to swell the great stream of soldiers pouring by concentric lines of railway towards the Rhine and Saar. And by the time that the communications were clear for them, the marvellously developed organisation of the Confederation had provided landwehr amply sufficient to take their place.

Considerable bodies of these reserve troops remained stationed in the maritime provinces to the end. Their retention hundreds of miles from the theatre of war did not, however, greatly inconvenience the German military authorities. So overwhelming was the superiority of the forces which invaded France that these wardens of the North Sea

and Baltic shores could easily be spared. Their services could be dispensed with from the scene of active operations. Once or twice only for a brief period did the victors feel the want of men; and the fortune of war ruled that the enemy should not profit by these fleeting opportunities.

Nor should it be forgotten that if French predominance at sea tended to tie considerable bodies of German troops to garrison duties, it had also the effect that the proposed expeditionary force gathered in the Channel ports for shipment to the Baltic was lost to Marshals MacMahon and Bazaine during the critical opening phases of the campaign. It is not suggested that the absence of these detachments influenced the fights in Alsace and on the Moselle to any great extent. Still it should be remembered that the French could worse afford to dispense with a fraction of their army than their opponents, so that upon the whole the threat of descents upon the German coasts seems to have recoiled upon the belligerent enjoying maritime command.

But the sea-power of the French greatly benefited them in the Mediterranean. In time of peace Algeria and Rome absorbed thousands of men. Had maritime command been in dispute in southern waters, the armies vainly striving to stem the torrent of invasion could not have counted upon help from Italy and Africa. As it was, the

transports from Civita Vecchia and the Barbary ports, safe from hostile cruisers, brought seasoned soldiers to swell the columns of the French. Troops from Algiers fought at Wörth. A brigade from Rome helped to make up the XIIIth Army Corps, which, having arrived too late on the Meuse to share in the catastrophe of Sedan, subsequently formed the nucleus of regulars which stiffened the nondescript levies in the defence of Paris. The French command of the Mediterranean affected the conflict more than did the fleets which hovered in the North Sea and the Baltic. For France resembles the British and Ottoman empires in having a proportion of her military forces stationed permanently in remote provinces and dependencies with which the only communication is by sea. A State so situated cannot put forth its full strength on land unless its navy be supreme upon the ocean.

The influence of maritime command over the operations of armies in the field is not illustrated very vividly by the great wars of 1859, of 1866, and of 1870-71. Sea-power affected the course of these struggles merely indirectly. But when in 1877 the Tsar appealed to arms to liberate the Balkan Christians from the Moslem yoke, the old question of predominance in the Euxine assumed afresh its strategical prominence. A campaign ensued governed to a great extent by the

naval position of the antagonists. And as the conditions differed widely from those obtaining during the Crimean war, and during the campaigns of Wittgenstein and Diebich, the history of the operations deserves to be compared carefully with the narrative of those earlier struggles, and merits a chapter to itself.

CHAPTER VII.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

Sketch of the outbreak of the conflict.

BEFORE passing in review the last of the three crusades which Russia has since the Peace of 1815 undertaken against the Ottoman empire, we must revert to the stirring events in the Western Hemisphere, which engrossed the attention of the civilised world from 1861 to 1865. The American Civil War was a struggle waged throughout by both sides with unflinching resolution. Its course was strangely checkered and was marked by episodes hitherto unknown in military operations. It involved a number of distinct campaigns; these campaigns occurred in theatres of war separated widely from each other; and so much was this the case that there is scarcely one single strategical principle which its history does not exemplify. The influence of sea-power upon the issue is not perhaps so obvious as it was in the operations which culminated at Konia and in the case of the Crimean

War. But an examination of its annals cannot fail to convince us that its destinies were in reality ruled by the command of the sea which the conditions at the outset assured to the Federal side.

Manifold causes led up to the secession of the Confederate States. The antipathy between the Southern planters and the keen business classes of the North was the growth of years. The drift of public opinion forced them more and more apart. The rapid increase of population in the New England States and in those extending westwards towards the Upper Mississippi, was viewed with alarm in Georgia and the Carolinas. The developing resources and thriving commerce of the great belt stretching from Illinois to the Gulf of Maine foreshadowed its preponderance in the Union, and excited the jealousy of the conservative districts south of the Ohio and Potomac. The slave question was of vital moment to the cotton and tobacco producing provinces where negro labour was indispensable, and the North was taking up an attitude of pronounced hostility to a system which civilisation regarded with abhorrence. Matters were brought to a head by the election to the office of President of a typical representative of hard-headed, pushing Yankeedom. And in the winter of 1860-61 South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas separated from the Union by their own

act, and formed themselves into a Confederation under a central government distinct from that of the United States.

The Government of Washington resolved to compel the seceding states to re-enter the Union, if necessary by force of arms. Both parties prepared for war. And Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas, forced to take sides, threw in their lot with the Confederation. Missouri was divided in allegiance. So that when hostilities commenced the regions comprised in the South included the whole area between the Ohio and the Gulf of Mexico, and between Maryland and the Rio Grande. Since the design of the Federals was to force the Secessionists to reunite with the North, the South stood naturally on the defensive, and became the theatre of war. And therefore a brief description of this vast territory from the strategical point of view will not be out of place.

The theatre of war.

The map at the end of the chapter shows the immense extent of coast-line of the Confederation. From the Chesapeake to Mexico its length is quite 3000 miles. The territory comprised in the South is cut into two unequal portions by the Mississippi, a huge river navigable for large gunboats, as are also the lower stretches of the Ohio and Cumberland which swell its volume. The west of Virginia is deeply indented by the estuaries of its rivers, and most of these estuaries form convenient harbours.

North Carolina is sheltered from the Atlantic by long spits of sand, within which are the wide lagoons known as Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, expanses of water unsuitable for navigation except by vessels of comparatively small draught. Further south are the great harbours of Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and Jacksonville, with several others of less importance. In the Gulf of Mexico the chief ports at the time of the war were Mobile, Galveston, and the Mississippi mouth leading to New Orleans. There were many points on the seaboard of the Confederate States well suited as maritime bases for invading armies landing on the coast, but it was very generally the case that the country bordering on the sea was ill-suited for the maintenance and movements of great military forces; so that the interior was not by any means at the mercy of a foe enjoying naval supremacy, although the littoral generally was much exposed to isolated attacks.

The American states south of the Ohio and Potomac were in the early sixties but sparsely populated. Vast districts were still clothed in virgin forests. Settlements were few and far between. Except on the sea-coast there were few great towns, Richmond and Atlanta being the two chief inland cities. Roads were rough and kept in bad repair; therefore railways—always of prime importance to belligerents—acquired an excep-

tional significance; the contending armies were indeed linked to the lines of steam communication to an extent unheard of in previous war. To the west the rivers of the Ohio basin were navigable to vessels of some size; their importance was therefore fully equal to that of the railways, and, as will be seen, they played a prominent part in deciding the issue of the conflict. The districts which became theatres of war were not productive enough long to support great armies such as took the field; supply difficulties were ever present, and the suddenly improvised military forces which engaged in the earlier struggles were terribly hampered by anxiety as to subsistence, for which their defective organisation afforded no guarantee, and which the scene of operations could but partially provide.

Relative strength of belligerents.

The resources of the Federals on land were immeasurably superior to those of the Confederates. With a far larger population to draw upon, with the chief factories of war material under their control, and with the small regular army of the United States almost entirely at their disposal, the Northerners seemed at the outset to have the game absolutely in their hands. But while the forces of the Union were recruited from prosperous manufacturing districts and great cities, while the executive at Washington held in its grip most of the arsenals and magazines of which the country boasted, while the North was in appearance by

far the more formidable power, the Confederates possessed sources of strength the effect of which was not anticipated. The social conditions of the Southern States lent to their armies a backbone which their adversaries sorely needed. The country gentlemen of the seceding community were of the stuff from which great leaders are produced. Dragged from their estates by the turmoil of civil strife, they displayed in full measure the virtues of a dominant caste. The chieftains on the Southern side developed an aptitude for making war which was conspicuous by its absence in the Federal ranks. While the hastily collected levies of the Confederation were still in their first months of service, the rank and file already owed that unfaltering allegiance to their officers which will sometimes turn the tide of battle when all seems lost. On land the North appeared to be predominant. In reality the antagonists were not ill-matched during the early phases of the contest in a military sense.

The Federals assured of maritime command.

At sea, however, the Federals were supreme. Practically the entire United States navy was at their command. All the great dockyards except one were situated in the Northern States. The *personnel* of the national fleet was recruited mainly on the seaboard between the Chesapeake and the Canadian borders. When war broke out, the Federals were in a position at once to assume

maritime dominion on the Atlantic and in the Gulf of Mexico; and one of the first episodes of the struggle was the destruction of the naval establishment at Norfolk in Virginia and the burning of the war-vessels building and repairing there by the officers in charge acting under instructions from Washington. Norfolk and its ruined dockyard were, for a short space of time, to rivet the attention of the belligerents at a later date. And the promptitude of the Federals in disabling it for doing serious mischief was creditable to the judgment and foresight of their chiefs; it appeared to show a recognition of the value of sea-power on the Northern side of which later conduct gave but little evidence.

The commencement of hostilities. Federals succeed in holding Fort Monroe.

The first act of war occurred at Charleston. The Federal garrison was compelled to evacuate the place. Detachments of regular troops at other points upon the Confederate coasts were in most cases obliged to follow suit. One point, however, the Union soldiery succeeded in holding, and its possession in the campaigns which followed proved of incalculable value to the Northern side. This was Fort Monroe on the York Town peninsula. Only some seventy miles from Richmond, which had been made the Confederate capital, at the mouth of the James river, close to the fine anchorage of Hampton Roads, and only an hour's steam from Norfolk, Fort Monroe possessed a

strategical importance which the antagonists perhaps did not fully appreciate at the outbreak of the conflict. It never changed hands during the four years' struggle. It gave the Federals a footing in Virginia. And upon its possession by the Northern troops depended some of the most remarkable operations of the war.

During April and May of 1861 the adversaries were girding themselves for the fray. The Federals designed the invasion of Kentucky and Virginia; they sent considerable bodies of troops to Fort Monroe by sea; and early in June the Northern forces crossed both the Ohio and the Potomac, and the struggle commenced in real earnest.

With the struggle in Kentucky, in Missouri, in Tennessee, and in other states of the interior, it is not proposed to deal. Away from the sea-coast and the Mississippi, the operations were, upon the whole, till a late stage of the war, generally desultory in character. They consisted in the main of petty skirmishes and predatory incursions. Companies of freebooters swept through the country sacking and pillaging. Gunboats ran the gauntlet of batteries planted on the river banks. Bodies of horse, manœuvred with incomparable boldness, carried into execution those great raids which still furnish models for the light cavalry leaders of to-day. From time to time considerable

armies were set in motion and sanguinary encounters took place. But although the Federals made steady progress, their advance was for many months slow and not uncheckered by occasional damaging defeat. The contest was, however, only indirectly influenced by sea-power, and it scarcely comes within the scope of this volume. In Virginia, on the other hand, the operations involved most remarkable combinations of war. Maritime command was throughout an important factor in shaping their course. Here the forces of the Union had before them an objective which they strove again and again to attain by routes and methods changing with each successive campaign. This was the theatre of war where the most remarkable combats had their scene, and where the final blow was struck which stamped secession out and restored peace to the United States.

Importance of Richmond.

Richmond, the chosen capital of the South, was not a vast centre of population like the great cities beyond the Potomac, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. It was not renowned for manufactures or for trade. It was, however, an important railway junction, and its selection as the metropolis of secession gave to it a strategical significance from the outbreak of hostilities which otherwise it would not have possessed. As the war progressed the place became transformed into a huge military depôt. It was the seat of the supreme military

administration of the Confederates. Some straggling earthworks thrown up early in the struggle spread out till the place became a colossal entrenched camp. And a variety of causes worked together to change the quiet country town in the space of a few months into a place of arms on which hinged the destinies of a nation. Nor was the Federal Government slow to recognise how far-reaching would be the moral and national effect of capturing the city. From the earliest days of the war Richmond was the goal at which the principal armies of the Union aimed. The attention of President Lincoln and his military advisers was ever fixed upon the lower James.

Lines of advance on Richmond.

From Washington, the natural headquarters of the Northern armies mustered in the populous Atlantic States, several possible lines of operations led towards the Southern capital. They can be readily traced on the sketch plan of the Virginian theatre of war at the end of the chapter. There was the railway from Alexandria, situated opposite Washington on the Potomac, to Manassas Junction and on to Gordonsville. From Acquia Creek lower down on the Potomac, a river which is navigable to above the Union metropolis, a railway ran by Fredericksburg. There were also the estuaries of the Rappahannock, of the Pamunky or York river, and of the James, each of which could be utilised as a maritime base in view of

advance against Richmond from the east and south-east. Moreover, beyond the Blue Ridge Mountains the Shenandoah valley offered a possible line of approach from Harper's Ferry and the middle Potomac, which from its direction threatened the communications of the Confederates on the lower James with the west. So that in the early summer of 1861, while the Federal executive was straining every nerve to collect an imposing force for the invasion of Virginia, the leaders had before them a strategical problem not easy of solution—namely, the choice of the best route to follow when the campaign commenced.

Bull Run.

It was decided to advance by Manassas Junction. A force formidable in numbers, if not in other respects, crossed the Potomac and moved slowly forward; but on the 21st of July it was disastrously defeated at Bull Run. The troops suffered severely; they were out-manœuvred and out-fought, and they fled precipitately over the Potomac in a state of complete demoralisation. For a few days Washington was in consternation. Earthworks were thrown up in frantic haste. From hour to hour the citizens awaited a Confederate attack, and listened in terror for the sound of hostile guns. The Secessionist leaders, however, failed to follow up their victory; and so the first trial of strength in Virginia came to an abrupt conclusion, and both

sides absorbed their energies in preparation for the next.

Effect of Federal naval power in 1861.

But even before the disaster of Bull Run, the Federals were making their naval power felt. A blockade of the Confederate coasts was established, and a force was assembled at Fort Monroe to operate against the shores and lagoons of Northern Carolina. In August Fort Hatteras, on the spit of sand dividing Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds from the Atlantic, was captured, and the North thereby gained secure ingress to these inner waters. Shortly afterwards a similar expeditionary force established itself at Port Royal, between Savannah and Charleston. And these two successes of the Union, although not of immediate importance, were a cause of grave annoyance to the Confederates, and gave the Government which had been set up at Richmond a foretaste of troubles in store for them at a later date.

Influence of Jefferson Davis upon the Southern cause.

At the head of the Confederation was a very remarkable man, President Jefferson Davis. He was no mere figurehead adorning the Secessionist cause. To him more than to any other individual, more even than to the great commander Lee, may be attributed the marvellous fight which the South made in what was really a hopeless struggle. As head of the central Government established by the seceding States, the responsibility for putting in line the fighting forces needed to stem the Federal

invasions lay with him. In every respect the resources of the foe were almost overwhelming. The states adhering to the Union had a vastly greater population to feed their armies than those seceding. The Northern ships of war by blockading the coasts forbade the influx of munitions of war from abroad. All the principal arsenals of the Union were in the Federal States, so that factories had to be erected in Secessionist territory when the war broke out. But Jefferson Davis's boundless energy and dogged determination overcame these difficulties, and his administrative genius created the depôts of war material, of clothing, and of equipments which enabled the Confederate armies to keep the field. In every department of military administration was to be seen the hand of the chief to whom the Southern nation looked with implicit confidence. As the conflict developed, the people more and more put their trust in him. They flocked to the standard of secession in answer to his proclamations. His chief instruments, chosen with signal skill and judgment, proved well worthy of his confidence. His generals were allowed a latitude of action which showed that mutual reliance and a thorough understanding between them and their chief existed. Few men have been exposed to greater obloquy. Few men have faced a crushing responsibility with more unwavering courage.

Preparations for the campaign of 1862 in Virginia.

The Federal Government was bitterly mortified at the humiliating disaster of Bull Run, and during the autumn of 1861 the executive laboured diligently to create an army more worthy of the public confidence. But President Lincoln and his military advisers lacked the administrative capacity of their Richmond rivals. There was, moreover, no harmony between the various departments at Washington. The vast resources of the territories north of the Ohio and the Potomac were not turned to the best account. In spite of the advantages which the North possessed, the armies of the Union were far worse organised and far worse fitted for the field throughout the early periods of the war than those opposed to them. The Federal authorities, however, succeeded in gradually getting together a great military force on the Potomac, in view of an offensive campaign in the spring of 1862; and they placed at its head General M'Clellan, a commander who had gained some measure of success in Western Virginia during the operations of the preceding summer.

The year 1862 opened favourably to the cause of Union. In Kentucky and Tennessee the forces of the South were pressed back from the Ohio. On the Atlantic coast the Federal fleets made themselves masters of Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and landed detachments at various points in North Carolina. But the Government

of Washington and the population of the New England States were intent upon the subjugation of Virginia, and interested themselves little in victories elsewhere. There was a keen desire that something should be done, and that right speedily, to wipe out the disgrace of Bull Run. The civilians chafed at the apparent inaction of the great army on the Potomac. There was no sympathy for M'Clellan's soldier-like solicitude that his troops should be properly organised ere they marched to meet the foe; and, finally, the Federal commander was hounded on to commence a campaign when he did not consider his forces to be yet ripe for the venture.

M'Clellan's plans.

M'Clellan was not perhaps a great master of the art of war; but he was a sound administrator, a capable strategist, and a resolute chief. He grasped the nature of the problem with which the army of the Potomac had to cope, and perceived the difficulties attending the march of a great mass of men from Washington to the Confederate capital with an active enemy to bar the way. He also estimated correctly the advantages which maritime command gave him in a theatre of war so deeply indented by great bays and estuaries. He formed the plan of disembarking his forces east of Richmond, and of striking at that all-important point by the shortest possible line, basing himself upon the sea. But the scheme

was not received with favour by his civilian superiors; these feared for Washington although that city had now grown into a fortress, and a sharp divergence of opinion manifested itself, which has caused much controversy. In the end the general prevailed, although he was deprived of a considerable portion of his force. He made an advance to beyond Bull Run, which served as a feint, and then he shipped his troops and moved from the Potomac to Fort Monroe with the design of advancing thence along the York Town peninsula, as the territory between the York river and the James was called, on Richmond.

Effect of the *Merrimac* in the James river on his operations.

M'Clellan anticipated that the Federal war-vessels would most effectually support his advance in the inlets on either flank. But Hampton Roads, at the mouth of the James, had recently become the scene of naval operations as strange as they were unexpected. The supremacy of the Northern fleet had been suddenly challenged. The Confederates had, with characteristic energy and resource, re-established Norfolk as a naval dockyard. They had managed to equip some gunboats by its means. And they had converted one of the war-vessels, which the Federals had only partially burnt when they endeavoured at the outset of the war to destroy the establishment, into an ironclad — the famous *Merrimac*. One day early in March this singular battleship,

the precursor of the yardless armour-clads of to-day, came down from Norfolk to the Hampton Roads where a Union squadron lay at anchor, and achieved a brilliant triumph. It destroyed two first-class Federal men-of-war. The whole squadron was thrown into dismay. For a few hours this novel craft threatened to drive the Northern navy from its favourite rendezvous. No more remarkable episode occurred in the whole course of the protracted war.

The panic which this sudden maritime activity on the part of the Confederates created at the capital speaks volumes for the security which maritime command conferred on the New England States with their great seaport cities. The leaders of the Northern side were not slow to perceive what a transformation in the whole aspect of the war a Secessionist victory on the high seas would bring about. The suspense for a few hours was painful in intensity. But the supremacy of the *Merrimac* near Hampton Roads was only of a fleeting kind. Happily for the Union cause there arrived from New York, on the very night after the hostile turret-ship had dealt out such destruction, a war-vessel of even more eccentric type, the little *Monitor*. On the morrow a duel was fought between these pioneers of the modern fighting-ship, in which neither gained the upper hand. The *Merrimac* withdrew up the James.

The *Monitor* remained in Hampton Roads guarding the Northern squadron against fresh attacks from the dreaded hostile craft. And so the naval situation in the vicinity of Fort Monroe remained for some weeks—the James in Secessionist hands, its mouth blockaded by the Federal flotilla.

M'Clellan's difficulties.

Such was the position of affairs when M'Clellan appeared upon the scene with his army, and he suddenly learnt that the sea-power, on which he had confidently counted, was somewhat of a broken reed. The Federal general was not prepared for the contingency of the James being under the enemy's control. He had hoped for naval aid in the York river, but he found on arrival that this could no longer be afforded him; the *Merrimac* had upset all calculations. Still, command of the outer waters was not in dispute so long as the Southern battleships remained shut up in the estuary above Hampton Roads. M'Clellan's army safely disembarked in the York Town peninsula, but he perceived that the contemplated co-operation of the fleet in his advance on Richmond was impracticable. And another very serious disappointment awaited him; a considerable portion of his force, which was under orders to follow him from the Potomac and which was to disembark some miles up the York river so as to turn the lines which the

enemy had constructed near York Town, was suddenly, and almost without warning, detained by President Lincoln. The result was that the commander of the Federal army, whose scheme of operations hinged upon rapidity of movement while the foe was unprepared, found himself constrained to operate by the tedious process of a siege against the strong position which the Confederate troops opposing him had taken up. For a whole month the host from the Potomac was at a standstill. Then, on the 4th of May the hostile detachments evacuated their intrenchments, and M'Clellan was able at last to proceed towards Richmond.

Federals obtain command of the James.

A few days afterwards there occurred an incident of great importance to the North. Menaced with attack both from Fort Monroe and from the side of Albemarle Sound, the enemy evacuated Norfolk. The *Merrimac*, which had kept the Federal squadron in Hampton Roads in constant terror, could not, owing to her draught of water, retire up the James, and she was abandoned and blown up. The immediate result of this was that the command of the great inlet on M'Clellan's left was transferred to the side of the Union. The far-reaching consequences of this were not apparent at the moment, owing to the invading army having based itself upon the estuary of the Pamunky, but it will be seen that before the end of this

eventful Campaign of the Peninsula, the control over the lower James became vital to the very existence of the Northern legions, and proved to be their salvation in the hour of danger.

The advance on Richmond.

M'Clellan pressed forward along the Pamunky to White House, up to which point the river could be used for a line of communications. Then he marched straight upon the hostile capital. But his progress was deliberate and slow. His army was encumbered by colossal transport trains. The staff was incompetent and inexperienced, and was incapable of efficiently directing the movements of so great a body of troops. Knowledge of the topography of the country to be traversed was most defective. The strength and dispositions of the enemy were wrapped in doubt. However, by the end of May the invading army was on the Chickahominy, close to Richmond, and on the 31st was fought the indecisive battle of Fair Oaks, from which it became manifest that there were formidable hostile forces between M'Clellan and the Confederate metropolis. This battle of Fair Oaks had one most important result upon the war; General Johnston, the Southern commander of the forces in front of Richmond, was severely wounded, and Jefferson Davis nominated in his place a man who combined with rare talents for command a conspicuous capacity for organisation and a strange

fascination over all who served under him—General Lee.

M'Clellan paused, awaiting the co-operation of an army which had advanced from Washington to Fredericksburg and which was mainly made up of the very troops the retention of which on the Potomac two months before had thrown his arrangements for advance through York Town out of gear. But the expected succour never came. And to explain the cause of the failure of this force to bear a share in the campaign on the Chickahominy, it is necessary to refer briefly to events in the northern portions of Virginia, which had become the scene of operations of surpassing military interest.

Remarkable operations of Lee and Jackson.

President Lincoln had broken up the mighty Federal forces on the Potomac into three separate bodies. One was in the upper valley of the river. Another was in the Shenandoah valley. The third was that at Fredericksburg. Besides the main Confederate army under Lee facing M'Clellan, there was only one other body of troops available to defend Virginia, a force of some thousands of men in the Shenandoah valley. But this was made up of ripe and seasoned soldiery who reposed an enthusiastic and unbounded confidence in their chief. Unhampered by unwieldy baggage trains, and in the hardest training after the active operations of the summer, this little army

formed a typical flying column. Nor was the trust of the rank and file in their commander a mere idle hero-worship; at their head was "Stonewall" Jackson, who was about to teach the Federals how a born leader can triumph against overwhelming odds.

Jackson began by inflicting on the Union forces in the Shenandoah valley a defeat so crushing that they fled in utter disorganisation into Maryland. The authorities at Washington thereupon despatched the Fredericksburg army westwards in hot haste to restore the situation, and to hold the victorious Southern general in check. Jackson evaded it. He evaded also the extreme right wing of the Federals, which marched against him from the headwaters of the Potomac. And, abandoning the Shenandoah valley to the vastly superior armies of the North which with hesitating steps were marching to discomfit him, he headed for the James. By his masterly strategy he had drawn off westwards the whole of the troops which might have succoured M'Clellan on the Chickahominy; and now in full agreement with his military superior, General Lee, he was hastening towards Richmond, in strength sufficient to enable the Confederate army covering the capital to assume the offensive, and to strike a tremendous blow at the principal army which the Federals had put into the field.

Defeat of M'Clellan. He finds salvation on the James.

Fortunate was it for M'Clellan at this alarming juncture that the *Merrimac* was gone, and that the stars and stripes were dominant in the estuary of the James. How sea-power will enable an army sometimes to shift its base was pointed out in the opening chapter; the change of Wellington's base from Lisbon to the Basque provinces was quoted as an illustration. The invasion of the Crimea affords another instance in that the allies, who landed south of Eupatoria, marched inland round Sebastopol and finally established themselves on the southern shores of the peninsula. The campaign of 1862 east of Richmond shows how an army based upon the sea may suddenly, on its communications being imperilled, abandon these and gain a new maritime base, escaping thereby from a position full of danger. For Lee, as soon as Jackson joined him, directed strong columns against M'Clellan's right, and after hard fighting forced the Federal general away from the line of the Pamunky. The Northern forces were placed in such a position by the hostile tactics, that their line of communications with the White House were very seriously threatened. But M'Clellan showed a fertility of resource and presence of mind in this crisis which almost compensate for the somewhat dilatory proceedings which had characterised his operations up till then. He promptly marched off

southwards towards the James, abandoning the White House, and established himself near Malvern Hill, where, assured by sea-power of his supplies, with a safe line of retreat in case of emergency, and backed by the moral support of the gunboats of the North, he held his ground.

Remarks on this campaign.

The soldiership of Lee and Jackson had been brilliant. They had worked on interior lines with resolute confidence, and had turned to account this great principle of strategy with unerring skill. They had beaten the opposing legions in detail, and had inflicted reverses on the armies of the Union of a crushing character. But the maritime command of the enemy had in the end robbed the Confederate leaders of the fruits of their masterly combinations, just when these approached their climax. Sea-power had rescued M'Clellan from their clutches just when they seemed to have him safe. Like the retreat of Sir John Moore and the wars in Denmark, this campaign shows how difficult it is to inflict disaster on an enemy backed by naval forces when the theatre of war is partially surrounded by the sea.

So ended the Campaign of the Peninsula. Its conception had been bold and judicious. Its foundation was sea-power, which the forces of the Union had every reason to believe was their strongest card. The North had built great hopes upon it, and not without good cause. Whether

M'Clellan would have succeeded had not a portion of his army been withheld by higher authority at the last moment, can never be decided now. But in his attempt to capture Richmond from the east the Federal chief certainly got no fair treatment from the Government which appointed him to the command. And when we compare his achievements with the operations of a later date, with the inert and feeble strategy and leadership of Pope and Burnside, it is hard to deny to him the credit of having, in the days when the forces of Secession were not yet spent in the unequal struggle, and when the overwhelming numerical preponderance of the Union legions had not yet borne down all resistance, more nearly than any other Northern general attained the object for which all alike contended.

The capture of New Orleans. Its vast importance.

Fortune had not smiled upon the Yankee cause in Virginia; elsewhere, however, the North had not the same grounds for dissatisfaction and disappointment. In April a signal triumph had been gained in the Gulf of Mexico. New Orleans had been captured. It was a success the importance of which can scarcely be exaggerated. New Orleans was the principal city in the seceded states, one of the chief places, indeed, on the American continent. It was the emporium of the trade of the Mississippi basin and the headquarters of commercial activity in the south-western pro-

vinces. Its close relations with many great mercantile centres east of the Atlantic caused its loss to greatly damage Confederate prestige in Europe. But the consequences of the occupation of this great city by the Federals were not momentous merely owing to its moral effect. It meant the passage into the Mississippi of the Northern vessels of war. Already Union gunboats steamed about at will on the upper waters of the great river and on the Ohio. It only remained for the flotilla on the upper reaches to unite with Admiral Farragut, who had forced the approaches to New Orleans and landed the military force sent round by sea from New York and Boston, to establish Federal command over the great waterway from St. Louis to the Gulf of Mexico. But to this junction a serious obstacle presented itself; the Confederates had fortified Vicksburg, and their guns at this place swept the river channel most effectually. A determined attempt to capture this improvised fortress in July miscarried; and for a time important operations on the Mississippi ceased.

The campaign on the Potomac, and battle of Antietam.

The Washington Government was deeply disappointed at M'Clellan's ill success. President Lincoln and his advisers, while thwarting the general commanding their principal army by their pusillanimity and lack of purpose, were slow to abandon hope that he would wipe out the stain of the shameful defeat of Bull Run. On his retreat

to the James they determined on a vigorous campaign farther north. And the scattered corps on the Potomac, which Jackson had so signally outmanœuvred, were concentrated on the Rappahannock under General Pope with the design of advancing by Gordonsville on Richmond.

Lee's army at Richmond was between Pope on the Rappahannock and M'Clellan on the James. The Southern commander was not the man to let so favourable an opportunity slip by. He marched suddenly northwards, intending to bring practically his whole force to bear on Pope alone. But Northern sea-power to a great extent counteracted the advantages which Lee derived from his central position; for a large part of M'Clellan's army, and a corps which had been operating in North Carolina from the side of Albemarle Sound, were brought round by ship to aid the Federal forces on the Rappahannock, and had Pope been a match for his great opponent in the art of war he should have held his ground. But the campaign proved most disastrous to the North. The stalwart strategy and trenchant tactics of Lee and his dashing lieutenant Jackson bewildered the Federal commander. His army was driven back in confusion upon Washington. And so complete was the Confederate victory that Lee resolved to invade Maryland. He crossed the Potomac near Harper's Ferry. But on the Antietam he was

met by the combined forces of the North under M'Clellan, who in the hour of danger had been called to the chief command by popular acclamation, and after an indecisive battle he resolved to abandon the effort to carry the war into the enemy's country. He retired into Virginia, and the eventful campaign of the Potomac in 1862 came to an end for the time being.

Difficulties of the Confederates.

The Federals had little cause for congratulation as the winter approached. The campaigns in Virginia had completely failed. In the west, the capture of New Orleans in the spring had not been followed up by the prompt establishment of maritime command on the lower Mississippi. But nevertheless signs were not wanting that the cause of the Union was really in the ascendant. The blockade of the Confederate coasts was becoming stricter. Western Virginia, where popular sympathy was with the North, was occupied by Federal troops. The Secessionists had lost their hold on Kentucky and on Western Tennessee. The difficulties of Jefferson Davis and his Government were ever growing. Already the drain of the war was telling on the Southern population. The resources of the North in men were almost inexhaustible, and the Federal armies were constantly fed by detachments of recruits from the thickly inhabited states north of the Potomac and the Ohio. The Confederates, on the other hand, had

no great cities and manufacturing centres to draw upon to make good wastage. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the people of the South, the seceded states had become a nation inspired by the most ardent patriotism, and resolved to fight on to the bitter end; but a poor and thinly-peopled region was striving against a rich and populous country, and every day that the war continued the overwhelming strength of the latter was becoming more apparent.

The campaign of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

M'Clellan having arrested the invasion of Maryland, and seen the enemy fall back into Virginia, could claim at the least not to have been vanquished. But the sinister influence of President Lincoln and his counsellors over the operations about Washington and Richmond exerted itself afresh. The supersession of a commander in sight of the enemy is seldom wise; M'Clellan was not, it is true, quite trusted on political grounds, but nothing can excuse his removal from his position at the head of the army of the Potomac, and the placing of Burnside in his stead. The result was another humiliating disaster to the Federal arms before the close of 1862. As Lee retreated, the forces of the North advanced to the upper Rappahannock. Burnside made a flank march to Fredericksburg, intending to turn the Confederate right and make a sudden move on Richmond; but faulty arrangements led to serious delay. A

man with such a genius for war as Lee possessed was not easily deceived by manœuvres carried out so clumsily; he detected the intentions of the enemy, and the consequence was that Burnside, attempting to advance through Fredericksburg, found himself obliged to attack his formidable opponent in a strong position and was defeated with tremendous loss. This was in December. During mid-winter the armies faced each other on the lower Rappahannock.

Fredericksburg had many advantages as a base compared to Washington and Centreville. The distance to Richmond was considerably less. The lower Rappahannock served as a screen behind which an army could assemble unmolested preparatory to moving southwards, and could fully prepare itself for the venture with little fear of any sudden onset of the enemy. The vicinity to Acquia Creek and the lower Potomac gave to the city, where Hooker, who had replaced Burnside, was busy organising his army for a fresh attempt, most of the attributes of a maritime base. The new Federal chief remained quiescent till the end of April. Then he crossed the Rappahannock. A few days later he was decisively defeated at the battle of Chancellorsville, a combat signalised by transcendent tactics on the victors' side, but memorable chiefly for the fatality which led to Jackson's death when he had reached the

very zenith of his fame. Face to face with such tremendous odds, the South could ill afford to lose the great soldier whose name had grown into a household word in both hemispheres, and whose rare gifts of leadership had acted like a charm in many an hour of danger to the Confederate cause.

Lee's advance into Pennsylvania. Gettysburg.

Frustrated again, the Union forces recrossed the Rappahannock; here with the Potomac behind them they were perfectly secure. But Lee was about to play for a great stake, and to give the discouraged Federals work to do in an unexpected quarter. Fully alive to the evil influence which a perpetual defensive had upon his men, and deeply impressed with the sufferings of unfortunate Virginia, the Southern chief resolved once more to tempt fortune upon hostile soil; he wished to make Pennsylvania feel what it was to be a theatre of war; and, masking his movements with a fine dexterity, he moved on Harper's Ferry, passed the Potomac, and marched northwards. When news came of this bold invasion, the alarm was extreme in Washington and the great cities of the North. But the military authorities acted with a creditable firmness in this sudden crisis. The command of the Potomac made it easy for the troops at Fredericksburg to move up north of Washington. Reserve corps were put in motion. And a great army was

gathered together in a short space of time to offer battle to the enemy. For three days a tremendous conflict raged around the town of Gettysburg in Pennsylvania. The struggle was desperate, the number of the slain appalling. The issue for a considerable time hung in the balance; but eventually the Confederates, outnumbered and overmatched, gave way and withdrew towards the Potomac. Lee extricated his army from its perilous position and regained Virginia, his soldiers carrying with them many cherished trophies of their bold incursion into Northern territory. The Federal army followed with halting steps, and advanced towards the Rappahannock. But the operations in this theatre of war for the remainder of 1863 are of trifling interest compared to the stirring events near the Gulf of Mexico.

The capture of Vicksburg, and opening up of the Mississippi.

Almost simultaneously with their hard-earned victory at Gettysburg, the Northern arms gained a great triumph on the Mississippi. Vicksburg had been for a considerable time the main object of the Federals in the south-west. The Confederates, with sound appreciation of the strategical importance of the place, had greatly strengthened the defences during the winter of 1862–63. Port Hudson, situated between Vicksburg and New Orleans, had also been strongly fortified, and its erection into a military stronghold effectually pre-

vented Farragut's fleet at New Orleans from intervening in the siege of Vicksburg. This siege was undertaken by General Grant with a great army recruited from Illinois and Indiana, and it lasted for a considerable time. The garrison made a resolute defence, as did that of Port Hudson against a smaller body of assailants. Finally, however, both fortresses were compelled to yield. They capitulated, almost simultaneously, early in July, and so the Mississippi fell completely under the domination of the North.

Its effect, and the extent to which the triumph was due to Federal maritime command.

The importance of this conquest to the Union cause was enormous. But before tracing its influence over subsequent events it should be noted how the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson was due to the happy co-operation of the land and naval forces of the Federals. It was sea-power which enabled the siege of Port Hudson to be undertaken and to be prosecuted with effective vigour; not only the troops which formed the investing ring around the place, but also the siege-trains which shattered its defences, came round by ship from the New England States. It was Farragut's enterprise against New Orleans more than a year before which gave the North its footing on the lower Mississippi. The upper reaches were in Federal territory. It remained only for the legions from the Ohio to join hands with the navy in the south to gain possession of

the great waterway which cut the Confederation in two, and which opened a road into the heart of the seceded provinces.

Up to the time when the Mississippi fell into Federal hands, the great Northern forces in the basins of the Cumberland and Tennessee had made slow progress. These campaigns in the interior had been characterised by strange vicissitudes. The fortune of war had favoured each adversary in turn; the Confederates had drawn largely upon Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas for men and for supplies, and had managed to keep the enemy at bay in some districts and to greatly retard the hostile advance in others. But from the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson the tide set strongly in favour of the Union in this theatre of operations. For while the armies of the South were now cut off from valuable sources of support from the Trans-Mississippi States, the forces of the Union were able to concentrate from west and north against eastern Tennessee which till then had been a stronghold of Secession; and by the end of the year a great Federal host was firmly established at Chatanooga, on the confines of Georgia, prepared to move south-eastwards on Atlanta in the coming spring.

Exhaustion of the South.

1863 closed ominously for the Confederate cause. The resources of the South were growing less and less able to support the strain. The Federal blockade

was becoming more and more stringent from day to day. The naval enterprises of the North were getting bolder. Every effort of the Secessionists to create sea-power had failed since the days when for a few hours the maritime forces of the Union were in peril of eclipse in Hampton Roads. There were no shipwrights in the Confederate States, no secure building-yards, no means of creating a navy fit to cope with the now formidable Northern fleets. A few commerce-destroyers were harrying Federal trade, blockade-runners were constantly evading the vigilance of the hostile ships of war, but for all practical purposes the South was in a state of siege. By land and sea the enemy was gathering round it, shutting it off from the world, and throwing it upon its own limited resources. Even the triumphs gained upon the battlefield were equivalent to disasters, for they were purchased at the loss of men who could not be replaced. The buoyant spirit of the people, the patriotic sacrifices of all classes, the military genius of the chieftains who had emerged from obscurity and taken the lead in the crisis, had kept the foe at bay. But the contest was too unequal. The Federals had men and money almost without limit. Their command of the sea was trampling down Secession. Under the insipid leadership of President Lincoln's nominees the great armies of the North had effected nothing in Virginia; elsewhere

however they had gained the upper hand, and meant to keep it.

Grant's Virginian campaign of 1864.

Early in 1864 Grant was called to the supreme command of the Federal forces. He was especially designed to lead the army of the Potomac; but he was also to guide the general course of operations, and to ensure co-operation between the great forces in the field in the various theatres of war. And although he had no pretensions to stategical or tactical talent, he possessed one very valuable quality in a man entrusted with such comprehensive military powers. He trusted his subordinates, and did not hamper them in what they did.

Grant's force on the Potomac was a splendid army. It was admirably equipped. The ranks included many veterans. The officers were now men of ripe experience in the art of war. The organisation was adequate and thorough. Commanded by a Jackson or a Lee, this mighty host should have swept before it and destroyed the Confederate force drawn up to oppose it, which mustered barely one-third of its numerical strength. The Southern troops moreover were ill equipped and but indifferently armed. They had no reserves to fill up the gaps in their ranks caused by battle and disease. But on the other hand they were filled with undiminished ardour for the cause; they reposed unbounded confidence in their chief;

they were accustomed to victory over the armies of the North; and they were determined to fight on to the last in what they held to be a sacred cause.

During the early part of 1864 the opposing forces were face to face on the Rapidan. Grant's scheme was to fight his way to Richmond with the army of the Potomac, while a small force on his right pushed up the Shenandoah valley, and while the troops on the York Town peninsula, reinforced from North Carolina, advanced by the line of the James river towards the Confederate capital. But the Federal commander made no secret of the plan by which he really hoped to eventually gain the upper hand. He could afford losses on the battlefield, and Lee could not; his design was to wear the enemy out by incessant combats, to fight on every opportunity, to disregard tactical failures so long as the hostile numbers were reduced by casualties in action. And with the inflexibility of purpose which was the most striking characteristic of the man, he obstinately adhered to this strange method of conducting war, and triumphed in the end.

Influence on it of sea-power.

On the 4th of May the Federals advanced over the Rapidan, and moved eastwards with the intention of securing a fresh base at Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek. Lee was on the alert, and conformed to the Northern march. For several days there was

severe fighting in the difficult wooded country south of Fredericksburg. The forces of the Union were handled most indifferently, they suffered very serious losses, and they made but little way. But Grant, appreciating, perhaps, the support which maritime command might accord his army, edged off eastwards round the Confederate right; and by this manœuvre, which was not carried out with the decision usual where a commander is acting on a definite plan, the Federals acquired a secure retreat to the estuary of the Rappahannock should the worst befall. Driven by dire necessity to husband his resources, Lee dared not strike home at the hostile columns; and so he circled round, keeping always between the enemy and Richmond. The Union legions gradually drifted on to the Pamunky, and continuing their movement they worked southwards towards the James, assured of their supplies by undisputed sea-power but kept at bay by a much inferior army. On the side of the James the left wing from Fort Monroe had failed to make impression on the Secessionist detachments covering Petersburg and Richmond. And thus it came about that early in June Grant was on the Chickahominy, occupying ground almost identical with that which M'Clellan had occupied two years before, but having sacrificed of his men a number equal to the whole Confederate army under Lee and very nearly equal to the Federal force which

had missed by so little reaching the Southern capital from the York Town peninsula in 1862.

The siege of Richmond and Petersburg.

On the 3d of June the Federals delivered a grand attack upon Lee's army between the Pamunky and the Chickahominy, and were repulsed with the loss of many thousand men. Baffled at this point, Grant continued his flank march southwards, and, utilising sea-power, he moved a considerable portion of his forces round by ship from White House to the James. Eventually the main body of the Northern army united with the extreme left wing from Fort Monroe and formed a great host astride the James and based upon the sea. An assault was attempted against the hostile lines protecting Petersburg; but this was beaten off with heavy loss by the detachments in the trenches, and it became evident that the Confederate forces meant to hold their lines across the James to the last. The vast forces of the Union thereupon came to a standstill and field operations ceased as far as the bulk of the invaders were concerned. Grant found himself before an entrenched camp of huge extent, held by resolute, determined men under a leader who seemed to divine his every plan long ere it was put in execution. The Federal troops, although dispirited with ill success, were ever ready to make any venture when appealed to, but after all that they had gone through since leaving the Rapidan and the tremendous losses

which they had sustained, their situation was most depressing. The Confederates had erected an extensive chain of fortifications, which effectually guarded both Petersburg and Richmond from the east. Behind these entrenchments Lee was ever on the watch; and Grant, in full communication with the Northern States by sea, commenced a kind of siege of this huge improvised place of arms. There was scarcely a league of ground on the great arc traversed by the army of the Potomac from the Rapidan to the James where the Federals had not suffered a reverse. But preponderance of strength, combined with maritime command, had, in spite of all, brought them to within a day's march of the Confederate capital. Grant's grim strategy was bearing fruit. Drafts were sent by sea in thousands to keep his units up to strength; but the seceded states had no men left to make good losses in the force defending Richmond, and in the autumn the forces of the Union on the James were to those of Lee as four or five to one.

Confederate counter-stroke against Washington parried by maritime command.

Soon after the arrival of Grant's great army on the James, a very remarkable episode of war proved the incalculable value of maritime command to the Northern forces in their land operations. The Federal campaign in the Shenandoah valley was at first unfortunate. Not only was the corps advancing up the valley driven back, but the Con-

federates opposing it boldly crossed the Potomac and made a dash for Washington. The greatest alarm prevailed in the Union capital. Extravagant apprehensions were entertained by the citizens of Philadelphia and New York. A mere handful of men under an intrepid leader spread panic from Harper's Ferry to Massachusetts. At this crisis the central military administration of the North demanded aid from Grant. A considerable body of troops was with all speed sent round by sea from the river James to Washington. Detachments just arrived in Hampton Roads from far-off New Orleans were sent on to the Potomac. And the hostile force which had penetrated into Maryland withdrew in haste to the Shenandoah valley, foiled in its design. As in 1862 when Stonewall Jackson gave so brilliant an exhibition of his powers as a commander, the campaign on the Western fringe of the Virginian theatre of war developed many memorable incidents, but since sea-power did not, except on the one occasion mentioned, affect its course they need not be recorded. One thrilling story, however, deserves to be told, for it illustrates with strange vividness the shifts and expedients to which the South was driven to have recourse in order to maintain its armies in the field, and it affords convincing evidence of the dauntless spirit animating the Confederate States when dangers thickened.

Dire straits of the Confederates.

When the Federals first moved up the Shenandoah valley simultaneously with Grant's advance across the Rapidan, the lads of Lexington Military College turned out to swell the slender force available to arrest the progress of the foe. The opposing armies met at Newmarket. The Confederates, admirably handled by their chief, swept the left flank of the enemy back in confusion; but the Northern artillery in the centre held its ground, and one battery in particular, fighting with great determination, completely checked the victorious onset of the Southern troops. The boys were ordered up to rush the guns. In view of the whole army they went at the battery and captured it under a storm of grape at the bayonet's point; but they left nearly one-third of their number on the field in carrying out an exploit ranking with the most gallant in a war famous for isolated acts of bravery. It was already no uncommon thing to find bridges guarded and prisoners escorted on the Confederate side by youths in their teens and by men too old to bear arms in the open field. Jefferson Davis was, as Grant expressed it, robbing the cradle and the grave to recruit his armies, but none hung back. The great Federal hosts were daily receiving additions in the shape of detachments of adventurers from Europe attracted by the liberal remuneration which the North could offer. The Confederate troops, dwindling

in numbers and engaged in a declining cause, fought on with indomitable pluck, depending on their own waning resources and without external aid.

Grant, in spite of his vast preponderance of force, was disappointed in all his efforts to work round the flanks of Lee and to cut him off from Lynchburg and North Carolina. There was a certain analogy between the situation before Richmond and Petersburg in the winter of 1864–65 and the siege of Sebastopol. In each case an army based upon the sea was endeavouring to compass the downfall of a suddenly improvised fortress which it was unable to surround. But while the Allies in the Crimea suffered for many months from lack of numbers, the strength of the Federals on the James was out of all proportion to the force scattered behind the long line of earthworks covering the two Confederate cities. Grant showed no disposition for bold manœuvres. He knew that his system of breaking down the hostile resistance by a process of exhaustion must in the end prove victorious in spite of the incomparable genius of his great opponent, and during the winter active operations in Virginia entirely ceased. The temper of the Northern army might have suffered under the depressing influence of a languishing campaign. But just at Christmas all ranks were stirred to enthusiasm by great news from the South. A

message arrived that a conquering Federal host from the far interior was at Savannah.

Sherman's campaign in Georgia.

The Washington executive had at last found a general capable of conducting an active offensive war and of manœuvring a great army in the field. The command of the forces assembled on the upper Tennessee had in the previous winter been entrusted to General Sherman, a soldier who had in the west given evidence of capacity for high command. Under the strong and vigorous leadership of this famous chief the Federal legions concentrated round Chatanooga soon made their presence felt in the heart of Georgia. Adapting his strategy and tactics to the topographical conditions of the theatre of war with the ready resource of the born commander, Sherman fought his way forward through the summer months, and early in September was established in Atlanta. The Confederate army opposing him had been manœuvred with no little skill, it was a force to be treated with circumspection and respect; but its leader, Hood, now committed himself to operations which showed that he did not appreciate the significance of the maritime power of the North. With the design of threatening Sherman's communications with the Ohio basin the Confederate force marched round the south of Atlanta and headed northwards towards Chatanooga and the upper Tennessee. At first the Federal chief conformed his movements

to those of the enemy. Then suddenly he changed the direction of his march and embarked on the famous enterprise with which his name will ever be associated.

The march to the sea—a simple operation, thanks to maritime command.

Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea aroused the utmost enthusiasm beyond the Potomac and the Ohio. It excited the admiration of the principal military authorities in Europe at the time. But the operation was remarkable rather for the originality of its conception than for its boldness or for the special skill with which it was executed. As an illustration of the art of war it cannot compare with the advance from Chatanooga to Atlanta. The attention which it attracted in the world of arms bears witness to the lack of knowledge as to the relations between sea-power and strategy on land which then prevailed. The movement was judicious, and it showed that Sherman was endowed with an independent judgment, but it was no great feat of soldiership. The Federal communications with Tennessee were gravely threatened, and the Atlantic coast promised a certain base. There was no middle course between abandoning the initiative to wander after Hood, and striking boldly across the fertile plains of Georgia for the sea. The enemy was in rear and not in front. The agricultural wealth of the district to be traversed obviated all anxiety as regards supply. Port Royal on the coast had

been a Union possession since early in the war. Seldom has a commander started on an important military undertaking with more absolute certainty that it would succeed.

Sherman fully recognised how vast a moral effect a march across Georgia must have. He knew how greatly the natural resources of this state and of the Carolinas aided the Confederate armies. So on the way he reverted to the system of military execution grown obsolete in modern civilised warfare. Warehouses were broken open and mansions gutted. Not only the farm produce available along the road, but also the furniture and valuables of the once prosperous landowners whose estates were on the line of march, were carried off. The Federal army headed for Savannah, its commander well aware that with the support of the fleet he could scarcely fail to capture that important city, which after some show of resistance was evacuated by its garrison. And in the short days of late December the splendid Northern force, which in a few months had traversed the whole length of Georgia, and which had converted the only seceding state which up to then had not felt the presence of an invader into a theatre of devastating war, was securely housed in almost the last town on the Southern seaboard not captured by Federal naval enterprise.

The outer harbour of Mobile had been secured

by Farragut in the autumn, and a few days after Sherman reached Savannah a joint naval and military expedition wrested the coast defences protecting Wilmington from the Confederates. The entire coast-line from New Orleans to the Chesapeake was thus in the early days of 1865 in Federal hands except for Charleston, where the first shot had been fired in the terrible civil war. A determined effort had been made the previous year to capture this main maritime stronghold of the South by an expeditionary force assembled at Port Royal, but the assailants after gaining a considerable measure of success had found the place too strong for them.

Increasing strength of the Federals around the Southern seaboard.

Grant, kept at bay by Lee before the Secession capital, was now eager that Sherman should come to his assistance. He proposed that the conquering army in Savannah should be brought up to the James by sea. Sherman, however, while concurring with his chief that it was of paramount importance to capture Richmond and to overwhelm Lee, suggested that a movement by land would be preferable. The Federal commander-in-chief wisely acquiesced in the project of his victorious subordinate and gave him a free hand, so Sherman prepared his forces for another march. He foresaw that he would meet with little opposition, being well aware that his old antagonist before Atlanta, Hood, had committed himself to futile

Sherman's advance on Virginia.

operations against Tennessee and Kentucky and was no longer to be feared. He knew that there could be no bodies of Confederate troops in the Carolinas fit to cope with his triumphant host. Maritime command assured him against disaster. And he resolved to devastate to the utmost power of a soldiery full of animosity the prosperous regions which he would traverse on the way to Goldsboro', the point selected as his primary objective.

Assistance received from sea-power.

The shoreward districts of the Carolinas—in great part swampy flats raised little above the level of high-water mark—are quite unsuited for the manœuvring of a mass of troops. Sherman therefore selected a line of march some scores of miles inland through the towns of Columbia and Cheraw. It was part of his plan that an auxiliary force should in advance open communications from Goldsboro' to the sea. This force was brought round by rail from Tennessee to Washington and thence by ship to Wilmington. Arrived at Wilmington, its commander, General Schofield, found such formidable difficulties on the road that, again utilising the sea for rapid movement of his troops, he re-embarked a portion of his army and sent it round to Newbern in Pamlico Sound. Then this subsidiary force, the assembling of which so well exemplifies the advantages of maritime command, marched in two converging columns for



Goldsboro'. Sherman had in the meantime in mid-January quitted Savannah. The Confederate general, Johnston, strove in vain to bar his progress; the scattered detachments in South Carolina were collected for the purpose; Charleston was evacuated, and thus fell at last into the hands of the Northern troops, its garrison being drawn off to swell the attenuated field army in the interior; but all the efforts of the South were now of no avail. Sherman's conquering legions swept on in irresistible force. And by the middle of March Sherman and Schofield were united not far from Goldsboro', and Johnston felt constrained to withdraw westwards and to confine himself to threatening the Federal communications in case the victorious army should press on toward Petersburg and Richmond.

The fall of Richmond.

But on the 2nd of April, Grant, who had been nursing his great host all the winter, had at last succeeded in piercing the Confederate defences south of the James. His troops passed through this gap in a mighty flood. Lee was obliged to abandon Richmond. Game to the last, the illustrious Southern general made one desperate effort to retire to the town of Lynchburg. The remnants of the noble force which he had so often led to victory had shrunk till it numbered only a few thousand men, and yet, although begirt on every side by foemen, threatened by great clouds

of Federal horse, outnumbered hopelessly and constantly at bay, the rapidly diminishing band maintained an unshaken front and showed no signs of yielding. It was, however, a vain and useless struggle, and it had become manifest that further fighting meant only unprofitable bloodshed. There was no refuge to retire to, nor hope of succour from the west or south. The cause upheld so valiantly was lost. And so on the 9th of April Lee surrendered unconditionally to the colossal army which he had so long defied. The closing scene was a not unfitting ending to the sanguinary drama enacted for so many months, and in it the victors displayed a magnanimity worthy of a great occasion. The lapse of time has blunted the keen edge of rancour aroused in the bitterly contested civil war. The meed of generous admiration freely accorded by Grant's soldiery to their beaten antagonists was prophetic of the respect with which the United States to-day looks back upon the army of Virginia and its famous chief. Americans, Republican and Democrat, are proud of its deeds, and are proud to claim in its commander as their own the greatest soldier save one of the nineteenth century.

Termination of the war.

Lee's capitulation heralded the speedy surrender of Johnston to Sherman in North Carolina. The Confederate troops who still kept the field elsewhere lost no time in laying down their arms.

And within a few weeks of the fall of Richmond the struggle had terminated in the remotest corners of the seceded states.

Concluding remarks.

This brief sketch of the American Civil War deals only with those of its campaigns which serve to illustrate the influence of maritime command. The operations in the interior, far from the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, have been passed over almost without mention. The story of the struggles in the Ohio basin, in Missouri, and Arkansas, is full of military interest—they played a conspicuous part in thwarting the efforts of the South to form an independent nation. But it was the sea-power of the North which, partly indirectly by means of the blockade and partly directly owing to the facilities which it afforded to the Federal forces in Virginia and to Sherman farther south, crushed the Confederation down. It is clear from the narrative that President Lincoln and his advisers did not avail themselves to the full of their naval dominion on the Atlantic coasts. M'Clellan alone of the successive commanders who tried to force their way through to Richmond founded his plan of attack upon the sea. Grant was driven to base himself upon the James by force of circumstances: it was not his deliberate intention at the outset to operate against the Secession capital from that side; but having reached the estuary after numerous unfortunate

engagements, he was enabled by maritime com mand there to gather up his forces for the fina stroke. And Sherman, with all his strength c character and genius for commanding men, coul not have acted with the freedom and the inde pendence of communications which have mad his campaign memorable had not the warships c the North ranged the sea supreme from Florid to the Chesapeake.

Only at one fleeting period of the war wa maritime supremacy ever in dispute, and the only locally. From the destruction of the Norfol dockyard to Lee's capitulation, the naval forces c the Union practically ruled the ocean. And ther is one point which must not be overlooked i summing up the effect upon the contest of Feder sea-power. Had the Confederates, instead, bee paramount in the Atlantic, the seceded province would not have almost alone been the scene c conflict. Except for some bold raids of Souther horse in the Ohio basin, for Lee's two notabl incursions north of the Potomac, and for th audacious dash at Washington in 1864, Feder territory never felt the terrors of invasion; an this immunity from hostile molestation was th consequence of Northern maritime command. preponderant navy at the orders of Presider Jefferson Davis would have completely altere the whole aspect of affairs. We can imagine th



GINIAN THEATRE OF WAR.

panic which a fleet of *Merrimacs* off Sandy Hook would have given rise to in the North. The mere threat of ravaging the coasts of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, would have gone far towards inducing the Federals to acquiesce in the separation of the Southern States. With Confederate warships cruising off their shores, the seaboard regions of the Union would have been a constant prey to descents of bands of fillibusters, and to attacks of expeditionary forces on a larger scale. In place of undertaking inroads into Secessionist Virginia, the legions of the Union would have been fully occupied in watching for and fending off maritime invasions from Maryland to Maine. A nation with commanding sea-power may not always employ this to the best advantage, but, as we shall see in the next chapter, be it ever so misused, it cannot fail to be a bulwark of defence.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877-78.

Collapse of Russian sea-power in the Euxine after the Crimean war.

THE Crimean war annihilated Russian naval power in the Black Sea. When the allied fleet retired through the Bosporus on the conclusion of peace, there was scarcely one single petty gunboat left to represent the Tsar upon its waters. The stately vessels which had triumphed at Sinope were rotting below the surface, where they had been sunk as obstacles to shelter harbours from maritime attack. Sebastopol was a heap of crumbling ruins. Its defences were dismantled and laid waste. Its building-yards were burnt to ashes. Seldom have the naval resources of a great and powerful nation been so absolutely obliterated and brought to nought. Nor did the Allies rest content with the devastation inflicted in the struggle. They were resolved to forbid, at least for a time, the reconstruction of the navy which they had so utterly overthrown. They de-

sired to create a barrier against the resuscitation of Muscovite predominance in the Euxine. So a clause was inserted in the Treaty of Paris which imposed a narrow limit upon the flotilla henceforward permitted to the vanquished empire upon its southern coasts, and thereby the Western Powers secured a guarantee that Constantinople should not by a sudden *coup-de-main* be wrested from the house of Othman by the Tsar.

No intelligent statesman supposed that this galling restriction placed upon the development of Russian sea-power could be long maintained. To the haughty Romanofs, and to the great nobles who mould public opinion within the realms of the Tsar, the Treaty of Paris was intolerable; the situation which it created was an impossible one, but it nevertheless served its purpose for some years. For more than a decade the Russian fleet in the Black Sea consisted of only a few gun-vessels engaged on police duties in accordance with the Act of Settlement. There was not even the nucleus of a seagoing fleet. The tottering empire of the Osmanlis received a new lease of life, rather because there was nothing to set up in its place than because its despotic Government and effete institutions had any merits in the eyes of Europe. And this unstable state of things lasted till 1870, when the Emperor Alexander, profiting by the collapse of French fighting-power before the Ger-

man legions, formally repudiated that part of the Treaty of Paris which restrained the expansion of his Black Sea fleet. Austria raised no serious protest. Great Britain was not prepared to take up arms in defence of an obsolete enactment. And from that day to this Russian sea-power within the Bosporus has grown by leaps and bounds.

Still a navy cannot be created in a moment. Although no small activity was displayed in building ships and training crews, progress was slow at first. And when the disturbed condition of the Balkans in 1876 awoke the latent antagonism of the Slav and the Osmanli, and the prospect of another conflict in the East caused a flutter throughout the civilised world, it was manifest that in the Black Sea Russia assuredly would not be paramount.

Augmentation of the Ottoman fleet.

Since the Crimean war the Porte had been strangely successful in obtaining loans. The investing public of Europe had shown a confidence in the financial stability of the Ottoman empire for which it is not easy to account. The Sultan's coffers had been filled from foreign lands. The reactionary oriental despotism enthroned upon the Bosporus launched out into lavish expenditure with this borrowed wealth. Huge sums were sunk in building palaces for the Caliph and his myriad *entourage*. Millions were swallowed up by the

swarm of corrupt officials and greedy religious dignitaries who form the Turkish governing class. But some of the money was devoted to better purpose. Arms and ammunition were purchased in vast quantities, and a considerable portion of the funds poured into the exchequer were devoted to acquiring a modern fleet. Liberal orders were placed with the great shipbuilding firms of the Thames and Clyde. A number of majestic ironclads from foreign yards cast anchor in the Golden Horn, where they may be seen lying to-day—symbols of the decay of a once mighty State. And when the Servian war and the troubles in Bulgaria revived the ancient feud with Russia, and all portents pointed to an early rupture, the Ottoman empire could fairly calculate upon maritime predominance when the crisis came.

Conditions at the outset of the war of 1877–78 as compared to those in 1828–29.

The inevitable conflict was delayed till 1877. Hostilities then commenced in April, and while the opposing armies were gathering for the struggle, strategists had time to note how different were the conditions from those that had obtained in 1828 and in 1853. At the commencement of the two former wars Russia had on each occasion possessed a powerful navy in the Euxine. Wittgenstein and Diebich had both founded their plan of campaign upon sea-power. But now, in consequence of the Treaty of Paris and of the great sums spent by Turkey on its naval forces, the Crescent was

dominant in the maritime theatre of combat. The armies of the Tsar could not trust to seaports on the Black Sea coast as bases of supply, as in the days when they beleaguered Varna and swooped down from the hills on Bourgas. The conditions had undergone a great change, and to the detriment of Russia.

Improved communications in Russia.

But the inconvenience caused to the Russians by their naval impotence in the Black Sea was, as compared to the war of 1828–29, almost compensated for by the changed strategical conditions on land. Owing to the vast extent of their dominions, successive Tsars have ever found the difficulty of rapidly concentrating their forces on the frontier a most serious drawback to effective operations. A land ruled by a despotic form of government, and peopled by great multitudes, can always gradually muster imposing armies within its borders. Of the gigantic military resources of Russia in men there has been no question since the days of Catherine; but in the many great conflicts upon which the empire has been engaged since it assumed approximately its present proportions in Europe it has rarely placed in the field an army representing more than a limited fraction of its fighting strength on paper. The force which extorted the Peace of Adrianople from the Porte never counted 50,000 men in any one locality. We have seen how the legions of the Tsar melted away during the Crimean war on the roads to Perekop. The

drying up on the way of the streams of reinforcements despatched from far-off northern provinces to succour Gortchakof illustrates vividly, if in somewhat exaggerated form, how hard it formerly was for Russia to use her mighty strength. Distance conquered the Muscovite forces in 1854 and 1855 as much as the allied armies with their maritime command. Railways, however, conquer distance, and during the twenty years following the Treaty of Paris Russia had been, like most other civilised countries, greatly opened up by lines of railway. St. Petersburg and Moscow were now in steam communication with the Black Sea coast and Bessarabia. A line from the central regions of the empire led to the steppe-lands north of the Caucasian range. A network of railways such as existed in the busy populous districts of Western Europe did not, it is true, overspread the Tsar's dominions; but the communications had been developed sufficiently to entirely transform the military conditions of the giant State, and to enhance its power for aggressive purposes to no small degree.

Communications little improved in Turkey, but this compensated for by maritime command.

The Ottoman empire had made no proportionate advance. It would not be correct to say that there had been no amelioration at all in the matter of communications since the Peace of Adrianople. One railway had been constructed by a foreign syndicate which connected Rustchuk with the port of Varna, another led from Con-

stantinople up to Philippopolis with a branch to the Ægean Sea, and these lines possessed a considerable strategical importance. But the progress in regard to roads had been so slight as to be almost imperceptible. Not that elaborate schemes had not been drawn up for highways through the country; on the contrary, there existed in the archives of most vilayets detailed and comprehensive projects drawn up by foreign hands. But it is an oriental trait to initiate and then not to execute, and the Osmanli official has a habit of starting public works and not completing them. From time to time, indeed, a pasha of a liberal turn of mind who grasps intuitively the urgent need of opening up his province may come to the front; he sets on foot ambitious schemes of bettering communications; at his instigation stretches of well-engineered roadway are commenced; sometimes they are even finished. But before the design is accomplished in its entirety, the beneficent ruler will have been displaced by a pasha of the usual school, and the works are then abandoned; some neglected although vital links in the chain are not completed, and the whole, useless from the failure of a part, lapses into disrepair, falls rapidly into decay, and soon remains merely a monument of oriental ineptitude. Apart from railways, Turkey in Europe was little better adapted for military operations in 1877 than

it had been in 1829, and Armenia, Kurdistan, and Anatolia had made no progress at all as regards communications. So that on land the facilities for concentrating great armies within the dominions of the Sultan had not developed as they had beyond the Pruth. If the Caliph, secure in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, could assemble his soldiers from remote provinces by ship transport, the Emperor Alexander also could, by means of his railways, gather his vast military forces in Bessarabia and Transcaucasia with an ease and certainty unknown in any previous war. It is important to bear this in mind in considering the influence of sea-power upon the campaign of 1877–78, and in comparing its general course with the operations of Wittgenstein, of Diebich, and of Paskievich.

Throughout the desperate struggle which ended with the Treaty of San Stefano, the Ottoman empire was for all practical purposes supreme in the Black Sea. The Turkish naval operations were not, indeed, of a brilliant character. Their powerful ironclads effected little against either the Russian flotilla or the Russian maritime fortresses, but they ranged the open waters from the Danube mouths to Poti, and at first hostile craft were forced to cling to their ports and could seldom venture many leagues from their own shores. So that Turkish troops could flit from the

Bosporus to Varna and to Trebizond in safety in every phase of the campaign.

Nor was it in the Euxine alone that the Porte could fairly claim to be supreme. The Russian flag was conspicuous by its absence in the Ægean and Ionian seas, and the effect of this upon the course of conflict was very great. It will be remembered how, in 1828 and 1829, a Muscovite squadron hovered off the Dardanelles, and how seriously the presence of these hostile warships hampered the Osmanlis. But in 1877 the Baltic fleet made no attempt to intervene in southern waters, being confined to its Livonian and Finnish ports by political exigencies, by the dread that the quarrel with the Turks might bring other and more formidable Powers into the field. This check placed on the naval strength of Russia was most beneficial to the cause of the Osmanlis. In the early weeks of conflict, troops for the Bulgarian theatre of war came in shoals across the sea from the Adriatic coasts, from distant Tunis, and from the delta of the Nile. And, as will be seen later on, a Turkish army, which had been conveyed for many leagues in transports, appeared upon the scene at a most critical period of the contest, and might under abler guidance have altered the fortunes of the war in Europe.

Growth of the armies on both sides.

Both belligerents had of late years greatly augmented their fighting strength on land. The

Ottoman armies which were gathered on the Danube and around the fortresses of Erzerum and Kars far exceeded in numbers the forces in which in previous wars the Commander of the Faithful had put his trust. Growing from year to year with steady regularity, the legions of the Tsar now reached to a gigantic total; the expansion of the railway system, moreover, which has been already spoken of, enabled the Russian authorities to place forces really representative of the huge numerical strength of their colossal army in the field. The relative size of the contending hosts introduced into the campaigns of 1877 features which were altogether new. But in one respect, the most recent of Russo-Turkish conflicts resembles the many which have gone before—as usual, there were two distinct theatres of war. The operations in the two continents were practically quite independent of each other. And, being the more decisive, the struggle in the Balkan peninsula may be taken first, as in former cases.

The European theatre of war.

Since the Treaty of Paris the old Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had become amalgamated into one single State, known as Roumania. Roumania enjoyed a considerable measure of independence, although it owed allegiance to the Sultan and formed, at least in name, a portion of the Ottoman empire. The Roumanians had their own little army. They sympathised

warmly with the cause of the down-trodden Bulgarians, whose liberation was the ostensible object of the Tsar. They readily consented to the passage of Russian troops across the Pruth, confident in the belief that they must benefit by alliance with their northern neighbour. And so from the very commencement of hostilities the Danube became the virtual frontier and the border-line which parted the antagonists.

Leaving out of consideration the question of maritime command, a question with which the control of the Danube channel was intimately connected, the broad strategical features of the European theatre of war had changed but little in the preceding fifty years. The Bulgarian Quadrilateral, that renowned quartette of fortresses before which the giaour had in former days so often recoiled, existed as of old. The condition of the defences of these strongholds had not indeed kept pace with the advances in artillery; their enceintes were restricted, their profiles out of date; but they were far from valueless. And the great Balkan mountain range remained almost as serious an obstacle as ever to a march towards the Sultan's capital. The topography of these sterile uplands was far better known, indeed, than when Diebich flung his troops into the defiles and made his dash on Bourgas, but the tracks leading over the hills from Bulgaria into Roumelia were as bad as they

had been in 1829. The Balkans still constituted a sturdy bulwark guarding the approaches to the Golden Horn against invading armies from the north. And the great waterway of the Danube formed as ever a first line of defence, rendered infinitely more formidable now than in previous conflicts by the presence of a strong Turkish flotilla in its channel.

Commencement of the war in the Balkans.

The war began in the closing days of April. The Russian army, which had been concentrated for months on the Wallachian borders, at once crossed the Pruth and poured into Roumania, while the Ottoman forces remained in observation south of the Danube. By the end of June 200,000 soldiers of the Tsar were massed in the principality, ready to attack. In front of them lay the formidable obstacle presented by the great river; its passage was the first great problem for the Russian generals to solve; and for a short space of time the naval power of the Sultan in its reaches assumed a paramount importance.

The Turkish flotilla in the Danube.

We have seen how the maritime ascendancy of the Federals came to their aid in 1862 and 1863, when the conquest of the Mississippi was undertaken and achieved. Operations of war by a river flotilla have an interest of their own, and the American Civil War illustrated their features very strikingly; the position on the Danube, however, differed from the circumstances of the conflict be-

yond the Atlantic in that the command of the river at the outset went hand in hand with the command of the sea. Turkish gunboats steamed unmolested from Widdin down to Galatz during the first few days of war, and their seagoing ironclads could work up-stream to above the junction of the Pruth to meet the smaller craft. The hostile navy in the river channel was a power to be reckoned with by the forces of the Tsar. A Farragut would have done great things with such a weapon in his hand. Even when the banks became fringed with Russian and Roumanian batteries a really active chief, supported by capable subordinates, would not tamely have abandoned the sacred trust of preventing the passage of the enemy but would have held the river to the very last. Every point of its course would have been kept under vigilant observation. A mosquito fleet would have been organised to patrol the channel from Nicopolis to Sulina. The fighting vessels would have been distributed so as to ensure that at the first threat of danger an imposing armada should hurry to the spot to confront the foe wherever he might attempt to make a crossing.

Its feeble operations.

A fatality, however, seems to shroud all Turkish naval operations. Within a week of the outbreak of hostilities, the Russians had been allowed to bar the channel at two points in the vicinity of Galatz and thus to shut the river off from the Ottoma

seagoing fleet. The Muscovite arrangements for dealing with the opposing flotilla of their antagonists had been matured long before the war commenced, and their plans were carried out with admirable skill by an efficient staff. Torpedo-boats, conveyed by rail from Kronstadt, were launched at favourable points. Ships weighted with ballast were sunk where requisite to create barriers. The Sultan's vessels, which displayed no activity whatever, were gradually reduced to harmlessness. Some were blown up through the daring exploits of individuals, others, shut up in narrow channels, were scuttled by their crews. Finally, in June, the invaders succeeded in fencing off a stretch between Nicopolis and Rustchuk, and before the end of the month they crossed at Sistova some days after a secondary passage had been effected as a feint a few miles from Galatz.

The Russians pass the river.

The attempt of the Ottoman navy to hold the Danube had been a signal failure. And the same ineptitude and want of purpose which characterised the management of the river flotilla displayed itself in the Euxine, if with less serious results. No effort was made to blockade the Russian coasts. A fleet so imposing could scarcely help establishing a sort of maritime command on the high seas, considering the feebleness of the opposing naval forces, and the movement of the Osmanli troops from the Bosporus to the theatres of war was

Naval ineptitude of the Turks in the Euxine.

always effected in security. But in spite of the powerful material of which this fleet consisted, the Turks were unable, or at least failed, to prevent Russian gunboats cruising about to some extent. The Tsar's war-vessels even succeeded in inflicting some injury by torpedoes on the squadron of the Porte. There was some excuse for this in the final stages of the struggle, for the straits to which the Sultan's armies were reduced obliged the Turks to use their battleships as transports, sacrificing thereby a great part of their naval strength; but for several months the Ottoman fleet ought to have made it almost impossible for a hostile fighting-ship to emerge from harbour.

War in Bulgaria.

The two months' delay before the invaders crossed the Danube was a perfect Godsend to the Porte. The credit for causing it does not in the slightest degree belong to the Turkish river flotilla. It arose from the difficulty of getting the encumbrances, which must accompany a great army when it takes the field, across Roumania, and from the precautions taken to ensure that when the Russian forces reached Bulgarian soil they should be ready for decisive action. But the respite from actual attack gave the Divan what it wanted most—time. It enabled the Ottoman Government, late in the day, to concentrate great military forces in the prospective theatre of war, and to divide them up into bodies each capable in itself

of undertaking a campaign. The main body was gathered in the Quadrilateral. A smaller army was detailed to remain in observation in the neighbourhood of Widdin. Reserves were collected in convenient places. And so, when the legions of the Emperor Alexander poured across their bridges at Sistova they found that, although there were only detachments immediately in front of them, the enemy was massed in enormous strength on their left.

The initial operations of the invaders were marked by a vigour and a daring which argued well for the future of the crusade upon which they now were fairly launched. Nicopolis was taken. A sufficient containing force was detailed to front eastwards and deal with hostile movements from that side, while General Gourko with a mobile column dashed southwards to the Balkans and seized the important Shipka Pass in the middle of July. All was going smoothly, and already the Russian commanders were dreaming of a march upon the Golden Horn, when suddenly Osman Pasha appeared at Plevna with the Ottoman troops from Widdin, and with comparative ease repelled a Muscovite attack in force. For a moment this Osmanli incursion from the west was regarded as phenomenal temerity; consideration showed that it constituted a very real danger. An army was got together with all speed

Osman Pasha at Plevna.

to sweep away the Turks from Plevna, and on t
30th of July this delivered its assault upon t
position which the enemy had strongly fortifi
The result was a very grave disaster, the
vaders being defeated with tremendous loss. A
the campaign of conquest which had opened
very full of promise gave place to a grim strug
for bare existence upon Turkish ground south
the Danube.

Difficulties of the Russians.

The catastrophe compelled the chief of the i
vading army to invoke assistance from Rouman
Gourko was recalled from beyond the Balka
where he had come in contact with strong bodi
of Ottoman troops. The forces of the Tsar we
drawn together, and all hopes of a speedy triumj
were dismissed. They found themselves oblig
to assume an attitude of observation till t
reinforcements urgently sent for should arri
Osman's bold stroke and stubborn tactics h
in fact transformed the situation as by magic.

Suliman Pasha brought round by sea from the Adriatic.

For some fleeting weeks the prospects of tl
Turks were full of hope. Plevna, on one fla
of the Russians, had shown itself secure; on t
other flank, the main body of the Sultan's forc
were ready to strike home; and beyond t
Balkans a veteran Osmanli army was assemblir
which was to participate in the great combin
effort now pending which was to expel the foe fro
Bulgarian soil. This last force, which was n

mustering in the Roumelian plains, had just arrived by sea from the shores of the Adriatic. It had reached the outskirts of the theatre of war in the very nick of time. And the whole story of its transfer from a distant province of the Sultan's dominions to the scene of the operations south of the Danube, and of the strange part it played in subsequent events, forms one of the most singular and interesting chapters in the annals of the campaign.

Administration is not a strong point in the Turkish army. Questions of commissariat and transport are neglected shamefully. Nothing more clearly demonstrates the splendid qualities of the Osmanli rank and file as soldiers than their uncomplaining endurance of miseries and hardships brought on by the mismanagement and sloth of those set over them. The staff is ignorant and apathetic. Matters of the most vital importance to the maintenance of the troops are left to chance. But in one respect the Ottoman military forces will compare not unfavourably with the highly organised armies of Western and Central Europe. This is the facility with which they move from place to place by sea. It is the result of the geographical conditions of the Empire, and of the ever-smouldering discontent in outlying provinces which breaking out ever and anon into sudden flame

necessitates the prompt despatch of troops t restore the authority of the Commander of th Faithful. No country other than Great Britai gets such constant practice in the transport c soldiers by ships, and the experience gaine stands the Turk in good stead in such a crisis a the war of 1877. Comfort is not considered, a with us. The tonnage allowed per man is ver different from the British standard. But in time of emergency it is astonishing how rapidly a Ottoman army can be sent across the sea, an how small an amount of shipping it requires.

Remarkable character of this operation.

When the Russian war broke out, the Ottoma Empire was vainly endeavouring to subdue th Montenegrins by force of arms. Those hardy hill men, typical guerillas as they were, proved fully a match for the Osmanli forces sent against them, an neither side could claim substantial victory. Bu when the military advisers of the Sultan found th soldiers of the Tsar across the Danube and threat ening Roumelia, they rightly judged the operation on the Adriatic to be inopportune, they calle upon the commander of the Turkish troop engaged on this minor struggle to hasten t defend the Balkans, and Suliman Pasha, the chie in question, at first rose fully to the occasion. Th movement of his army of some 30,000 men, fro the borders of Dalmatia to north of Adrianople was conducted with a skill and rapidity deserving

of the highest praise. It formed one of the most noteworthy episodes of this campaign. In a single week this large force was embarked at Dulcigno, was brought round to the Ægean, was disembarked near Enos, and was moved up by rail to beyond Adrianople, coming in contact with Gourko's foremost detachments just before that intrepid leader was recalled on the concentration of the Russian armies between Plevna and the Quadrilateral. The whole operation gave evidence of a vitality rarely manifest in Turkish military movements. It affords a most remarkable example of what sea-power will sometimes effect. In 1828 such a transfer of force could not have been carried out; then the warships of the Tsar were cruising off the Dardanelles. In 1877, however, political circumstances had secured to the Sultan command of the Eastern Mediterranean. And so, just when the invading host, disheartened by defeat and menaced on both flanks, was threatened with eclipse, there appeared upon the scene Suliman Pasha's veterans —a force amply sufficient to improve the Ottoman position from a promising into a commanding one.

Mehemet Ali and Suliman Pasha fail to relieve Plevna.

For a few weeks it seemed, indeed, as if the Sultan was about to retrieve the failing fortunes of his line. Seldom has a country invaded by a mighty hostile army enjoyed such an opportunity of hunting the enemy back in confusion across its

borders. But the chance was lost. The jealou
and incompetence of those in high places prov
fatal to the Turks. Under the invertebrate leade
ship of Mehemet Ali the feeble offensive attempt
from the Quadrilateral came to a standstill wh
the Russians made a counter-demonstration. Su
man Pasha did even worse; at first, after reachi
the theatre of war, he was unpardonably dilatory
setting to work, then he amazed all Europe
his rash assaults upon the well-nigh impregnab
Muscovite defences of the Shipka Pass. A fi
army was fatuously shattered amid the Balk
defiles in a series of sanguinary combats. A
Plevna, the obscure Bulgarian village which had
suddenly become a point of prime strategical i
portance, and upon the brave garrison of whi
was depending the issue of a great campaign, w
left to its fate. The forces of the Tsar were pe
mitted to recover from the effect of their reverse
and gradually to hem in Osman Pasha in t
fortress which he had created. Todleben w
summoned from honoured retirement to supe
intend the siege. During the autumn the Turki
field armies effected nothing, and the Russia
even when engaged to the hilt in the campaig
round Plevna, were permitted to push south-wes
wards towards Sofia. Finally, Osman Pash
abandoned by his comrades, made one supren
endeavour to pierce the ring of foes fencing him

on every side which proved abortive, and nothing was left to him but to surrender to the great forces which had proved too strong for him.

Its fall. Collapse of the Turks.

Then the invaders poured over the Balkans in midwinter. Suliman Pasha, nominated to the supreme command in place of Mehemet Ali, committed the terrible blunder of attempting by a general movement south-westwards from the Quadrilateral to anticipate the foe, and with inferior scattered groups to bar the exits from the mountain chain from Slivno to Sofia. The result was disastrous almost beyond precedent. One great body of troops was surrounded and laid down its arms. Other smaller detachments were beaten in detail and utterly dispersed. A portion of the army from Bulgaria, which had embarked at Varna for the Bosporus and which had taken train from the capital for Philippopolis, was heavily defeated. Adrianople, which forced Bulgarian labour had converted during the preceding months into a vast entrenched camp, fell without firing a single shot. At Constantinople all was in confusion,—the Government helpless, the people panic-stricken. Evil tidings kept pouring in from every side. Servia declared war. And, but for sea-power, the sorry remnants of Suliman's once formidable host, driven pell-mell back into the Rhodope Mountains, could not have reached the Golden Horn before the enemy; they were, how-

...rival on the shores of the Ægea
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sea-power did not really influence the course of the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1877–78 by its action in the Levant when the Ottoman armies had been crushed. It was the indirect effect of the reserves of maritime strength in the Channel and the Thames upon the Baltic fleet, while the Cabinet of St. James' still held aloof, which governed the naval situation as regards the belligerents in the days when the issue of the war was yet in doubt. The absence of Russian warships from the Ægean was one of the most significant features of the struggle. Nor does the utter collapse of the armies of the Sultan diminish its importance—it proves only that all the advantages of maritime command may fail to compensate for misdirected operations and for the incapacity of generals in high position. Suliman Pasha threw away an opportunity such as few commanders have been given in the wars of recent times, and thereby he has deprived us of a splendid example of the relations between sea-power and the conduct of armies on dry land.

Comparison of the European campaign with that of 1828–29.

The contrast between the general direction given to the Muscovite legions in their invasion of European Turkey in 1828, and that followed in [illegible]ast Russo-Turkish war, is remarkable. The [illegible]ions of the methodical, deliberate Wittgen[illegible] little in common with those of his [illegible]d masterful successor, but both chiefs

alike clung to the Black Sea littoral as the advanced into the territories of the Sultan. I 1877, on the other hand, the Russians operated b quite a different line. They carefully avoided th seaboard from start to finish. In place of follow ing the shortest route from Bessarabia to th Bosporus,—that along the coast from the Danub mouths,—they made a long detour through Buk harest. The passage of the great river obstacl was not, in consequence, effected till midsumme and the soldiers of the Tsar did not measure thei strength with their Moslem antagonists till thre months had elapsed. It was not a plan of campaig adopted willingly or from choice. The method c advance was imposed on the invaders by ster necessity, the naval strength of the Porte left ther no option but to pursue a line of operations fa inland. The strategical conditions were quite dif ferent from those of 1828, when the armies of th Tsar leant upon the sea instead of shunning it. Th risks involved by the scheme of operations of 187 were obvious from the outset, and the actual cours of the conflict demonstrated them to perfection both flanks were exposed instead of only one a in the earlier war, and Osman Pasha took ful advantage of the situation. With a comparatively small force boldly handled, he brought the invader up short; and had his efforts been loyally seconded had the other Ottoman commanders co-operate



vigorously with their illustrious colleague, there seems little reason to doubt that the Muscovite soldiery and their Roumanian associates would have suffered a crushing disaster.

The campaign in Asia.

While the Russian forces in Europe had, after a campaign full of vicissitudes, appeared within sight of the minarets and cupolas of Stamboul, and forced the Commander of the Faithful to yield to their master almost unconditionally, Armenia had, as in former struggles, been the scene of striking episodes of war.

Benefit to Turks of maritime command.

Situated as were the Turks in 1887 in the neighbourhood of Erzerum and Kars, the command of the Black Sea was to them all important. Communications from Syria and Anatolia to the frontier provinces were of the most wretched description. The country to be traversed by troops hastening to the prospective theatre of war was in great part a wilderness of mountains, a territory most unsuited for the maintenance of armies. The concentration of the Osmanli forces by march along the hill tracks which serve as roads, was a service of no little difficulty. Had there been an abundance of transport ships the mustering of the Turkish host would have been greatly facilitated; it does not, however, appear to have been the case that any large portion of the army which gradually assembled under Moukhtar Pasha was sent by sea to Trebizond.

The attention of the Porte was, during the decisiv phases of the struggle, engaged upon Bulgaria, an all shipping was absorbed in the movement c troops to the European theatre of war.

But if the naval predominance of the Turkis Empire in the Euxine did not very materiall forward the concentration of Ottoman troops o the Armenian frontier, it forbade the despatch c Russian forces or of war material from Odess from Sebastopol, and from the Sea of Azov t Poti. The benefits which Paskievich's arm derived from having the sea route open as a lin of communication in the winter of 1828–1829 ha been incalculable. Then Transcaucasia was newly acquired possession of the Tsar, divide from Russia proper by arid steppes, by a hug mountain barrier, and by the total want c adequate land communications. In 1877, how ever, the situation had undergone great chang Georgia, after many years of settled governmen had so developed its natural resources as to b capable of supporting a great army in the fielc Stores of all kinds needful for a long campaig had been collected. A broad highroad led fron the north over the Caucasus to Tiflis. The rout down the Volga and across the Caspian had bee opened up. Railways from the central govern ments of the Empire served to move troops t within a few weeks' march of the Turkish frontie

So that exclusion from the Black Sea, however inconvenient, was not fatal to Russian prospects of triumphing again in this arena of former victories.

The first abortive Russian invasion.

At the opening of hostilities, the Ottoman empire was most ill prepared for war in Asia. The attention of the Porte was concentrated upon the Danube and Bulgaria. Remote Armenia was neglected by the Seraskierate. But the Sultan had been fortunate in his choice of a leader for his scattered forces in the east. Moukhtar Pasha was a capital soldier, endowed with an energy and force of character rarely found in the Osmanli of prominent position. He strove manfully to organise an army to confront the imminent invasion, and his efforts were not altogether unsuccessful, as the Russians found to their grievous cost. The Tsar and his advisers greatly underrated the force of the resistance which the Turks were about to offer to the invasion of Armenia, and Moukhtar drew back at first and allowed Kars to be invested. But on the 25th of June, two months after the commencement of the struggle, the Muscovite main army was decisively defeated, the invaders were forced to retire all along the line and to raise the siege of Kars, and it became evident that with the forces at his disposal the Russian general could not any longer hope to prosecute an active offensive campaign within the Turkish borders.

At an early stage of the struggle the Turks

Turkish maritime expedition to Circassia.

attempted to utilise their sea-power by carryin the war into the enemy's country on the Circassia coast. The scene of Omar Pasha's fruitless oper tions of 1855 was selected for the enterprise. A Ottoman force landed at Sukhum Kalé north Redoute Kalé. But the anticipations of the Por that all Circassia would spring to arms and unfu the banner of rebellion were doomed to disappoin ment. The revolt of certain clans and chieftai against the Tsar caused inconvenience but no re danger. To a certain extent the expedition dre off troops from the Russian right wing on tl Turkish frontier and weakened the Muscovi forces, already insufficient for the task which ha been set them. But the detachments landed we not manœuvred with requisite vigour, nor we they organised in a manner calculated to admit sensational enterprises. Their action influenc the Armenian campaign during the few weel which they spent on Russian soil but slightly, ar during August Sukhum Kalé was abandon and the Turks withdrew by sea to Batoum ar Trebizond.

Russians advance again and capture Kars and Erzerum.

The collapse of their first effort to captu Kars and to advance on Erzerum had taug the Russians that a successful invasion of Ott man territory was not feasible with the for available on the spot while so capable a lead as Moukhtar Pasha barred the way. Durir

July, August, and September formidable reinforcements, mobilised in the heart of the empire, were sent to Transcaucasia, most of the regiments crossing the Caucasus. It was a slow process compared to what might have been effected had communications across the Euxine been secure, and the delay gave the Ottoman military authorities an opportunity of following up their early triumph. But Turkish energy seemed to have spent itself in this theatre of war. The Osmanli of to-day appears incapable of sustained effort. All Moukhtar Pasha's fertility of resource and strength of purpose failed to fit his army for a determined counter-stroke against the beaten enemy. While the Russians slowly swelled their forces, the troops opposing them stood practically still; the detachments drawn from Syria and Anatolia were insufficient even to make good the wastage of desertion. Some indecisive operations took place between Kars and the frontier while the Russians were gathering force to make their spring. Then, on the 14th of October, a great battle was fought, in which Moukhtar Pasha was completely overthrown; his army evaporated, as Oriental armies always do when their cause declines; and Kars was again invested by the soldiers of the Tsar, nearly the entire Turkish field army being absorbed in its defence. Now, late in the day, reinforcements

were sent to Trebizond from the Bosporus, l
they failed to keep the Russians from the ga
of Erzerum. On the 17th the famous stronghe
of Kars was taken by storm—a very brilli
feat of arms; and the capital of Armenia wo
assuredly have fallen had not intelligence arri
from the Bosporus that a truce was agreed to
Roumelia.

Con-clusion.

The dominion over the Black Sea, which t
Sultan's navy established in this war, does n
at first sight appear to have very greatly affect
the Armenian campaign. It had, of course, t
immediate result that the army of the Tsar co
not be reinforced by the shortest and most c
venient route. But the Turks made no determin
use of their maritime position. It was not, inde
till towards the close of the operations that sl
transport was used at all, on any large scale,
move Ottoman troops towards the threater
highland plateau, of which the enemy w
gradually gaining the possession. The desc
on Circassia, ill conceived and feebly carri
out, was an incident of no importance. T
maritime supremacy of the Osmanlis had c
result, however, which must not be overlooked
summing up the lessons of the campaign;
forbade descents by the forces of the Tsar up
the shores of Asiatic Turkey. In the Europe
theatre of war also the Sultan's coasts w

secure against aggression as a consequence of the naval situation in the Euxine.

Had the fleets of the Emperor Alexander been all-powerful in the waters common to the belligerents, the Porte must inevitably have been crushed after a few weeks of war. Russian forces, flowing in by rail from all parts of the empire to the northern Black Sea ports, would have been planted down at will upon the Ottoman coasts. The defences of Armenia would have been turned and rendered nugatory by expeditionary corps landed at Trebizond or at Samsun. Soldiers of the Tsar might have disembarked in the Bay of Bourgas—nay even at the outlet of the Bosporus, far beyond the fortresses, the natural obstacles and the Turkish army, which together formed the protection of Constantinople. In the days of Diebich and of Paskievich, when Russian ships of war had swept the high seas clear of Ottoman vessels, no means existed for concentrating masses of men at Sebastopol and Odessa as a preliminary to maritime invasion of the Ottoman realm; Russia had not in those days the means of putting forth her latent military strength. But in 1877 the conditions had undergone a transformation. The development of communications within the Muscovite dominions has totally altered the strategical relations between the ancient rivals for supremacy in South-Eastern

Europe, and has placed Turkey under the heel of its mighty neighbour in any conflict where the Russian navy holds the Euxine.

It was to prevent this that the Western Powers went to the Crimea; and the destruction of Sebastopol, with the consequent Treaty of Paris, delayed it for a time. Since the Berlin Conference, a powerful Russian fleet has grown up on the Black Sea coasts. There is nothing to challenge its supremacy, for the now obsolete Turkish ironclads are mouldering above the bridge of Galata. The Sultan's armies will not again, as when Osman Pasha's bold inspiration arrested the tide of Muscovite invasion in full flood, hold the gigantic military forces from beyond the Pruth at bay for months. The days are past for protracted, dubious operations by the Bulgarian Quadrilateral or in front of Erzerum. The Ottoman empire unsupported is at the mercy of the Tsar.


THE
CRIMEAN
WAR.
Scale of Miles.
Old Fort
Simferopol
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Rhodop
Mounta
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Redoute Kale
Poti
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Akhaltsik
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

CHAPTER IX.

FROM THE TREATY OF BERLIN TO THE PRESENT TIME.

The wars in South America.

SINCE the termination of the campaign of Plevna no great war within its confines has engrossed the attention of the European continent. The duel between Servia and Bulgaria involved no operations of an imposing kind, and this is the only struggle which has taken place since the Berlin Treaty. The Great Powers have been more intent on the coercion and conquest of savages and of semi-civilised realms than on combats with each other. The interest of the military history of most recent times has centred upon far-distant quarters of the globe. And down to the outbreak of hostilities on the shores of the Yellow Sea, the Pacific coast of South America has been the scene of the most prominent strategical and tactical incidents of the epoch.

The republics into which South America dis-

Chili; its career since 1819.

solved after the expulsion of the Spaniards a remarkable for the instability of their politic institutions. For seventy years they have been constant prey to internecine strife and revolutio Their governments have alternated between th despotism of dictatorships and the vagaries unlimited popular control. And in none of the has constitutional history been more checkere than in Chili, the most favoured of them all b nature and by geographical conditions. In spit however, of perpetual social ferment, the resourc of this riparian State have caused it to prosp above its fellows. The fertility of its soil and i mineral wealth have attracted emigrants from afa Its climate and its scenery excite the enthusias of the stranger. Since its emancipation th population has been ever on the increase. I prosperity has indeed proved a bar to its method cal development, from the enticement which it ha presented to undesirable adventurers from foreig lands since it came into existence as an independ ent country. And to the unscrupulousness an ambition of its politicians may be attributed mos of the external and internal conflicts in which Chi has been involved of recent years.

In 1878 Chili was bounded on the north b Bolivia. This inland republic then possessed strip of territory on the Pacific coast which gav it access to the sea, and in which was situated th

port of Antofagasta — the sketch map facing p. 328 shows the frontiers as they existed at this time. Immediately to the north of this strip was the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, a district analogous to Chili in that it lay between the Cordilleras and the sea. When the South American republics constituted themselves out of the ruins of the Spanish empire early in the century, Tarapaca was regarded as of no importance, and was indeed but little known. But as these tracts came to be explored and opened up, it was discovered that this southern extremity of Peru abounded in minerals, and contained guano deposits of surprising value. Accordingly the Chilians desired to have it for their own.

Its quarrel with Bolivia and Peru.

A government desirous of war is seldom long in want of pretext for a quarrel. The events leading up to the South American imbroglio which began in 1879 do not deserve to be recorded. Suffice it to say that early in the year a Chilian force seized Antofagasta. Peru took the part of Bolivia. Some of the ports of Tarapaca were bombarded by the Chilian fleet so as to make sure of war. And by the end of March the republics on the Pacific were in a state of open conflict.

Relative strength of the belligerents and strategical conditions.

In military strength, as far as actual numbers on paper and relative efficiency can be taken as a gauge, the belligerents were fairly matched. Peru and Bolivia could muster considerably more fight-

ing men than Chili; but the forces of the southern State were, on the other hand, better armed and trained and organised. The strategical conditions were such, however, that the campaign must inevitably be one-sided. For at sea Chili enjoyed an overwhelming superiority. Bolivia had no navy and the Peruvian fleet comprised only a few old vessels, quite unfit to cope with ironclads and cruisers of a modern type; in the harbour of Valparaiso, on the other hand, was assembled before the rupture a squadron of fighting-ships recently procured from the building-yards of Europe, with which the Chilians were justly confident of wiping the maritime forces of their antagonists out of existence. And the nature of the theatre of war was such that sea-power could not fail to be a paramount factor in deciding the struggle upon which the republics were entering.

North of Valparaiso and Santiago the tract of country which lies to the west of the Andes is of such configuration that communications parallel to the coast are almost non-existent. These conditions prevail for the whole distance from central Chili to the neighbourhood of Lima. The spurs of the great mountain range project down towards the sea; the valleys are at right angles to the coast-line; at various points, notably in the northern part of Chili, are considerable stretches of rugged, sterile highlands which afford no supplies whatever



for an army. And therefore the topography of the provinces most liable to become scenes of conflict made it almost impracticable for armies to operate by lines running north and south—the direction naturally suggested by the geographical position of the belligerent States. There was only one method by which the antagonists could rapidly concentrate their military forces at any point; this was to place them on board ship, and send them thither across the sea, and as a consequence, maritime command was essential for the successful prosecution of a campaign on Chilian, Bolivian, or Peruvian soil.

Commencement of the war, and conquest of Tarapaca by the Chilians.

For some months war was practically confined to operations in the Pacific. The Peruvians declined to let the enemy acquire naval supremacy unchallenged. For many months their few ships of war nobly upheld the honour of the flag. The narrative of these maritime hostilities is one of which the descendants of the Incas may be justly proud. But the struggle was too unequal to be long sustained. By the autumn the Chilian fleet could range the ocean theatre of war from end to end without fear of molestation, and the aggressive republic was in a position to put in execution the designs of conquest which had been taking shape in the brains of the Santiago executive for months past. While maritime command had been in dispute, neither side had attempted any opera-

tions of importance on land; but no sooner had t navy of the Allies been disposed of than a Chili army, which had been gradually collected since t spring at Antofagasta, was embarked and tra ported to Pisagua. The Allies, unable to guess t intentions of the enemy, had only despatched small force to the Tarapaca province. The deta ments composing it had marched across the tor pampas and the waterless deserts of Bolivia a Peru in the heat of summer. They offered stubborn and gallant resistance to the invade But in vain. They were greatly outnumbered the Chilians and were gradually overcome, a the coveted province, the undeveloped resources which had excited the cupidity of the southe republic, fell under the dominion of the army whi had sea-power at its back.

Conquest of Tacna.

The remnants of the garrison of Tarapaca retir northwards in good order, and there was a pau in the operations till news reached Pisagua th they had withdrawn to Tacna and had there be joined by a Bolivian force. The Chilians resolv to disperse this hostile army, and so in Februa 1880 an expeditionary force embarked at Pisag and effected a landing near Arica. The Tac campaign was as successful as that in Tarapac the Allies were dispersed, the important coast tow of Arica was captured without difficulty, and t whole district was overrun by the invading troo

Peru had striven vainly to send reinforcements to its threatened province, but the naval supremacy of the enemy forbade their despatch by the only route by which they could be expeditiously transferred to the scene of danger—the sea.

Preparations for a maritime descent on Lima.

The Chilian Government now resolved upon a decisive stroke. An attack upon the Peruvian capital was determined on. And with this in view the summer of 1880 was passed in deliberate and judicious preparation for the bold enterprise. It was known that the power of resistance of the Allies had been greatly shattered. The Bolivian troops from Tacna had retired into their own country, and it was evident that the invaders would have only the one antagonist to deal with before Lima. Peru, ever in dread of attack upon some remote maritime province, was not in a position to muster a great army in defence of its metropolis. Maritime command had enabled Chili up to the present to beat the enemy in detail, and the assailants could reasonably hope to find the defending forces scattered when the final campaign commenced. At the same time it was recognised at Santiago that the conquerors of Tarapaca and Tacna were launching upon an undertaking more serious than any which had gone before. They were about to operate in the very heart of a country peopled by a proud and patriotic race. Peru was at bay. The whole

nation was aroused. Its soldiers had already shown their mettle under most depressing circumstances, and in defence of the capital they were certain to fight valiantly and in desperation. The expeditionary force was therefore organised with no little care, all the arrangements were planned after anxious and prolonged deliberation, and nothing was overlooked likely to further the project or to ensure that it should end in triumph to the Chilian arms.

The landing.

The enterprise was not ripe for execution till December when landings were safely effected at two different points. One division disembarked at Pizco, and marched thence along the coast. Its track was marked by ruin and by burning homesteads; companies of freebooters swept along with the column, and villages were sacked, estates were pillaged, and public works were ruthlessly destroyed under the ægis of the divisional commander, who appears to have acted upon orders from higher authority to ravage the country traversed. The main body made its descent upon Curayaco nearer Lima a few days later, and firmly established itself at that point awaiting the arrival of the subsidiary force approaching from Pizco. No opposition was encountered when the final move commenced, and in the closing days of 1880 the entire expeditionary force was concentrated at a point not more than two days'



march from the Peruvian capital and ready to advance.

Capture of the Peruvian capital.

Peru was fortunate at this terrible crisis in having as President a man cast in nature's special mould for the leader of a nation. Pierola had been called a year before to rule the State by popular acclamation. Now, with a formidable hostile host preparing to swoop upon the capital, he gathered the whole male population of the district into an army for its protection with wonderful rapidity. Two sets of earthworks had been constructed athwart the line of approach along the shore from Curayaco, and the Peruvians were resolved that if the foe should prove victorious the triumph should not be a bloodless one. Enthusiasm animated the ranks of the defending side. Exasperated at the barbarous warfare of the invaders, the levies and the volunteers behind their parapets were bent on fighting to the last. The struggle, however, proved to be a hopeless one. The most devoted courage was displayed, but self-sacrificing patriotism availed little against the deadly armament, the elaborate organisation, the studied tactics, and the admirable discipline of the hostile forces. The first line of defence at Chorillos was carried by storm, and the Peruvians were hustled back from it to their last asylum, the fortified position of Millaflores. This also was attacked and captured by the Chilians, who in this second

battle received considerable assistance from the artillery fire of their fleet. And on the 17th of January Lima was in the hands of the enemy, who, when Callao had been secured, was firmly established in the heart of the Peruvian republic.

End of the war.

This great Chilian victory did not terminate the war. Desultory operations continued for many months. But the capture of the Peruvian capital was virtually the closing incident of the campaign, and with it the military interest of the struggle ceases. The whole social system of Peru was deranged by the almost unprecedented disasters which had befallen it, and the flower of the population had perished on the battlefield. Chili was not, however, prepared to undertake the conquest of the vast interior. Maintaining a firm grip on Lima and on certain ports upon the coast, and despatching occasional maritime expeditions to various points as demonstrations, the conquerors were content to bide their time and to await the submission of the ancient race which they had so completely overcome. And in the end a peace was concluded which gave the victors all that they could hope for. Tarapaca and the coast districts of Bolivia were ceded by the Allies, the southern republic thus gaining the ports of Antofagasta, Iquique, and Pisagua and becoming possessor of the rich nitrate beds which the financiers of Valparaiso and Santiago had so coveted; and the Chilians,

moreover, became the acknowledged leaders on the western side of South America, an ascendancy most gratifying to an ambitious people.

The struggle a sequence of three maritime expeditions.

This war had really consisted of four separate campaigns. The first had been a maritime campaign, and had ended with the Chilian naval forces establishing themselves as paramount from the frontiers of Ecuador to the Straits of Magellan. Then came the operations in Tarapaca based upon the sea. These were followed by the conquest of Tacna. Finally came the expedition against Lima and the fall of the Peruvian capital. Each of the three land campaigns had been prepared for at leisure by the Chilians, and had been carried out in virtue of their maritime command. The Power holding the supremacy at sea had throughout enjoyed the advantage of the initiative, and had beaten the hostile military forces successively and in instalments. The cause of the Allies was lost as soon as the weak but admirably handled Peruvian navy succumbed to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy. The significance of sea-power in warfare in this portion of the globe was demonstrated with irresistible force in the struggle of the Pacific States for their freedom early in the century. The series of operations which lasted from 1879 to 1881 strengthen the lessons taught by the War of Independence. And before many years elapsed the paramount influence

of maritime command in any conflict in the western watershed of South America was to be proved afresh near the scenes of San Martin's memorable triumphs over the Spaniards seventy years before.

The Chilian civil war.

In the year 1890 Chili was thrown into a ferment by a grave constitutional crisis. The President, Balmaceda, came into conflict with the Congress elected by the people. Such incidents are not uncommon in the republics of the South American continent; but Balmaceda who aimed at dictatorship was a capable, resolute, and unscrupulous man, and the Chilians are an independent race, jealous of their rights. So the upshot was a civil war.

The navy and the army take different sides.

The trouble came to a head in the early days of 1891. A revolution broke out as part of a deep-laid plan. And its opening incidents were marked by a strange strategical development for which the Government was wholly unprepared. The navy declared for the constitutional cause, the army adhered to Balmaceda; so that in the preliminary phases of the contest which ensued one side was supreme at sea but had no army, the other side was all-powerful on land but had no fleet. Conditions so abnormal could hardly fail to bring about a peculiar and interesting set of operations, and their history, which will only be sketched out in these pages, will repay a careful study of the

organisation and the tactics employed by the opposing forces.

Sea-power enables the Constitutionalists to seize the northern provinces.

The Constitutionalists had carefully matured their plans, and from the moment of taking action they displayed an energy and judgment which promised well for their prospects of success. Their war-vessels rapidly secured possession of practically the entire Chilian mercantile marine. They had sympathisers in all districts, and by descents on Coquimbo and kindred ports, numbers of recruits were obtained for the cause and placed aboard the captured vessels. Pisagua was then taken, and a heterogeneous force was landed. From this base the whole of Tarapaca was gradually overrun, its distance from the populous regions further south and from the military centres preventing Balmaceda from sending thither any considerable force to uphold his authority or to keep his antagonists in check. The opponents of the President thus acquired a firm footing in the northern end of Chili, from which they gradually extended their dominion southwards. Hazarding nothing, they worked their way by slow degrees to Caldera; and that seaport city soon came to be the headquarters of the growing Constitutionalist army, which with a remarkable skill and vigour was being prepared for the important operations contemplated by the leaders of the popular cause.

The sinking of the *Blanco Encalada*.

Although the Chilian navy had for the most part abandoned Balmaceda, the Government party was not altogether powerless at sea. The President had become to all intents and purposes dictator, and as dangers thickened he showed himself to be not insensible to the importance of maritime command. He was fortunate in having at his disposal some vessels which, though small in size, possessed a very high rate of speed, and these were sent to sea to attack the Constitutionalist fleet should an opportunity present itself. This gave rise to a highly dramatic incident which attracted much attention in the naval circles of foreign countries. The *Blanco Encalada*, one of the most formidable of the hostile ships, was assailed in Caldera harbour with torpedoes and was sunk by a well-directed missile. It was a fine achievement, and the catastrophe taught the revolutionary chiefs that their naval supremacy was not absolute and that it behoved them to treat the dangerous craft obeying Balmaceda's mandate with respect.

Creation of a Constitutionalist army.

All the spring and summer the rebel forces, mustering in the north, were swelling in numbers, and were gaining in martial bearing and efficiency. The Constitutionalists were happy in having in their ranks a number of men of light and leading who were gifted with administrative ability rarely found in such surroundings. The conversion

of the gangs of raw levies picked up on the coast into a really formidable engine for making war is, indeed, one of the most notable episodes of our time. Arms were purchased abroad by accredited agents, and were shipped in frequent instalments to Caldera and Iquique for distribution to the troops. The soldiery were sedulously drilled, and were gradually trained up to a high standard of perfection. A trustworthy staff was got together. And by the month of August there existed in the revolted northern districts an army of 10,000 men fit for the field and eager to prove its mettle in combat with the enemy.

The Government was not unaware of the creation of this force and of its capabilities. But it was assembled in a district most difficult of access from the south, and the naval preponderance of the revolutionary party precluded the possibility of dealing with it by maritime attack. The military advisers of Balmaceda foresaw that this menacing army would eventually arrive by sea in the districts still under his sway, and would attempt in the heart of Chili to overthrow the regular troops who were already showing signs of disaffection. But they were hampered in their preparations by uncertainty as to the objective which the enemy would finally select. The Constitutionalists might be contemplating an attack

upon Coquimbo, or they might strike a blow at Valparaiso and the capital, or they might determine to effect a landing near Talcahuano in the south in one of the most fertile and populous portions of the State. Valparaiso was in railway communication with Talcahuano; therefore forces detailed to defend one locality could be transferred to the other with comparative rapidity should their presence be required. But Coquimbo stood on quite another footing. This thriving port, from which a railway led inland tapping the resources of a prosperous valley, was a full fortnight's march from Valparaiso. The intervening country presented most serious topographical impediments to the movement of troops. Coquimbo was in fact isolated in a strategical sense, and the consequences of this greatly influenced the entire campaign: for the Balmacedists had come to the conclusion that it was the goal at which the enemy would aim, and one-fourth of the Government troops being in consequence located in the vicinity as a guard, these took no part in the stirring events which brought about the fall of the dictator.

The maritime descent near Valparaiso.

The short and decisive operations which terminated in the re-establishnent of constitutional rule in Chili furnish an apt and convincing illustration of the advantages which an army enjoys when it undertakes a maritime descent. We have seen

how the circumstances compelled the Government to disseminate their forces, and they were in total ignorance as to the point where the blow would fall to the last. On the 20th of August the revolutionary army arrived in Quinteros Bay, some miles north of Valparaiso. The plans for the enterprise had been drawn up with wonderful completeness. Not a detail had been overlooked. The landing was carried out with a speed and precision which formed an eloquent tribute to the foresight of the leaders and the staff. The whole expeditionary force was ashore before the President could send a man to interfere, and the strategical conditions were such that the Balmacedist troops at Coquimbo became for all practical purposes as useless as if they had been non-existent.

End of the war.

The Government advanced the division stationed in Valparaiso to meet the invaders; the division in Santiago hastened to the scene; and reinforcements were called up from the south of which some arrived by sea at Valparaiso, the Constitutionalist fleet being entirely occupied in safe-guarding the transports. The Revolutionary army, however, beat the Balmacedist troops in detail. Many of them deserted and went over to the other side. In a very short space of time Valparaiso was in the hands of the Constitutionalist forces. The resistance of the supporters of dictatorship thereupon collapsed, Santiago was occupied, and in a

few days the civil war was over. This swift overthrow of the side inferior upon the ocean was no doubt in some measure due to the unpopularity of the cause; but none the less the Chilian revolution of 1891 ranks as one of the most remarkable examples of the influence of sea-power upon a land campaign recorded in the annals of contemporary war.

Campaign of Tel-el-Kebir.

Such strategical principles as can be deduced from small wars are not always fully applicable to operations on a grander scale. Conversely, maxims which govern regular warfare may not necessarily be adaptable to campaigns against irregular foemen. But the struggle which culminated in the storming of the Tel-el-Kebir lines illustrates the value of maritime command so very vividly that its more salient features are well worthy of a passing mention.

Influence upon it of British naval power.

The overthrow of the Egyptian rebels by British forces was accomplished by an exceptionally decisive victory in the field. The advance from Ismailia to the gates of Cairo involved a singularly interesting and instructive set of operations of a special and peculiar kind. The whole plan of campaign, however, hinged upon the naval command on which the army of invasion could absolutely depend. There could be no question but that the highly efficient



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE WARS ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA—THE ADVANCE ON LIMA.

force despatched to the Levant from the United Kingdom must overcome the motley array of Sudanese and Fellaheen gathered under the banners of the upstart colonel Arabi. But it was on political grounds essential that the issue should be decided with the least possible delay. And it was of course in the highest degree desirable that the power of the Khedive upon the Nile should be restored at a minimum cost in lives to the expeditionary force.

The bombardment of Alexandria was in the main a purely naval incident. But it nevertheless exerted a far-reaching influence over the subsequent British military operations. In the first place, it rendered practicable the landing of an army in the famous maritime city, and this was the first move in the game of conquest. From the excitement, moreover, which the cannon of the great battleships caused among the susceptible Egyptians it tended to rivet the attention of Arabi and his myrmidons upon a locality other than that which the British Commander had chosen as his base. The erroneous conviction as to Alexandria was confirmed by subsequent events, by the arrival of a fleet of transports in its harbour, by the show of military activity directed against the lines of Kafr Dowar, and by the landing of considerable bodies of troops on the quays of the great Mediterranean seaport. The British opera-

tions started, in fact, with a most impressive incident. Its primary object was to destroy the menacing batteries bearing on the harbour. But the sequel, the landing of a force to save the city from destruction, secured in advance a point of concentration for the army. And the whole set of circumstances had a most important effect in tricking the enemy and throwing the Egyptian rebel chiefs upon a false scent.

Liberty of action enjoyed by Lord Wolseley, thanks to maritime command.

The liberty of action which the commander of an army about to make a descent upon hostile shores enjoys has been commented on in earlier pages. Lord Wolseley's campaign is an excellent example of this. The delicate international situation involved by the seizure of the Suez Canal made it imperative, quite apart from the strategical conditions of the campaign, that the design to base the British operations on the Bitter Lakes should remain a secret to the last. Maritime command rendered possible the stratagem of a pretended attack upon Aboukir which contributed so greatly to perplex the enemy, and which served to mask the real plan until it was an accomplished fact. Ismailia and some important miles of ground beyond were mastered by surprise, and the transfer thither of the expeditionary force by sea then became a simple matter. It was naval supremacy which enabled Lord Wolseley to fix his grip upon the line which leads from the

Canal towards the delta of the Nile by a deft and sudden stroke, and to lay a firm foundation for his ultimate triumph.

The campaign of Tel-el-Kebir affords us edifying studies of both strategy and tactics. Regarded in the abstract, there are some striking lessons in the art of war to be learnt from it. But to the people of this country it has a special and peculiar interest. It demonstrates as no operation of its fighting forces since the fall of Sebastopol has done the potentialities of the British Empire's great amphibious strength.

Huge armies are not always essential for maritime expeditions against the dominions even of a powerful foe. Difficulties of transport indeed prohibit the employment of vast military forces, even by a land gifted with a mercantile marine so colossal as the United Kingdom. The suddenness with which such blows can be delivered goes far, however, to compensate for deficiency of numbers. And the security of retreat will often justify the undertaking of such enterprises with bodies of troops which are insignificant and paltry as compared with the hosts which the enemy calculates on ordinarily putting in the field.

The Chino-Japanese war.

Only one more war remains to be considered— the struggle between the Celestial empire and Japan. No campaign of our time has exhibited

so clearly and with such striking force the relations which exist between maritime and military fighting strength when sea-girt realms enter the lists against each other. And a special interest is attached to the operations by the fact that both belligerents alike had at their command a formidable navy, a circumstance which seemed to promise at the outset highly exciting contests on the sea. A peculiar feature, moreover, was introduced into this conflict in furthermost Asia by its earlier phases having for their arena the territory of a third and practically neutral party. All over the civilised world its incidents were closely watched. In the United Kingdom the course of operations was followed with the keenest attention owing to the analogy of Japan's position as an insular Power with our own.

The rival empires.

The gigantic Chinese empire, with its countless inhabitants, its ample though undeveloped resources, its splendid geographical position, and its centuries of semi-civilisation, was up to 1894 looked on as a mighty Power in Eastern Asia. There were men of ripe judgment, of wide experience, and of intimate acquaintance with the country who entertained a confidence in its fighting capacity amounting wellnigh to a superstition. The military and naval strength of Japan, on the other hand, was not held in high esteem. Europe sneered at the progressive tendencies of a State

famed till very recently chiefly for its picturesque barbarism. Its sudden civilisation was set down as a mere thin veneer. The ambitious race which gave extravagant orders for naval and military armaments to the great private arsenals of the West, and which framed its army organisation on the German model, was ridiculed for aping methods incompatible with its social system and its institutions. The ridicule gave place, however, to amazed admiration when the island empire proved itself capable of making war with an amplitude of preparation, a fixity of purpose, and a grasp of strategical conditions which not one of the foremost military and naval Powers of the world could have surpassed, and which few of them could have equalled.

Cause of quarrel.

The quarrel between the Governments of Tokio and Pekin arose over the kingdom of Korea. The Korean peninsula formed a semi-independent State. Its people had scarcely any pretensions to real civilisation, and to European travellers the country was very little known. Its Government was a squalid form of despotism. But its mineral and agricultural wealth, and its long coast-line indented with many excellent natural harbours, caused it to be coveted by its powerful neighbours. The rival empires of the Far East have indeed been disputing over it for centuries, and it has been one cause of the historical vendetta between the Chinese and

the people of Japan which dates back almost to the days of Timour.

Korea as a theatre of war.

The sketch at the end of the chapter shows the position of Korea relatively to the belligerents. It will be seen that its frontier coincides with that of the Celestial empire. It is separated from the Japanese archipelago by a stretch of ocean broader than the British Channel at its widest part. Being the bone of contention between the antagonists, it naturally became the goal of the fighting forces of both of them. And the fact that it was in contact with the territories of one side, while it was separated from the territories of the other by a stretch of sea, produced a singular strategical situation, and one which would have been even more remarkable had not Manchuria, the Chinese province adjacent to Korea, been a vast arid region affording limited facilities for moving troops. The difficulties in the way of despatching an army from China proper to the Korean theatre of war by land caused large detachments to be despatched by sea from Shantung and the Peiho. And the consequence was that for a time both adversaries were engaged in sending their forces simultaneously to the scene of action by ship transport.

Relative strength of the belligerents.

Subsequent events proved most conclusively that the island empire was by far the stronger Power on land. The Japanese soldiers were armed with excellent weapons. They were

organised like a European army. They were drilled and trained up to a pitch of high efficiency. Their leaders were masters of the art of handling troops. The subordinate officers, capable and competent, were fully qualified to control, whether in movement, in bivouac, or in battle, the rank and file confided to their charge. Compared to the forces to which it was opposed, the Chinese army was little better than a rabble, and could not hope to prove victorious in the campaign on which it was embarking. The inferiority of the Celestials to their rivals on land was manifest from the moment that the rival armies came in contact.

But at sea the belligerents were somewhat better matched. China possessed a fleet including many formidable ironclads. Japan trusted rather to cruisers with a potent armament and engines capable of developing a high rate of speed, than to the battleships which had found favour in the Celestial empire. Both navies represented fighting forces, respectable even when judged by the Western standard. It was certain from the outset that neither one side nor the other would win for itself maritime preponderance without a fight, and there seemed every probability that naval tactics would help considerably to decide how the struggle was to end.

The actual rupture occurred in July 1894. At

Commencement of hostilities.

this time the rival empires had each a military force assembled in Korea. The Japanese troops were encamped in and round the capital, Seoul; the Chinese had a detachment at Asan, farther south, and were assembling an army near the Yalu river to meet eventualities. The first overt act of hostility of the campaign was brought about by an attempt on the part of the Celestials to reinforce their weakly force assembled at Asan. A transport proceeding under escort from Wei-hai-wei to the Korean coast with troops on board encountered some Japanese cruisers. An action ensued. The transport was sunk, involving serious loss of life, and the convoying vessels were dispersed and fled to Chinese waters. This initial triumph was quickly followed up. The Japanese force at Seoul marched for Asan and scattered the opposing troops collected there like chaff, and the islanders thus firmly established themselves in the heart of the peninsula which was the subject of dispute by a few determined acts which promised well for further action.

There followed an apparent lull in warlike operations. Six weeks passed without another fight. The Japanese fleet spent the greater part of August in cruising defiantly off the Chinese coast, engaging the attention of the hostile navy which was very ill prepared for such a very sudden crisis. At the time these operations in the Yellow Sea

seemed somewhat objectless, but in reality they were undertaken with a definite and most important purpose. Their design was to cloak the movement of a great field army from the Japanese ports to the Korean shores, and in this the efforts of the cruiser squadron were signally successful. A constant stream of troops poured across the intervening channel towards the theatre of war meeting with no interruption from the Chinese ships of war. Chemulpo and Gensan were the chief landing-places. Numbers of transports had been brought up for the purpose. The whole transaction was performed with a celerity and a precision which left nothing to be desired. And the strategists at Tokio must be given credit for a confidence and foresight of no common order in that they thus despatched their soldiery across the ocean while the question of maritime command remained unsettled.

The Japanese War Office had taken stock of the situation around the Yellow Sea, and appreciated the hostile military forces at their proper value. Close observation of the Celestial empire, and a careful survey of its organisation for war, had convinced the astute islanders that any force which the enemy could put into the field in Korea must crumble up before the onset of their troops. They therefore framed their plans in a happy spirit of audacity, which, however, was coupled

with scrupulous attention to details. At first Japan was entirely occupied with the task of concentrating an army in the theatre of war, and nothing was allowed to interfere with this. The Chinese were permitted to despatch detachments by sea to the estuary of the Yalu; the Japanese navy was too busy safeguarding the transports between Hiroshima and Chemulpo to undertake operations in the inner waters between the Liao Tung province and Shantung. And so it came about that early in September the military situation in Korea was highly interesting. A large Japanese army was assembled in the peninsula, partly about Seoul and partly at Gensan. The Celestials had collected a considerable force in the north, of which one great fraction was at Phong Yang, while the rest was nearer to the frontier. Then suddenly the period of preparation ended, and the campaign commenced in earnest.

The Japanese advance. Battle of Phong Yang.

From the moment that they were ready to advance the Japanese acted with an energy and determination in striking contrast with the methodical deliberation which up till then had characterised their operations. They at once assumed a dominant attitude, and moved rapidly forward to attack the enemy. On the 15th of September they gained a most decisive victory. They captured the important strategical position of Phong Yang as the result of a finely planned and executed

combination of war. The place was assaulted simultaneously by separate columns, which had approached the place respectively from Seoul and from Gensan. The Celestial advanced army was utterly defeated and fled terror-stricken northwards. As regards the military possession of Korea the battle was conclusive. It pricked the bubble of Chinese invincibility. And the organisation and fighting capability of the victors, which up till then had been an unknown quantity, were placed beyond a doubt.

Battle of the Yalu.

This blow was promptly followed by another and severer one. On the very day of the combat at Phong Yang the last detachments of the army from Hiroshima set foot on shore near Chemulpo. The Japanese navy was thus relieved from its tedious duties of observation and of escort, and a picked squadron proceeded at once to seek out the hostile fleet and to engage it wherever it should be met with. Two days later the maritime forces of the rival empires came in collision near an island about half-way between Port Arthur and the estuary of the Yalu. The Chinese flotilla was returning from the Yalu escorting empty transports which had been landing troops on the Korean frontier, and was at a certain disadvantage. The Japanese attacked without the slightest hesitation, and a well-contested engagement ensued, lasting for some hours. Although tactically the

encounter was somewhat indecisive, the Japanese undoubtedly gained the upper hand, the completeness of their victory being marred by their failure to follow up the Chinese vessels when these retreated in confusion. The vanquished squadron, partially crippled but not incapable of further mischief, succeeded in making Port Arthur. There it remained, to all appearances an appreciable fighting force, for a few days; then it crossed over to Wei-hai-wei.

But strategically this memorable sea-fight turned out to be conclusive. The navy on which the Dragon throne relied was cowed by the terrible experiences of the day. It abandoned the maritime command of the Yellow Sea to the Japanese cruisers. The battle of the Yalu left the island empire supreme upon the open waters, and enabled it to undertake operations which would have been impossible under other circumstances. No general action on the high seas since Trafalgar can compare with it in influence over military history. From that day Japan's position in the theatre of war was unassailable, and the Celestial empire was at the mercy of an antagonist which it had despised.

Military advance to the Yalu.

After the battle of Phong Yang the conquering army in the Korea—now under Marshal Yamagata, the most distinguished soldier in Japan—advanced slowly to the Yalu, the mouth of the Taidong serving as a secondary base. On the 25th of October the frontier was passed, and the Japanese entered Man-

churia. The vicinity of Mukden to the lower Yalu led to the belief in Pekin and in foreign countries that the invaders contemplated the capture of this ancient city, venerated as sacred by the Celestials and renowned as the receptacle of the ever-accumulating treasure of the Manchu dynasty. But approaching winter rendered the prospects of an active campaign in these frigid steppes most unpromising. The Japanese had, moreover, resolved on operations in another theatre of war. A reserve army, called the Second Army in contradistinction to that of Yamagata which was called the First, had been organised at Hiroshima. Maritime command being now assured, it was resolved to transport it direct to the Liao Tung peninsula, at the extremity of which Port Arthur the chief naval dockyard and coast fortress of the Chinese empire was situated. The scheme of operations was decided upon with the object of wresting that great stronghold from the foe, and simultaneously with the forcing of the Yalu a great fleet of transports appeared at the mouth of the little Hun Yuan river, and the disembarkation of the Second Army commenced forthwith.

The expedition of the Second Army to the Liao Tung peninsula.

Port Arthur possesses formidable land defences in addition to the numerous and powerfully armed batteries which guard the approaches to its excellent harbour. Some miles to the north of it, moreover, the Liao Tung peninsula tapers to a narrow

Capture of Port Arthur.

isthmus, designed by nature for defence. When the Japanese Second Army approached this narrow defile, arrangements were judiciously come to with the attendant fleet that the ships should co-operate with their guns in any combat that might ensue. So feeble, however, was the resistance of the Chinese that the land forces made their way right up to Port Arthur almost unassisted by the sister service. The invaders made no pause before the imposing hostile forts. They attacked them at once, and on the 21st of November they were with very little loss masters of the finest dockyard in Eastern Asia, of the most important naval station of the Celestial empire, and of an ideal advanced maritime base for operating against the Peiho and Pekin, should they decide to occupy the hostile capital.

Advance of the First Army.

In the meantime the First Army was not idle. It was slowly but steadily sweeping forward into Southern Manchuria. Active service in the almost Arctic climate of these regions north of the Yellow Sea presented many serious difficulties. But the tough determined Japanese soldiery seemed to thrive on it. The goal at which the invaders were aiming was the north-eastern corner of the Gulf of Pechili, the stragetical importance of which is manifest from a glance at the map. Once securely established beyond the Liao river, the Japanese would be interposed between the sacred

city of Mukden and the seat of Chinese Government at Pekin, and they would be in a position to direct their operations against either point. During the winter the northern portion of the gulf are closed by ice; but it was foreseen that on the approach of spring, Yingku, at the Liao mouth, would become an excellent maritime base. And so, in pursuance of the plan of occupying this locality, part of the Second Army was despatched northwards in December to aid the troops approaching from the Yalu. In the early days of 1895 the two forces were close together near Newchwang ready to unite and to commence a vigorous campaign against the growing Chinese army in their front, as soon as the weather should grow milder.

The descent on Shantung.

While in Manchuria affairs were thus for a brief space at a standstill, the Japanese resolved to detach a portion of their forces from the peninsula of Liao Tung for operations against Wei-hai-wei on the opposite side of the Yellow Sea. This great naval place of arms ranked in importance second only to Port Arthur. The course of the war, moreover, had given to it a quite unexpected strategical significance, for the Chinese fleet was moored in the harbour protected by the heavy ordnance of its batteries. Its capture meant, therefore, not merely the possession of the second of the two great maritime fortresses of the

enemy, but it involved almost for certain the final destruction of the sea-power of the Celestial empire. The naval forces which had been beaten at the Yalu had shunned the open sea since that disastrous day, and had skulked in bays and estuaries where the prudent Japanese captains would not risk their ships in following them. Still, while they existed, the victorious side could not be absolutely certain that the transports and freight-ships on which its operations hinged were safe when not under escort. So that the design of seizing Wei-hai-wei promised results more far reaching than the mere capture of an imposing stronghold separated from the theatre of operations by many leagues of sea.

Capture of Wei-hai-wei.

The expedition is a capital example of a maritime descent on hostile territory. It shows the liberty of action which a commander enjoys when he engages in this class of enterprise, and it illustrates most forcibly the facilities which exist for deceiving the adversary as to the point of attack intended. The Japanese first made a feint against the seaport town of Tengchu lying some seventy miles west of Wei-hai-wei, and by this ruse attracted to its vicinity a great part of the army told off to defend the province of Shantung. Then they steamed eastwards and appeared unexpectedly at Yang Chung, a place with a convenient beach situated about twenty miles east of the fortress, where there

was only an insignificant detachment to contest the landing.

The expeditionary army was soon on shore, and moved so rapidly that it had arrived close to the land defences of Wei-hai-wei before it met with any appreciable resistance. The enemy strove in vain to arrest the progress of the invading troops. The Chinese quailed before the determined operations of their doughty assailants, and these very speedily gained a footing in the works. A singular situation now, however, supervened. The Japanese soldiery as they rushed the batteries bearing on the harbour came under fire of the hostile fleet. Its commander, Admiral Ting, displayed under untoward circumstances an energy, a courage, and a fertility of resource which almost condones his earlier lethargy and want of impulse. He had sent parties ashore to dismount many of the heaviest guns of the works which bore upon the ships when the enemy approached. His vessels were brought into action against the Japanese troops wherever they appeared. So that although the invaders gradually mastered the fortress from the land side, they found that they still had a powerful squadron under a capable chief to deal with which showed no symptoms of surrendering.

The harbour of Wei-hai-wei is in form a semicircle. It is sheltered from the sea by a com-

manding island, the channels on either side of it being of no great width; this island was fortified, and booms had been constructed across the entrances. Therefore the fleet of Admiral Ting still remained dangerous after the invaders had gained possession of all the mainland works. A maritime attack upon it was by no means easy owing to the nature of the approaches and to the guns upon the island, and bad weather at first obliged the Japanese naval forces to keep at a respectful distance. For some days the remnants of the celestial squadron bade defiance to the great forces gathering around on sea and land. Then the assailants brought their fine torpedo flotilla into requisition to force an entrance to the anchorage, and to deal with the still formidable fighting ships of Admiral Ting. The intrepid night attacks of the Japanese torpedo-boats form episodes as thrilling as any which occurred throughout the war. Their bold efforts were crowned with a most well-deserved success. Ship after ship of the doomed fleet shut up in harbour was placed *hors de combat.* Finally, on the 12th of February, the Chinese admiral proposed a capitulation, and thus the sea-power of the celestial Empire, which at the outset of hostilities had seemed a match for that of the aggressive islanders, ceased finally to be a factor in determining how the struggle was to end.

End of the war.

The capture of Wei-hai-wei was the last of the many triumphs of the Japanese. The position of the most ancient of monarchies had been deplorable even before this crushing disaster. Its armies had been driven from Korea. Port Arthur had fallen. Great portions of Manchuria were in occupation of the foe. The Chinese flag had been driven off the ocean. But now the situation had grown desperate. The navy had to all intents and purposes ceased to exist. The enemy was firmly planted within the Chinese borders, conning over further conquests. No military forces remained which could hope to stay the advance of the formidable invading hosts. Mukden would inevitably be lost as soon as spring approached, should the invaders resolve to violate its sacred precincts. The prospect that this despised seafaring race which had so suddenly become a terror to them might thrust its legions up the Peiho to the capital was staring the Chinese in the face. The Japanese generals might emulate the exploits of Montauban and Hope Grant, and a catastrophe before Pekin might overturn the ruling dynasty. In Manchuria the invaders were on the move again, they had stormed the walled city of Newchwang and were on the Liao River. The mandarins felt that the time had come to ask for terms, and after some negotiations a Treaty of Peace was signed which brought the conflict to an end, on conditions

humiliating to the vanquished, but not more so than was rendered inevitable by their abject plight.

Final observations.

Seldom has a State better deserved success in war than the victors in this singular contest. Each achievement in the struggle — the conquest of Korea, the capture of Port Arthur, the final triumph at Wei-hai-wei—was the result of patient and enlightened preparations. The leadership had been sterling throughout, and characterised by wise foresight and calm determination. The fighting *personnel* had, on sea and land alike, exhibited qualities which won the admiration of all who witnessed the campaign. At the root of the startling successes of the winning side was judicious utilisation of sea-power under varying circumstances, although, except during the operations of the torpedo-boats at Wei-hai-wei, the maritime operations were never of a very showy kind. No attempts were made to imitate in the Yellow Sea the bold tactics of Lord Exmouth when he bombarded the pirate stronghold of Algiers. The Japanese admirals knew too well the capabilities of their vessels and the duty these had to perform for the general good, to sacrifice them in rash ventures against powerful batteries guarding the great naval harbours of the enemy. The task of the fleet was to so manœuvre that the army should be free to carry out the plans elaborated

at Tokio, and the naval forces performed their share in the campaign with indefatigable vigour and faultless precision.

It is true that the strange torpor of the hostile squadrons greatly aided the Japanese navy in carrying out its allotted duty. The conduct of the Chinese naval authorities in the early stages of the war is inexcusable. They made no effort to let the influence of their powerful battleships be felt at the critical time. They allowed the command of the waters round Korea to fall into their adversary's hands, and made not one endeavour to assert themselves. Had Admiral Ting stood boldly out to sea while the island empire was straining every nerve to pass its troops across from Hiroshima to Chemulpo and Gensan, the whole course of the struggle might have undergone a change; he might have fallen in with hostile transports under insufficient escort; he might have fought a general engagement with a squadron hampered by helpless vessels, under conditions very different from the battle of the Yalu. The Japanese had, however, correctly gauged the qualities of the naval forces with which they were about to cope, and the sequel proved the soundness of their premises.

Question of land defences to maritime fortresses.

There was one feature of this distant war which attracted no small attention at the time in Europe, and a few observations as to which will not be out

as illustrated by the war.

of place before closing this volume. The two great coast fortresses of the Chinese realm, Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, both succumbed to land attacks. There is, however, nothing to occasion surprise in the fact that Japan chose to operate against these two principal hostile places of arms with military instead of with maritime forces. The whole naval history of modern times tends to discountenance the attack of fleets upon coast batteries if these be formidable. It is not for such hazardous enterprises that a nation strives to build up sea-power. The modern fighting-ship is far too valuable to be risked in such a cause.

The Japanese having obtained the maritime command, and having resolved to wrest the strongholds from the foe, adopted the only justifiable method of achieving their purpose. Naval supremacy enabled them to bring military force to bear against the land front of the fortresses. The works were taken by assault, and as it turned out the operations involved no desperate combat. But had they been too strong to be dealt with in this unceremonious fashion they could have been proceeded against by the formal process of a siege. It was the collapse of Chinese sea-power which gave significance to the land forts of Port Arthur, and which rendered attack upon them possible. And the conditions which existed in the Yellow Sea will be found to be applicable to

certain other cases where naval dockyards have to be defended.

The question of land defences for Portsmouth, or Brest, or Spezzia, or any maritime fortress so situated that it is safe, or practically safe, from attack by a hostile army which has not come by ship, is one of sea-power. A nation paramount upon the ocean has no need for strongholds safe from land attacks. Preponderating naval forces make any form of fortification other than pure coast defence an anachronism, if the place to be protected can only be approached by an enemy who has first ventured on a voyage across the sea. No State has fleets sufficient to permit its naval arsenals to be unprotected against the raids of hostile ships of war, and especially of torpedo vessels. But land defences stand on quite another footing. It is important that the real and not only the apparent lessons of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei should be learnt in the United Kingdom, where in the military world the technical faddist gets such length of rope. For fortification is a costly luxury, and on the Portsdown hills and by the Tamar and the Plym are to be found monuments of what a false impression of the fundamental strategical laws which govern our existence as a State will sometimes bring about.

The doctrine of the fleet

There is one other point to be dealt with—the doctrine of the fleet "in being." The struggle of

"in being" as illustrated by the war.

the legions of the Dragon throne against the pertinacity, the civilisation, and the maritime resources of the island empire which rivalry of ages had made a hated enemy, is not the first to illustrate in these pages a principle which has of recent years formed the subject of keen debate and controversy between opposing schools of military thought. We have seen how Ibrahim landed his troops in the Morea while the Greek mariners were idling in the Cyclades, and how the vast armada of the Western Powers reached the Crimean shores unmolested by the Russian warships in Sebastopol. The movement of a great military force from Japan to the Asiatic mainland at the commencement of the campaign affords us a fresh example of troops being transplanted across a wide stretch of ocean in defiance of a still unsubdued navy. An army, complete in every detail, with an adequate artillery, an efficient transport service, and the hospitals, the pontoon trains, and the telegraph corps deemed essential in European military circles for effective operations, was transported to Korea, while an unbeaten fleet of hostile battleships was "in being" in the Yellow Sea.

When Torrington, after the discreditable encounter close to Beachy Head, repaired to the Thames, it was claimed by his partisans—and the view finds ardent support to-day in certain quarters

—that the presence of his beaten and inferior fleet above the Nore assured the southern coast of England from invasion. Whether it did or not is now mere matter of conjecture, since Louis refrained from any attempt to follow up Tourville's memorable triumph by a descent upon the British shores. The history of war since Waterloo does not, however, support the theory of the fleet "in being," unless the fleet represents a naval force which from its strength, its composition, and the capacity of its commander and its *personnel*, is a match for the warships which the enemy can send to sea. There has not been one single instance, except the capture of the Spanish transports on the way to Chili by the suddenly created rebel navy, of a military expeditionary force on a large scale meeting with disaster while at sea. Attempts of this hazardous nature are rarely made if the enemy have the predominant navy. When the maritime supremacy is in dispute a military commander may commit his fortunes to the deep; but the chief of an army shrinks from a descent upon the shores of a hostile nation unless the enemy's fighting-vessels be unable to do him mischief, or unless their appearance on the scene while the troops are in their transports is so improbable that the contingency need not be taken into account. To presume, however, that a resolute commander will be deterred from risk-

ing a voyage by the bugbear of a fleet "in being," unless that fleet be manifestly a dangerous fighting force, is to ignore the teachings of history.

Conclusion.

Naval equilibrium in a maritime theatre of war is a state of things unusual, but not at all impossible. When it prevails, sea-power is not likely to have much influence upon the operations of the opposing armies. It is when the fleets of one side gain the upper hand, or are decidedly superior, that land warfare may be governed by maritime conditions. It has been the endeavour of this volume to trace, through the course of campaigns in many quarters of the globe, how the conduct of armies in the field is often dependent on preponderance at sea. And it is fortunate that of the many notable struggles which have taken place since the downfall of Napoleon the final one should have been marked by such singularly harmonious co-operation between the navy and the army of the victors, and by the joint action of the united services of the winning side should have ended in a triumph so resplendent for the nation which gained the maritime command.



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
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